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THE CROZER QUARTERLY

July, 1941

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Volume XVIII Number 3

THE CROZER QUARTERLY

Published by
Crozer Theological Seminary
Chester, Pennsylvania

MORTON S. ENSLIN, Editor
RITTENHOUSE NEISSER, Business Manager

The policy of the CROZER QUARTERLY is to present investigations, discussions, and reviews in the field of religion which will prove of value and interest to the professional student of religion and to the layman.

Manuscripts, books for review, and communications for the editor should be addressed
Editor of the CROZER QUARTERLY
Chester, Pennsylvania
Business communications and subscriptions should be addressed
Business Manager of the CROZER QUARTERLY
Chester, Pennsylvania

Issued Quarterly $1.50 a year Single Numbers, 40 cents

Printed for the Crozer Theological Seminary by
THE JUDSON PRESS
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Entered as second-class matter, December 21, 1923, at the post office at Chester, Pa., under Act of March 3, 1879.

Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized December 21, 1923.

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PRINTED IN U. S. A.

THE CROZER QUARTERLY

Vol. XVIII JULY, 1941 No. 3

PREACHING CHRIST IN WAR TIME

WILLIAM P. MERRILL

New York City

THE ONLY way in which I can approach such a theme is with a humble confession of inadequacy. There may be men capable of making clear to all Christians just what their Christian message ought to be in these confused and confusing times, but I do not know who they are. One retires from the world of bombs and torpedoes to the world of thought, only to hear all about him the clash of conflicting views of men of equal sincerity. Two religious magazines come regularly to me, one of which bases its estimate of present issues on the thesis that this war is just a struggle between two rival imperialisms, with little or no moral distinction involved, while the other comes close to identifying the one side with hell and the other with the kingdom of God. I feel sure of the sincerity of both parties, but each of them confuses and irritates me, until there is danger that my own patron saint will be the donkey between the two bales of hay.

All I can do is, with humility and sincerity, to try to tell you what I think about this difficult subject. There is a story that seems to have a certain pertinency: A Highland minister whose church had burned down went to Edinburgh, and called on a leading Scottish laird, to ask for a contribution. Rebuffed by the butler at the door, he stalked in, demanding that the great man see him. In came the peer, indignant at this insolent intrusion. He asked, "Man, do you know who I am?" "I do," was the reply, "Ye're a hell-deserving sinner like myself." He got a liberal donation. I stand before you, a sinner like yourselves, ready to do and say what I can, and praying that it may not be wholly in vain.

It is not easy to preach Christ at any time. It is doubly hard in time of war. For it is not easy to apply the mind and teaching of Jesus accurately to specific and immediate situations. And the state of war is terribly specific and immediate.

The first thing we need is to remember always that Jesus was not a casuist. Jesus could never have been a Jesuit. He did not address himself to this or that particular ethical or religious question, and offer a precise solution applicable to every individual case. If he had, he could not have been what, God be praised, he is, "the same yesterday and today and forever." In the interest of his influence over the ages, he had to refrain from giving specific rules for precise situations.

But I feel sure his attitude on this matter rested on another consideration also. He respected the freedom of the individual conscience. He came, as he said, "not to send peace but a sword." That is, not to soothe but to sting. One of the strongest Christian leaders I know once remarked that the greatest service Christ rendered to him was to be continually stinging his conscience.

It is very impressive, the way Jesus deals with people who come to him with specific questions. In almost every case, he counters with another question; "Lord, what shall I do about this?" "Well, what do you think about it?" Having thus stirred the inquirer to do his own thinking and form his own judgments, Jesus is apt to add a story or a saying, that states the fundamental principle underlying the whole matter, and leave the individual to apply it for himself. On one occasion when Jesus thus threw back the question, and the young man did his best to answer, the record goes on, "And when Jesus saw that he had answered intelligently, he said, Thou art not far from the kingdom of God." It takes intelligence, the best we possess, to determine just what Jesus would have us do in this or that particular situation. It isn't as easy as it seems to answer the question, "What would Jesus do?" He is as far as possible from being a sort of Emily Post on ethical and religious questions.

Even when Jesus seems to come nearest to specific rules, he really stresses general principles. Peter asks how often he shall forgive his brother. "Until seven times?" Seven is the perfect number. If that is not right, he wants to be told how far he must go in forgiveness. Well, Jesus gives him a definite number, "Until seventy times seven." But does anyone suppose that, because he has thus given a precise number, Jesus really expects Peter to list in his diary the times he forgives, one, two, three, on till he has reached four hundred and ninety? It is just his human, almost playful, way of saying, "Forgiveness can have no limits."

True Christianity follows its Lord in this. Paul wrote to the church at Rome, "Him that is weak in the faith receive ye; but not for decision of scruples." That is, take in the weak brother, but don't try to settle his questions of conscience. Make him do that for himself, and so help him to grow out of his weakness. The church in Corinth sent a lot of specific questions to Paul; and he tried, in his letters to the Corinthians, to deal with the matters on which they wanted light. But, however helpful his answers may have been in that particular church, they have proved a liability rather than an asset to Paul's influence through the ages. There are many people who dislike Paul, and have little use for him, because of his attitude about marriage, or about the place of women in the church and home, or about the use of wine for indigestion, and other definite matters. All these things form a ludicrously small part of Paul's magnificent

contribution to the thought and practice of Christianity. But we honor and understand all the better the steadfast refusal of the Lord Jesus to play the part of casuist when we note the effect Paul's few efforts in that direction have had on his reputation and influence.

Does not this mean that if one is really to preach Christ, really to be a minister of Christ and his gospel, he must be careful to maintain something of this attitude, this steady devotion to ideals and principles, this caution and reserve in attempting to tell people just how to apply them? Of course that inevitably exposes the preacher to the easy charge of being a "generalizer," of never "getting down to brass tacks." It also exposes him to the danger of evading issues that have deep ethical and spiritual significance, of dwelling in a dream world, of following Plato or À Kempis rather than Jesus.

Let no one of us preachers forget for a moment that the Lord we profess to follow was put to death as a public nuisance after a very short career as preacher of the kingdom of God. I am not pleading with you or myself that we become bland expositors of general principles, not really meant to be applied. I am only trying to guard against the temptation to tell individuals or groups exactly what they ought to do here and there. Let your conduct and example speak plainly; apply the principles of the gospel as powerfully as possible to what *you* do, the way *you* live. Be ready always to give concrete advice to all who will receive it. But be sure to say, as Paul did, "This is what *I* say, not the Lord."

We need to keep our eyes open, and our minds alert, to two extreme possibilities, connected with this attitude of Jesus. It is easy, on the one hand, to be a literalist, insisting that Jesus did have in mind specific matters, and did give definite rules about them; easy to become a fanatic, as defined by Harnack, "seeing only one redhot spot," to take some one utterance of our Lord as central to his entire gospel. The classic example is Tolstoi, in his exaltation of *non-resistance* to the highest place.

On the other hand, it is all too easy to be a sentimentalist, admiring the beauty and truth of Jesus' teaching, but detaching it from the conduct of actual life. A great Christian teacher once said, "The Bible study of many Christians consists in having pious thoughts while they read." There is quite too much of that. Who of us can plead "not guilty"? I know few Christians, if any, who can face with equanimity the devastating question, "Why call ye me Lord, Lord, but do not the things that I say?"

Jesus announced great principles and ideals. He meant that they should apply to all life everywhere. He countenanced no evasion, no sidestepping, no soft-pedaling. But one of his basic ideals was the supreme importance of the individual conscience, and the individual accountability to God alone. We preachers have the difficult task of setting forth his

ideals without compromise or equivocation, and at the same time not attempting to give precise instructions as to how individuals or groups are to carry them out, or to sit in judgment on their honest efforts so to do. We can, often we should, express our judgment on such practical matters, but always with a disclaimer of authority to bind anyone's conscience. There can be nothing *ex cathedra* about true Christian preaching.

Some may think this an overlong introduction to the topic assigned. It is really an attempt to deal with a basic element in our preaching Christ at any time, an element of special importance in war time.

What should our preaching of Christ stress just now? I give my judgment frankly but humbly. Take it for what it is worth. The best I can hope is that it may set you to studying the gospel for yourself.

First of all, in glad conformity to the mind of Jesus our Lord, we should exalt brotherliness, generous sympathy, our basic unity in Christ, above all partisan issues, all differences of view. Pacifist and non-pacifist alike should keep this in mind. So should all particular groups. It did me great good to note that two of my most honored and loved friends, in articles in the same series, frankly expressing their opposite views about present war issues, were in full agreement in taking as the climax of each article the fundamental necessity that Christians shall exalt our unity and brotherhood in Christ, and keep Christ and his gospel above any and all partisan differences.

I honor the extreme pacifist who stands firmly by his conviction that war is essentially and always unchristian, and that therefore he can have nothing to do with it, or with anything that contributes to it. I confess I always want to ask him how he can pay his taxes in war time, or even in peace time, when so large a percentage of government expenditure is for war preparation. But I honor him. We need such out and out witnesses to the iniquity and degradation of the war spirit and method, just as the abolitionists were needed at the time when slavery was the burning issue. But the pacifist is wrong when he assumes that no true Christian can ever take any other position than the one he takes; or when he lets acerbity get into his utterances and attitudes.

I have respect, on the other hand, for the man who feels compelled to take a stand for the defence of righteousness and honor and freedom, even if that means participation in war. Lincoln seems to me nearer right than the abolitionists. But this man is wrong if he assumes, or implies, that the pacifist is cowardly, or irresponsible; that only those can possibly be right who agree with him in backing the defence of democracy, even if that means war.

Each side can, and each side does, appeal to words and teachings of Jesus and of the New Testament. I have read strong articles and listened

to eloquent speeches and sermons, on the one side and the other, which made much of such sayings, as "Resist not evil," "Put up thy sword," "Love your enemies," and other words of Jesus; urging that they clearly prove that no Christian can have anything to do with war; and on the other side quoting "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," "I came not to send peace but a sword," "Fear not that which will kill the body, but fear that which will destroy the soul," or Paul's strong command to obey the state; urging that these clearly show that the Christian should count righteousness, defence of the weak, and freedom, as of such vital importance as to justify anything, even war, in their defence. Within one month recently two books were sent to me for review, one of which contended that Jesus would condemn any professing Christian who in any way justified war, while the other insisted that no one was really a Christian who did not support Britain in the present conflict.

Now, friends, not even the pope has the right to set himself up as an infallible interpreter of the mind of Christ, much less a plain Christian preacher.

Somehow we must all show ourselves Christians in these hard times by what Paul so well calls, "speaking truth in love." By all means let every Christian say frankly where he stands, what he believes; let him even "proclaim it from the housetops" as Jesus said. But the moment intolerance for the opinions and judgments of others creeps into what he says and does, it imparts an unholy and unchristian color to it all. It is important that the Christian should say what he thinks. It is equally important that he should be generous, courteous, appreciative, toward those who hold different, or even opposite views. True, Jesus spoke scathing words about some of his opponents, but not because of their views. It was because of their spirit, of pride, intolerance, conceit. No Christian should ever forget that the one man Jesus unsparingly condemned was the man who was sure that he was absolutely right, that he alone was right.

This criterion should apply to our whole attitude in war times. I have a profound respect and admiration for the refusal of so many leaders in Britain to let hatred creep into their feeling toward the German people. Professor Baillie told us recently that one can find among the British great indignation, but little hatred.

The preacher can—I think he should—emphasize most of all the one unmistakably clear word our Lord spoke about peace and war, "Blessed are the peacemakers." Jesus does not say, "Blessed are they who are peaceable," "Blessed are the amiable," or even "Blessed are they that avoid war." What he says is, "Blessed are the peace*makers*." And, as an ancient prophet reminds us, "peace is the fruit of righteousness." In the same ancient book one finds a prediction of some one to come whose name

shall be "The Prince of Peace"; and the significant statement is added, "Of the increase of his *government* and of peace there shall be no end."

All Christians should be deeply interested, and all preachers should use their pulpits, in the cause of the *making* of peace, the effort to build a world order in which peace shall be the natural fruit of established justice, freedom, fairness, and coöperation. We cannot remind our people too often that peace can come and abide only as men and nations everywhere live together in brotherly coöperation and goodwill and justice. Peace is not a *Ding an sich.* It is a by-product of goodwill, as the angels sang when Christ was born, "Peace on earth to men of goodwill."

Within a few months of the close of the former World War, I sat in a room with about two hundred men from all the nations of Europe. There we were—Frenchmen, Germans, English, Italians, and the rest. And I remember how I said to myself, "If only the average man and woman in each of these countries could get the attitude of those in this room—no higher than that—war would disappear, and peace would come to stay." It is as simple as that—and as difficult as that. One of the supreme duties and privileges of Christians today is to stand, through everything, for that high enterprise of peace*making*—as Paul puts it, "following after the things that make for peace."

One of those things—perhaps the most important of them—is economic justice and fairness. I was deeply impressed a day or two ago by words written by the leader of one of the biggest and most successful business organizations in this country, who is also an earnest Christian: "Wrongs must be righted, and we must make the natural resources of the world available to all nations, large and small, on a basis of equal opportunity for the development of improved standards of living and of a fuller spiritual and cultural life for all people, regardless of race or creed."

As in the case of the war situation, so in the case of the economic situation, we must be exceedingly careful not to set forth the particular economic views we happen to hold, as if they had a clear imprimatur from our Lord. But most of us need even more urgently emphasis on our duty, as preachers of Christ and his gospel, to remind people plainly and persistently, of what Jesus said about money—how easily it can corrupt and blight the soul, how dangerous it can be to the higher life. On nothing did he speak more decisively. He never said, in so many words, "You cannot serve God and war"; but he did say in so many words, "You cannot serve God and money." Do we remind people of that? War time is just the time for doing it. Wrong and unjust economic conditions are among the most sure and prolific sources of war, now and always. We should speak plainly about this, being careful to base what we say on indisputable fact. A great New Testament scholar has declared that the three dangers

against which Jesus most solemnly warned his followers are worry, money, and selfishness. I wonder how many of us have not at some time or times sinned on all three lines at once: we have worried over not having enough money to indulge our selfishness.

It is one of the plainest principles of the religion of Christ that no Christian can make money a main motive in his life. Christ was no communist, or socialist; but much less was he an "economic royalist." Money is like fire, good servant, bad master; like liquor, always to be used with care, lest it enslave the soul. Christ is more explicit in his warning here than anywhere else. For he saw, and wanted us to see, that the love of money is utterly incompatible with membership in the kingdom of God.

We should make much of the cross in war time. But not chiefly as a refuge, a hiding place, as it is so often presented, making our religion just a sublimated selfishness. In times of personal sorrow and trouble, it is indeed blessed to sing, "Rock of Ages, let me hide myself in Thee." But, in times like the present, if we listen, we shall have to say what the negro spiritual puts so compactly,

> I went to the rock to hide my face;
> But the rock cried out, "No hiding place;
> No hiding place down here."

Jesus did not hide. He stood out, faced what came, and took the consequences.

Preach the cross as Jesus did, as for the follower no less than for the Son of God. It is a time for heroic sacrifice, for giving what "demands my soul, my life, my all." We must not present an easy, comforting, pleasant religion, while the world is in agony. We must take up Christ's message of the cross, and push it into the conscience until it hurts. And that we can never do until we are taking that message to our own hearts, and living our own lives in response to its call.

War time is a time for reminding ourselves and all others that "we must all stand before the judgment seat of Christ." Especially must we emphasize the fact that Christ himself drew a picture of the Great Day of Judgment in which he showed the nations arraigned at the bar, and judged solely by what they had done or failed to do for the needy and helpless people. Nor must we warn the nations only. The *church* must repent and confess. One of our most highminded American poets drew a solemn and terrible accusation against the church, revisited by Christ, greeting him in magnificent churches and cathedrals, with rich music and liturgy; and Christ, with bowed head, hearing above all the hymns and anthems the groaning of the poor. The church officials plead with him:

"O Lord and Master, not ours the guilt,
We build but as our fathers built;
Behold thine images, how they stand,
Sovereign and sole, through all our land."

. . . . . .

Then Christ sought out an artisan,
A low-browed, stunted, haggard man,
And a motherless girl, whose fingers thin
Pushed from her faintly want and sin.

These set he in the midst of them,
And as they drew back their garment-hem,
For fear of defilement, "Lo, here," said he,
"The images ye have made of me." [1]

Leaving home today, I picked up a book I had just bought, and found something that appealed to me. Let me read a bit of it:

Why, then, did men crucify Jesus? What sent Jesus to the cross was not the sins of personal life but the sins of public life. Not such sins as attack and down a man in his own chamber or scar his private relationships, but the sins that attack men when they meet in market-place or parliament and make of our corporate relations dramas of personal ambition and intrigue, dog-fights of selfish passion. . . . . They crucified him because their social conventions were challenged, their social privileges imperiled, their social positions endangered. . . . . In brief, the crucifiers were not sinful men fearing exposure. They were public servants protecting the status quo. Jesus Christ was crucified by the bigotry of responsible leadership and the complacent indifference of the masses.

In nineteen centuries, basic human nature has not changed perceptibly. Nor have the impulses and passions in men's make-up that strut across the arena of public events. The forces that destroyed Jesus are still the most powerful factors in mankind's corporate existence. Still these are the most dangerous enemies of his Will and his Kingdom:

the power of vested interests, political and religious;
the irrational irresponsibility of fear;
the insidious self-deception of ambition, pride, egotism;
the inertia of complacent indifference.

He who has grasped the drama of that man's life has understood human history. He who has made himself sharer in that man's faith has made life's final decision.[2]

Yet perhaps the best part of our preaching in war time will be the presentation of the wonderfully hopeful, indomitable attitude of our Lord as he faced the crisis in his own life, and the fears and questionings of his followers. There is no scene in the gospel story which fits more perfectly into our present world condition than that which shows us Jesus and

[1] James Russell Lowell, *A Parable.*

[2] Henry P. Van Dusen, *Reality and Religion,* The Edward W. Hazen Foundation, Publishers, 1941, pp. 51 f.

his friends sitting together on the Mount of Olives. They are asking him with dread about the future. He tells them the hard, bitter truth, in words that strangely fit our life today: "Ye shall hear of wars and rumors of war; nation rising against nation and people against people; there shall be famines and pestilence and persecutions; and the love of many shall wax cold; men's hearts fainting with fear for expectation of the things that are coming on the earth!" That is what war time means.

But he does not stop with this. He tells them in what spirit to meet this terrible situation. He gives four heartening words of counsel: "See, but do not be troubled; the end is not yet; these things are the beginning of travail, like the springtime; take heed to *yourselves,* that ye may be able to stand before the Son of Man."

There is the message we need, for ourselves and for those to whom we have the privilege of preaching in this time. "See, but do not be afraid." We are so apt either to see, and hear, read the papers, listen to the radio, and be fearful, troubled, anxious; or to shut our eyes and ears, and keep a certain selfish calm by forgetting the sorrows of the world. Jesus says, "See, but do not be troubled." Keep an open mind, but an untroubled heart. "The end is not yet." "This gospel must be preached to all the world, and then shall the end come." Do not say, "Well, this is the end, the collapse of our civilization, the wiping out of all that we hold dear." The end will not come, says our Lord, until the *right* end comes, until the kingdom of God shall come all over the world. God will have his way at last.

Not an end but a beginning. "These things are the beginning of travail." Labor pangs, birth throes, out of which shall come new life for the world. All this, says our wonderful Master, is like the swelling of the trees in the springtime, the beginning of new life. "But take heed to yourselves; do not be overcome with indolence and fear and self-indulgence. So live and work and play your part as to be able to stand before the Son of Man and not be wholly ashamed."

What a message it is! What a leader we have! What a gospel to preach! If any of us have been saying, with Hamlet, "The times are out of joint, O cursed spite, that ever I was born to set them right," let us be ashamed of ourselves as we look at Jesus, the author and perfecter of faith. Facing the dreadful state of the world, we cry with Paul, "Who is sufficient for these things?" May the Spirit of the living God enable us to go on, as Paul did, to say, "Our sufficiency is of God, who hath made us sufficient. I thank Jesus Christ my Lord, for that he counted me trustworthy, putting me into this ministry."

BELLEROPHON SWATS THE GADFLY

MATTHIAS R. HEILIG
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Of all the shadowy characters on the Styx, originating in those early misty epochs through which historic times fitfully filtered, Bellerophon was the most provocative.

I had been walking along the left bank of the Styx for several parasangs, among stately trees which reminded me of our willows, over acres of flowering moss and something which reminded me of our grass of Parnassus, when I reached a sudden rise of ground, on the rounded summit of which, on a marble bench, sat Bellerophon.

He was reading Hesiod. A copy of Homer's poems lay at his feet. I gazed at him awhile in silent admiration. As I approached him I heard him muttering; and soon I was near enough to hear him say:

"Preposterous assumption! unmitigated rot!"

"For what kind of wisdom are you looking in one so ancient?" I asked.

"I was curious to see," he replied, without looking up, "whether those who lived nearer the origin of things would know something about the manner and means by which the things that *are* came out of the things that *were*."

"But," said I, "both Hesiod and the more ancient Homer lived too recently. Modern anthropologists are agreed that man lived fifty thousand years or more in a state of sub-ethical, half self-conscious stupidity before he had the wit to invent the charming bedtime stories known as mythical lore. However, it seems to have been a success from the start. Its popularity was so great that in competition with it, serious drama, history, philosophy, and religion had to beg for a bare existence."

"You are forgetting," said he, "that much of mythology was the primordial effort to record history, the first feeble attempt to express philosophic ideas, and that it was the very matrix of religion—a necessary vehicle for its primitive expression."

"Oh," said I, "then you were not serious in condemning what you found in Hesiod."

"Wrong again," said he. "What I deprecate is the continuation and glorification of myth beyond its period of usefulness and out of its natural sphere. A seaweed is a very beautiful organism in its proper habitat, but a disgusting mass of slime when brought to land."

"Will not men always be 'children of larger growth,' craving the graphic simplicity of . . . . ?"

Bellerophon groaned. "You humans are always falling back upon your patterns of thought, your catch phrases, your categories, your clichés, your clever-sounding words. You observe how people act under certain stimuli and you catalogue the cause and effect. This you call knowledge. It is usually the most superficial observation of peripheral phenomena. You observe individuals of a class who are acting at variance with established norms, and you say the individuals have a 'fixation,' by which you mean 'an excessive concentration of the libido upon some idea or thing'."

"Well," I interrupted, "your ancient savants did not seem to arrive at any clearer understanding of the basic facts in man's psychic conditions, and of the laws governing the manifestations of the libido . . . ."

"That is the reason for their using myth," said he.

"To cover up their ignorance?"

"No; rather, to symbolize their inexpressible ideas," he continued. "The ancient teachers used such symbols as people could translate into proper feeling. But, of course, no symbol, no parable, no word, no painting, no song, no drama, nor representation of any sort can by even the utmost exercise of genius or knowledge convey from one mind to another an exact definition or understanding of a given object, condition, or idea. In other words, reality is indescribable. And this is so because the mind has no means of probing into its ultimate structure; nor has it vocabulary with which to express that which has never been, and can never be, experienced by the senses. In still other words: the more real, vital, and spiritual an idea is, the more inexpressible it becomes. And so it is that religious verities and moral imperatives must be conveyed to the feelings rather than to the intelligence."

"But," I objected, "is not the intelligence the final arbiter? Does it not decide what ideas shall be accepted and allowed to influence the emotions?"

"The intellect makes a brave showing; but the feelings decide the issue at last," said he, and then suddenly handing me the book, at which he had been glancing, exclaimed, "Look at this asinine illustration, designed to show me falling from Pegasus! I never fell from Pegasus! What is the idea back of this?"

"Is it possible," I replied, "that you do not know the rather well-established myth of the Gadfly? Zeus was said to have sent the gadfly to sting Pegasus, with the idea of unhorsing you before you succeed in entering Elysium."

"That illustrates again the danger of extending the age of myth too far," mumbled Bellerophon, more to himself, I thought, than to me. "I have no doubt," he went on, "that early Greeks concluded that, as punishment for daring to wish to enter Elysium, Zeus actually sent that gadfly

to sting the flank of good Pegasus. How right Hecatæus was that the legends of the Greeks are contradictory and ridiculous!"

"What," I asked hesitatingly, "is wrong with the legend?"

Bellerophon smiled. "Hardly," said he, "would Zeus have attempted to make a gadfly contradict its own nature. You see," he added, suddenly facing me, "the gadflies have instincts, and tropisms, and impulses, and stimuli—all worked out for them by nature and contingency through millennia of years. Zeus would not and could not influence the life and determine the particular action of a gadfly or of any other creature. As a matter of fact, no creature excepting man knows or can know what Zeus desires it to do. And man, even when he is reasonably sure of the divine will, can still refuse to obey it."

"The central idea," I said, "seemed to be that because of your presumption, Zeus wanted to keep you out of Elysium."

"The same error," he replied, "as is found in the Garden of Eden myth of the early Hebrews. Zeus welcomes all who wish to come to Elysium, for no one really seeks the celestial abode unless he has a true spiritual sympathy with what is there. Thievish, lying, selfish, murderous, and sensual people know well enough that they *make* their place just what they themselves *are*. They know how bored, or ashamed, or uncomfortable, or frenzied they would become among the gods, heroes, and other great souls."

"I see," I answered weakly. There was a silence for awhile, and then I asked another foolish question.

"By the way, couldn't Zeus have made a strong wind blow that gadfly into the region where you were riding Pegasus?"

"How many times do you have to be told a thing?" said he. "Zeus is law-abiding. He would not interfere with the operations of nature, either in the inanimate, inorganic objects and forces or in living creatures, gadflies and others."

"But," I insisted, "you admitted that he would interfere with human conduct."

"When did I admit anything as absurd as that?"

"You said man is the only creature capable of knowing the divine will."

"So I did; and what do you infer from that?"

"Well," I replied, "what is it to reveal one's will to another, if it is not equivalent to trying to influence that other to obey?"

"Oh, this human ingenuity," he laughed, "which creates a complex system of logic to escape from the tyranny of ignorance, and straightway becomes the slaves of the system!"

"All right," said I, "explain it away; don't try to laugh it off. Ex-

plain how the Supreme *Nous*[1] can have a will toward man and can design a nature which evidently reveals much of it, and yet not use his laws to persuade man to obey his will."

"The Supreme *Nous*," replied Bellerophon, "pays this high compliment to man, that he expects man to try to conduct himself as a really independent creature. To be sure, he is by nature, but isn't by the circumstance of his being a neurotic and hysterical victim of his imagination.

"You have been confusing the functions of similar categories of ideas—a very frequent error," Bellerophon continued, gradually becoming more earnest and emphatic. "You are assuming that the universe acts as you find mankind habitually disposed to act. It is a species of anthropomorphism. You see, for at least twenty thousand years self-conscious humans have been developing their now rather permanent and inherent spiritual characteristics: conscience, moral sensibilities, sense of fitness or the opposite, sense of integrity or its abuse, sense of abstract duty in relation to concrete action, and the versatile sense of honor, justice, love, beauty, relevancy, and progress. Well, as to emotional disposition and intellective equipment men are the natural products of the past.

"These mental powers are considered by men—and quite properly—to be spiritual and divine properties; that is, they are concerned with the nature of reality and the meaning and purpose of life. The employment of such powers—if the rules of reason and logic are valid—is the prerogative of responsible and creative spirits. Now, man is a creative, governing, progressive, meliorating creature. This manifest superiority over his environment dignifies man with a kind of reflected divinity.

"In using what is categorically just, ethical, true, beautiful, and creative of value, pleasure, and knowledge, man knows that he is exercising the natural *authority* of divinity; *and* he knows that the Supreme *Nous* wills the proper use of these virtues. This does not mean that man knows the will of the Supreme *Nous* completely or even extensively, but in sufficient degree. To the extent that man uses and experiments with these powers and elements in the laboratory of his thought, to that extent does he discover the will of the Supreme One. Or, put it in the passive voice, if you prefer: to that extent is the Supreme One revealed to man."

"And," I asked, "is the Supreme *Nous* not revealed in any other way?"

"In no other way," replied Bellerophon, and then added: "The soul becomes enlightened by experience—as man engages in constructive, creative, investigative work—by a certain cosmic spiritual upthrust; just as the trees of the forest develop fibrous and cellular stamina by a biologic upthrust or apogeotropism."

[1] Mind or intelligence.

As I thought about it, that term seemed to me exceedingly significant.

"I believe," said I, "I could construct a whole theory of moral philosophy around that word 'apogeotropism.'"

Bellerophon grinned. "Still addicted to the human habits; still wont to formulate systems around a symbol. Well, go ahead; how would you proceed?"

"Well," I began, "there are certainly contrary forces at work everywhere and always. In general, the one is centrifugal, the other centripetal; one is gravitational, the other levitational; in some spheres one is anabolistic, the other katabolistic. Clearly in man we observe a force, or a whole category of forces, pulling him toward the earth, toward the lower planes of living—mentally, physically, socially, and in every material respect. *Facilis descensus;* and the majority let themselves gravitate.

"These forces which are geocentric are constant, ruthless, consistent, and law-abiding; in fact, they are necessary to the constitution of the present order. Yet man, to achieve his destined status, must resist them or establish a balance with them. They would spell ruin to man, should he surrender totally to them.

"Now, fortunately, another set of forces operates in man. These are the apogeotropic tendencies, which urge and energize man to lift himself and his condition up and above the low level of ignorance, vice, and all that is humanly inferior and degrading. These up-thrusting powers enable him to walk erect, literally and symbolically, and lend energy to those faculties by which he procures the higher values and produces the better elements of a superior life, ever improving conditions in himself and in his world, until finally he finds himself in Paradise itself."

"And," commented Bellerophon, "you are the one who approved of the myth in which Zeus was punishing me for trying to ride Pegasus into Elysium. Tch! tch! How consistent you mortals aren't!"

I had expected no encomiums from him, so I was not disappointed. I said, "I think I have been no more inconsistent than you. You repudiate the myth in one breath, and in the next ask me to interpret myth consistently."

"Why do we waste words on such silly ideas?" said he. "Tell me: do you consider that the myths of primitive people ought to provide the *permanent* bases of religious thought?"

"N-no; of course not," said I; "but I supposed that you .... well .... that you honored them sufficiently to sanction the system of metaphysical doctrines built upon the ideas underlying them."

"That has been done, alas, only too generally," said Bellerophon.

"Is it not true that myths arose out of misunderstanding of actual occurrences or from simple facts inadequately reported?" I asked.

"Many of them—my own included. You see," he went on, "Pegasus was a very remarkable horse—a 'sport,' your biologists would have called him. He was eighteen hands high, very intelligent, and unbelievably speedy and enduring, yet most amiable and loyal. I was riding him around Mt. Olympus; and some pious citizens conceived the fancy that I was aspiring to scale the heights and enter the abode of the gods. They reported that we glided along without Pegasus' hoofs touching the ground."

"I envy you your experience with such an animal," I said.

"He was a remarkable creature," continued Bellerophon. "The truth about him would have been much more entertaining than the absurd legends invented about him."

"Yes," I replied, responding to his kindlier tone; "and yet, I recall how greatly as a boy I enjoyed the mysterious story of your wild flight into the celestial regions. I enjoyed the stories also of Hercules, and Cassiopeia, and Perseus . . . ."

"Such myths," said Bellerophon, "had at least one good result: they led early men to take an interest in astronomy. Everything men know of light and electric rays—electrons, protons, photons, and separated atoms —goes right back through the wild fancies of astrologers, on back to the stellified heroes whose immortal fame is recorded in the constellations." I assented; and he continued:

"And music, art, and literature, too, have been enriched by these childish fables. Milton's great epics, *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained,* contain some of the noblest rhetoric in all literature. *Parsifal* is the greatest collection of sublime themes in a supported grandeur in the musical world. Myth was also a strong political factor. It had much to do with the unity of the early Egyptians and later Hebrews. Still later the Teutons, convinced that the Christian myth was a true revelation of man's miserable plight, and of his possible escape from the devil and his prison by the magic of sacred rites, plus a desperation faith and denial of their deep-seated passions, reluctantly gave up their brutal heroics, and indulged in battle only when they could deceive themselves into thinking they were practicing chivalry or protecting the interests of the church. Heinrich Heine spoke of this in his day. He credited Christianity with having calmed the brutal Nordic lust for battle, without eradicating the savage joy of conflict. The magic talisman, the cross, he said, was rapidly decaying. He prophesied what we have seen. 'The talisman,' he said, 'has been broken pathetically into pieces'; and the old stone gods rising from unremembered ruins, 'rubbing the dust of a thousand years from their eyes,' have leaped to life to bring down their gigantic battle-axes on the Gothic cathedrals."

"In which case myths were not so wise and useful," I interrupted.

"Only because man tried to use them after their usefulness was spent."

"Should they have invented other myths?"

"No-o-o!" thundered Bellerophon; "the time for the serious contemplation of raw facts and undraped reality had come, but men loved the twilight of occultism more than the light. Traditions become very dear; and the birth of a new spirit is always painful and often dangerous."

"But," I began, thinking of the familiar and thrilling history of the Christian church, made precious by many a youthful association, and made impressive by heroisms, authority, and weird prophecy—"but, hasn't the Christian myth proved to be the least offensive and the most successful religious system—the best possible religion for human kind?"

"No one can answer that," he replied; "simply because no one knows how another system might have worked. Perhaps a liberal mixture of Plato, Buddha, Moses, and Jesus, with proper eradication of tradition and myth and fiction, from time to time, as their superfluity was discovered, would have done much better than Athanasian and Anselmic Christianity."

"But, is it too late," I asked, "to get away from superfluous myths?"

"You propound somber riddles," said he. "My guess would be: it is too late. The world became too enthusiastic over mechanical toys, and came to find more joy in playing with scientific gadgets than in safeguarding its ethical and spiritual development. At length, the whole subject of character evolution became a matter of mechanistic adjustment of mind cells, which had inherited tendencies from both good and bad sources. Man, it was said, was inseparable from his past; and he behaved according to inherited patterns; and his most determined efforts to be free were but the inescapable illusions of a futile optimism."

"But," I interrupted, "this conception was repudiated by the savants of the early twentieth century."

"Yes, of course. Heisenberg taught that nature has no intention of being accurate, precise, and pattern-abiding in designing and evolving biological individuals and in planning their careers. The indeterminism which he and his followers postulated gave much encouragement to those who still trusted in the freedom of the will, feeling it impossible to believe in an infallible causation, deeply concealed, like a stubborn Satan, in the nature of materiality."

"Which error, O Bellerophon, do you consider the worse," I asked humbly, "the pseudo-scientific or the pseudo-religious?"

"The latter," he replied without hesitation. "For a sane religious outlook would quiet all morbid fears and yet instil a respect for the moral imperatives. This respect for the categorical 'oughts' is better medicine than all your drugs and rest cures and diet regulations. But human beings will not think soberly about religion."

"You astonish me," I said, "when you intimate that people feel at all concerned about religion. I thought that the generations under fifty had given up their interest in the subject."

"You are not very observing," replied Bellerophon. "The people who *seem* to have forgotten religion have simply pushed the matter into their subconscious mind—where it creates twice as much disturbance as before. This accounts for suicides, nervous breakdowns, sadistic and other abnormal crimes, and the prevailing passion for gaiety and distracting entertainment among people who want to have no reverence for the ethical absolutes and stern realities of spiritual life."

"At the risk of stretching your patience beyond its limits," I said, "I would like to ask you to classify the pseudo-religious myths with reference to their importance as mischief makers."

He smiled, as if he suspected me of being sarcastic; but he complied after a short pause. "There are several categories of myths," he said. "The largest and nastiest group is that embracing the fancies which fan the flame of fear. Every religion has built upon the long-established dread of death. The temptation to utilize this as propagandism, abetted by bad conscience and anthropomorphic ideas of divine justice, was too great to resist. To the grim mystery of death was added the horror of hell. Dante gives us some notion of the grotesque villainies which the Deity was supposed to sanction or even devise as means of torturing ignorant sinners—which villainies were believed in with ghoulish relish by mediæval saints.

"To the extent that the doctrine of hell has been discarded, the fear of the occult and of various substitutes for hell has come into vogue. Long ago it became such a habit to instil fear into youth—as a motive to modest and constrained conduct—that people generally accepted the fear motive as quite proper and natural. Without being urged, they feared everything they did not understand. They feared the invisible, the inexplicable, the uncontrolled, the unpredictable, the powers of nature, the strength of aliens, the uncertainties of health and fortune, the unknown of tomorrow, and the mysteries of night.

"Life was just one series of trepidations and alarms. People feared the consequences of misinterpreting the myths of religion; and they topped their pinnacle of anxiety with a fear of God himself."

"What," I asked timidly, fearing the whiplash of his irony, "what would become of the rash and optimistic hero daring to face the world of today with its furtive fanatics, patriots, gangsters, politicians, exploiters, and robber barons, if he lived a free life, fearing nothing?"

"Jesus is the classic and conclusive answer to that," said he. "But a hero would last longer today, because society, nasty as it is, is not quite so putrid as it was in Jesus' day—thanks to Jesus."

"Then you think," I said, "that people today fall short of the high standard of Jesus' life largely because of cowardice?"

"What else can one think?" replied Bellerophon.

"And," I went on, "this fear that poisons life today is in some measure, you intimate, the consequence of myths built up around the fragmentary biographies of Jesus."

"Incontrovertibly," said he, emphatically.

"In repudiating myth, is there not danger of including—or at least, seeming to include—some valuable truths, such as the existence of God?" I inquired.

"The philosophic mind is not likely to do that," said he. "The mind says: 'How can that be unreal which has created me, unless I, too, am unreal, in which case my thoughts and conclusions are unreal and useless?' Or else it says: 'Which is more likely to be imaginary, this huge universe which the unphilosophic savage experiences in essentially the same way as that in which the most sophisticated modern scholar does, or the ideas which speculative minds, stimulated by hints and analogies and epiphenomenal evidences and the treacherous syllogisms of formal logic, have formulated?' What would be your answer?"

"I should say that the ideas are more likely to be unreal," I replied.

"So should I," said he, and continued: "Well, to use a little of this 'treacherous logic,' we might say: If the universe is imaginary, then God must be deceiving me. The alternative may be that God is only what I think. Indeed, he may be only *because* I think. In that case there is no God outside of my mind; and the God of my mind is subject to me—I am not subject to him. But this alternative is practically invalidated by the fact that I did not create myself.

"On the other hand, if the universe is real (a valid supposition since the contrary leads nowhere), then God, the creator, ground, and preserver of it must be real. Hence he is not deceiving me. Hence he and I are not alone. Which means that coöperative search for reality need not be a hopeless task; on the contrary, it has the brightest and richest promise."

"I see," said I; "and by these confused syllogisms you escape solipsism."

"What other escape is there?" he asked; and having no reply, I urged him to continue with the myths.

"Possibly I should mention those included under what is called 'special revelation.' The prevailing error in all organized religions has been the supposition that God ever would or could speak to man, that is, reveal himself by verbal communication. Men discover God, or awake to his reality and the manner of his activities, according to their merits and deserts as students of fact and law. For, I repeat, the Creative *Nous* does

not reveal himself and his will except in the orderly emergences of his natural world. This 'natural world,' however, includes vast categories in matter, mind, and spirit. The great historic religions and a thousand other puny sects all have claimed that God gave them special truths to cherish and teach. The 'truths' were often as potent and adequate as the authentication and validation of them were top-heavy with presumption and blasphemy."

At this point I interrupted: "If, as you say, God does not speak to man nor interfere with his career, of what utility is prayer? It is evident that men cannot resist the impulse to hope that their cry for help in time of agony or peril will elicit a special providence in their behalf. It has always been a basic article of religious faith. Men have thought that if the gods are of any use, it is in such crises that they can justify their existence. I do not see how you can remove this pillar of orthodoxy with impunity."

"Christopher Wren," replied Bellerophon, "once built an imposing edifice, one important section of which seemed to have inadequate support. The directors complained; so Wren placed two sturdy pillars where support seemed to be required. But he did not let them touch at the top by several inches. However, the directors thought they were touching. It is the same with prayer. Men ought to communicate with the divine Spirit; they ought to meditate upon his laws in a deep awareness of his omnipresence. But the permissible form of verbal worship addressed to the Deity is praise and appreciation.

"Under no circumstances whatsoever ought man instruct God as to human needs or desires; and it is surely brazen presumption to coax for that which God has withheld. Pleas for forgiveness are entirely unnecessary as the soul is purified the instant it turns in true remorse away from its sin."

"But," I injected, "the greatest teachers of all ages have insisted upon prayer in the form of petition."

"It was symbolism, in the age of myth," he replied calmly. "In this age in which men face reality, the soul talks to God as to a great friendly Other, upon whom the soul can depend to respond with all the spiritual machinery of the universe. Prayer is a kind of plugging-in to get and use the eternal and tremendous Power whose dynamos have been storing up energies to last an eternity. Prayer is a tapping of the divine reservoirs of hope, courage, love, and integrity. Prayer ought to be a searching introspection in the presence of God. Man receives from prayer only what he puts into prayer. But that can be a very great deal. God and his universe respond to prayer before it is uttered or thought. One might say: God and his universe are the perpetual answer to all human yearning and

aspiration. The child asks for toys; the mature adult asks for nothing; but he finds renewal as his soul finds contact with God."

"Is not man's whole attitude of seeking truth and spiritual assurance a prayer, a solicitation—made the more importunate by his sincerity?" I asked.

"Quite right," said Bellerophon. "It is therefore necessary to keep one's aspirations pure; and it is unnecessary to concentrate the will and emotions upon specific desires. It is certainly superfluous to spend time and energy describing to the Supreme *Nous* the particulars of your ambitions and cravings. Such a thing is dangerous: it savors of selfishness. No one dares covet for himself anything but that which may be shared by all mankind. If a man seeks first of all the ideal of goodness, everything he really needs will come his way; such is the setup of the universe." After a slight pause he continued:

"But a third and still more stagnating class of myths is that which might be called the 'salvation by substitution' myths. These vary greatly. But they all presuppose that the gods have acted as supermen might act. According to this anthropomorphism the gods have to be made propitious or satisfied by human sacrifice. The logical and judicial character of this monstrous idea captured the barbaric imagination of people, especially those of the Græco-Roman world of the first and second centuries. And, while wholly alien to the spirit and purpose of Jesus' teaching, it has persisted as a stumblingblock to sincere inquirers into this religion, to this day."

"If it is so barbaric," I asked, "why does it persist?"

"Why does war persist? But there is another reason. Not only are men savage and formal, cruel and legal; they are superstitious about a fickle goddess whom they call 'Consistency.' They observed in ancient days that every religion already well-established taught the necessity of sacrifice and atonement. It was an indigenous element in life. Daily routines were replete with repeated exemplifications of this inescapable amenity of social harmony. Today all doctrinaires wish to present to inquirers a system suitable and adaptable to the requirements and tastes of every nation and race the world around. A persuasive claim for missionaries to make is that their religion is a system to which all kinds of people can subscribe since it has elements which satisfy every human curiosity . . . ."

"Well," I interrupted, "what is wrong with that?"

"Only this," he answered: "the proper approach to God is not through an eclectic symbolics agreeable to the majority, but by a faith which trusts the universe and undigressingly seeks and lives by reality."

"But," I replied, "what are the humble, untutored peasants to do? What do they know about 'reality'? Is not religion indispensable to them?"

"Many untutored people have had the profoundest trust in the friendly intentions of God and his universe. And many have possessed an insight into truth and reality as instinctive as the virtues of childhood. The peasant walks by what light he has, with commendable courage, and finds his path growing brighter. We do not expect the peasant to be the discoverer of metaphysical principles. After all, most of religion is practical common sense, brotherliness, and childlike confidence.

"Of course, religion has its profundities. And here is where the philosopher tests his wits. You would not make the intelligence of the peasant the gauge of the philosophic norm in progressive religion, would you? Religious philosophy in its sublimest aspects must be interpreted, if at all, by the disciplined intelligence in its highest reaches. Pure religion does not put a premium upon ignorance. Did men measure the diameter of Antares with first-grade arithmetic? Did men split the atom after a few weeks of high school chemistry? Did the great religions of the Babylonians, Egyptians, Hebrews, and Hindus entrust the formulation of their dogmatic manifestos to groups of simple-minded peasants, who after the day's labors, devoted the fag-end of the day to this easy task of reading the symbols of divine truth in the mysterious depths either of the heavens or of their own fervid imaginations?"

Since he paused here I injected, "To the extent that they did, they made a mess of it."

"Quite true, generally speaking," he said. "Religion in its practical exemplification of goodness and faith is so simple that a child can and does use it. But who is wise enough to know the complete will and intention of the Creative Spirit, or the scope and method of his procedure? Too many mythmakers make their own meagre imagination stand in place of rational application of the surest and highest interpretation of divine purpose. And, therefore, your half-awakened average person is proud to find himself smart enough to be critical of the bungling inefficiency of the ceremonially impressive institutions which claim inspired and infallible authority and sanction. He still loves myth; but he is tired of this ineffectual kind."

"You would include the prophetic myths in this class, I suppose," said I.

"Of course," replied Bellerophon. "And it is astonishing how very plausible the dogmaticians have made the chain of exegetical evidences which has imprisoned pious minds in the orthodox system. They go back to the legend of creation for the first reference to the so-called 'plan of salvation.' The subtle serpent of the garden was called the devil; and he was destined to spoil all of God's splendid work. God's two finest creations go wrong. But instead of correcting the error of Adam and Eve

at once and reëstablishing the idyllic paradise at the beginning, God allows incalculable misery and agony—incident to the so-called 'fall'—to spread for ages, according to the myth. Then, at length, in answer to men's prayers and in fulfillment of various vague prophecies God sent an adequate sacrifice for the sins of the whole world. I know not which to wonder at more: the art and cleverness with which scholastics have kept this blasphemous myth alive, or the blind credulity of the otherwise fairly rational people who have believed it."

"What," I remarked, "would Jesus have said had he suspected that he would be made a party to such a scheme?"

"It would have added greatly to his burden of sorrows," replied Bellerophon sadly; and after a pause he continued:

"Another class of myths might be named the 'grace of God' myths. The heroes of the saintly days of yore seemed to possess charmed lives. They escaped evils, enjoyed powers, and accomplished their designs in an apparently miraculous manner, by, it was said, the grace of God. And, by the same token, the faithful ones today record escapes from the pits their foes dug for them, from the beguilement of crafty tempters, and from the just recompense of their own willfulness, by the same grace of God. The grateful saint, seeing a sinner plunging into ruin and disgrace, breathes a pious thanksgiving and says: 'There, but for the grace of God, go I'."

"Well," said I, "is that so monstrously reprehensible? After all, can one help realizing he has escaped certain common catastrophies, and ought he attribute his escape entirely to his own ingenuity and merit?"

"Hear the special pleader!" laughed Bellerophon. "Know this, O man, you escaped what you richly deserved by the grace of your own wit and chance and the natural constitution of your material environment."

"Oh! so you do not admit any part of what we men over on the Earth called 'special providence'," said I.

"The 'grace of God'," he answered, "if you insist upon that term, should be confined to one category of divine providence, namely, that in which the superior elements of human equipment and the distinctly spiritual potentialities are augmented beyond philosophic expectation and scientific explanation. We observe this in beauty, in value, in spiritual nobility, in love, in genius, and in the sublimities of human emotion and imagination, as well as in the emerging newness and increasing complexity and significance of the ceaseless creativeness of nature.

"It is a kind of long-range teleology, by the law of which, things seemingly take care of themselves and conspire to provide what is needful for abounding careers for all the creatures which nature brings to life. Such a provision is vastly deeper than human understanding and imagina-

tion. It is the concrete form of divine love. It is the all-sufficient evidence upon which to base the hope of finding the universe friendly to the core."

"And yet," I rejoined, "you think this divine love has not the power to come to the rescue of private individuals, to dispense personal piecemeal providences when calamity threatens or failure looms in the offing."

"Your surmisal is quite correct," said he. "Deity does not violate his own decrees. There is no need; eventually the highest and best integration will be established. Some individuals suffer temporal eclipse and apparent ruin, even as the small trees of a forest which are choked and stunted by the giants around them. Many brilliant lights are snuffed out before they reach the maximum of their powers. But the teleology which provided their existence *can,* possibly I should say *must,* also provide the proper eventual sequence. It may be in an intensity of experience which compensates for lack of extensity. Or, it may be in a new experience hereafter in the ocean of universal mind and spirit. We must not forget that we are parts of the divine Mind. Nor, ought we to forget that the light of genius which fails here may be rekindled even more brilliantly to enlighten mankind elsewhere. In short, and to change the figure, an object moves forward in a straight line when set in motion, unless deflected or stopped by an external object. Man moves forward with God's momentum in him. I doubt whether any external force will permanently deflect him."

"How," I asked, "can a man *worship* if he does not expect God to grant his proper requests, most of which concern his well-being and security in body, spirit, and estate?"

"Worship is never real," explained Bellerophon, "except when it is the overflow of the soul in inexpressible adoration. Plainly, this cannot be reduced to ritual and ceremony, to words and music! Artificial stimuli to emotional ecstasy in religion is an escape, futile and dangerous. You do not worship God when you piously fold your hands, bend your knees, close your eyes, and repeat euphuistic laudations, or appeals born of agony and despair. You worship when in utter sincerity of soul you feel a gratitude and reverence and expansion of being which compel you to ascend to a higher plane of living. Lucky is the man who can thus truly worship God once a year during his life!"

"We seem to be wandering from the subject," I observed.

"Not at all," said Bellerophon emphatically. "One of the most dangerous myths in the churches is that which teaches that God delights in formal services, genuflections, offertories, ceremonials, symbolizations. It is not mysterious rituals and sacred festivals that increase righteousness and please God; it is the contrite heart and honest mind."

"You must admit," I said, "that there are some beautiful legends and helpful myths based on the traditional lives of saintly Christian heroes."

"I admit nothing," said Bellerophon, plainly irritated. "You gild these heroes in youthful associations, and they glow warmly and sweetly," he continued, mixing his metaphors badly. "But the pagan Greek loved his Olympic myths just as much, and he found elements which the pagan in spirit to this day find appealing to their classic taste and disposition above the Christian traditions and myths."

"You yourself prefer the Greek myths?" I asked.

"All myths are anathema," he said quietly, and picked up a book as a signal that he was weary of the discussion. But after a pause he added: "The philosophic mind has little time for anything but reality."

Hardly hoping for further comment, I nevertheless asked one more question: "You consider the universe deaf to the mystic longings of man?"

"Nonsense!" he exclaimed, and put down his book. "The universe is overwhelmingly spiritual. The divine overflows everywhere in creation. Just as activity characterizes that which is alive, so emerging purpose and ascending transformation characterize that which is of God. The sensitive soul is aware of this because God wants him to be aware of it. Have you been picturing animal contentment, physical ecstasy, and the prideful glory of social and political preëminence as the goals of life? The universe says to you: 'What now, busy little fellow; look into thy soul and read aright thine instincts.' For these feel not only pall and disgust with the world, but also they feel an urge toward spiritual realization. And these instincts know that there is no frustration in the spiritual realm. So, when failure crushes one's life, nature says to the soul: 'Be of good cheer; God hath planted within thee the power to overcome the world. The kingdom of truth is within thee; live in it, and find inspiration in its supernal realities and its permanent values!'

"That is religion—a constant reference to that quality in the intelligence which is aware of the perfect and the eternal."

As I walked away, wondering what could take the place of exploded myths as an authority and as a ground for the hope of reward for virtue and faith, Bellerophon, as if he had read my thoughts, called after me:

"Goodness is the principal thing; therefore cultivate it. Goodness is religion in action. It must be founded on intelligence and spirituality, not on any supposed supernatural or miraculous pronouncements, nor because of any Plutonian threats or any paradisaical inducements. Goodness must be understood and practiced simply because it is the efficient summation of all the virtues, the all-embracing requirement of man's total nature, the irrefragable and inescapable will of God!"

AN ETHNOLOGIST SPEAKS FOR THE PAGAN INDIANS

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The Indians known as Iroquois, or the Six Nations, constitute an increasing body of North American aborigines numbering over 15,000. Of this number about two-thirds reside in the Canadian provinces of Quebec and Ontario. In historic times they constituted a confederacy known as the League of the Iroquois. Since the Revolutionary War the nucleus of the league has resided on the Six Nations Reserve, Brant County, Ontario, and number approximately 6,000. The tribes constituting the league were and are the Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, Oneida, Mohawk, and Tuscarora. From early times the Iroquois exhibited a relatively high social and political civilization, described by some authorities as precocious. In modern times they are characterized by a progressiveness which has produced from their ranks some noteworthy individuals. The nuclear body has ever been characterized by its tenacity to national traditions and adherence in large measure to the Faith of the Forefathers. The conservatives of the Six Nations Reserve who have resisted proselytism by missionaries of various Christian creeds comprise almost a fourth of this group. They are nearly all literate and distinctly intelligent. Their tenacity of tradition is deliberate and in their own sense a rationalized one. While designated as "pagans" by outsiders, in general they prefer to call themselves "deists." Their religious worship centres around their "church," the Long House, a large communal structure within which their devotions are paid to the Creator, and the sequence of rituals and ceremonials, constituting the annual religious cycle, is performed. The following paper offers an interpretation of the beliefs and doctrines of the Long House people, based upon research made by the writer over a period of some twenty years through association with the Cayuga of the Sour Springs Long House. He wishes to acknowledge his obligations to the religious leader of the Cayuga Long House and especially to Deskaheh (Alexander General), who acted voluntarily as interpreter and mentor. The following synopsis of the Long House religion was submitted on completion to the chief priests of the Sour Springs Long House through the mediation of Deskaheh, who expressed his judgment of the material examined in the following words: "I have read your write-up. I have not found anything wrong, so I have O Ked everything ready for print."[1]

We may note further that about the end of the nineteenth century a "revealer" named Handsome Lake appeared among the Iroquois, who revived the ancient religion, introduced some Christian elements, preached some revelations from the Creator, and codified the teachings, ethical and ritual, forming a creed known among the Iroquois as the Good Word.[2] The accompanying paper professes no other purpose than to present the situation of the Long House in the belief and activities of the Iroquois, as it operates today, for the information of those who do not have access to sources which describe it.

[1] Correspondence, Nov. 9, 1939.

[2] See Arthur C. Parker, *The Code of Handsome Lake, the Seneca Prophet*, Education Department Bulletin, No. 163, New York State Museum, Albany, 1913.

WHETHER or not the agencies of mission enterprise be moved to consider the observations of one like myself, an ethnologist who has engaged in field research in native religions over a long period of years, I feel nevertheless impelled to express some personal judgment on the manner of approach to certain aspects of the Indian mission problems.

From a broad social-religious viewpoint it would be well to reëxamine native creeds for clearer understanding of their fundamental principles, not categorically as "heathenish incantations," but as developments of thought evolved from an age-long experience in spiritual emotion, and in ethical teaching as well.

Anthropologists and ethnologists with intimate field experience have shown themselves to be widely of one mind in the intention to defend the religious liberties of oppressed and over-propagandized peoples. The result has been to express for them with impartial judgment the qualities of their creeds which are seldom made known to other than ethnological investigators. The scan-estimates of native religions of American tribes, not yet out of style, will before long be discarded and condemned, and sounder evaluations insisted upon through objective study. Native religious creeds will inevitably be given a higher rating, eventually to claim recognition for their values in the lives of the people who evolved them. Then the slogan of "tolerance" will sincerely mean something, and the warfare of denominations in the scramble for converts may result in the peace of tolerance. The still undenominationalized Indian groups that I know are rapidly rationalizing their teachings. Leaders among them are arising, and adherents are being gained among those of their race who have tried various white man's creeds. The Iroquois provide an example. Some non-evangelical field workers in research among groups of natives invariably encourage this independence of native thought and conduct. And the effect observed is decided to be beneficial; often more so than the lukewarm comfort of a mission-church membership dominated by enthusiasts whose motives are open to suspicion of insincerity and to sham professions of social brotherhood to which Indians feel they have so long been exposed. Regarded as new intrigues of the many-sided exploiting agencies to which they have become hardened, the well-meant efforts of white leaders are viewed with cold skepticism. As some of the Iroquois say, the "old faith of their fathers" is as good for them as the "old faith of the fathers" is good for the whites. And yet these same Iroquois "pagans" of the Long House have voluntarily incorporated a belief in the divinity of Christ into their own ritual and teaching. They ask us, then, "Why are we pressed to become Christians, when Unitarians, Hicksite Quakers, and Jews are tolerated, if not admitted as Christian confrères?" One answer is that we shall urge their recognition as people professing a

Christian folk-creed, and condemn the partisanship of "racket" apostolization. It would seem time to open the arms of the broad church, not to shove the unenrolled into confusing denominational affiliations. In the Iroquois groups referred to, their own sect of worship is a unit; one happily and ethically well-intentioned and well-understood by them as a legacy from their beloved forebears. Splitting up has direful consequences; and here is another source of the sickness of missions.

A next step in the move to "discuss in an orderly fashion any matters affecting the welfare of Indians and Indian missions" would be for some of us to urge investigation of certain native ("pagan") sects, particularly the deism of the Iroquois Long House, with a view to its recognition, at least, as a Christian discipline. This should lead to cessation of conversional propaganda with its inseparable social-political oppression. Much the same may furthermore be asserted in respect to the fundamentals of the Peyote cult, when sheer and unbiased judgment is passed upon it following upon research into its purposes and teachings. The recent study of Dr. W. LaBarre[3] is an example of the sort of attention which these religious systems call for.

It may come as a surprise to those on the outside who do not know Indian tenets, to learn that many of the leaders of the Long House religion know more about Christianity than Christians know about Indian beliefs. Many of them have attended mission services, some have linked themselves at times with Christian denominations and then seceded. In such cases their dissent was deliberate: not impulsive, but rather the direct result of analysis and comparison between their own belief and that of the Christians. They seldom miss the chance to evaluate the results of the two codes of teaching in terms of their respective effects upon character and conduct.

As evidence for the vitality of the religion of the Iroquois, witness the rather astonishing figures which confront us in examining the reports of the Department of Indian Affairs of Canada between the years 1924 and 1939. The total number of Indians listed for Ontario in 1924 was 20,429; in 1939, 29,907. 954 of these professed aboriginal beliefs in 1924 and 2,774 in 1939, and so were not listed as Christians. This represents an increase of from 5% to 10% of the total, or about 100%. However, since practically all of the non-Christians are adherents of the Long House creed, or deists as they are commonly known among the whites, the increase is even more striking. The Iroquois to whom the Long House is confined numbered about 4,600 in 1924, and consequently the deists comprised about 20% of the total. By 1939 the Iroquois numbered approxi-

[3] Weston LaBarre, *The Peyote Cult*, Yale University Publications in Anthropology, New Haven, 1938, pp. 1-188.

mately 5,500, of which 2,774 or 50% were deists, a relative increase of about 150%.

Better even to consider negotiated religious peace than opposition, for no organized Christian sect can hope to win them with their free will. Once more, if their faith is strangled by oppression or, through action prompted by church organizations professing the Golden Rule, legislated out of bounds, their frustrated religious societies may be counted among the scoffers against all faiths—howling examples of the sickness of missions. The results may be expected; a sadder demonstration of the futility of missions than any yet witnessed to the dismay of the saints. It could not be credited to the passive obstinacy or ignorance of uncivilized peoples but rather to the active obstinacy of the sophisticated. Religious overtones demand full consideration. The faith of their ancestral tradition if broken up and demoralized will, I foresee, leave a deplorable situation in its wake: loss of the will to live, moral irresponsibility, mental then physical sickness, loss of social coherence. The religious tradition of the people is usually a natural growth suited to them. The break with the past has brought crises under which many groups in a like situation have sunk into a mire of dismay and decline. Many mission stations in the East, founded with zeal and ardor, are now mere historical memories, the descendants of converts of two centuries ago, the pride of their mission founders and teachers, but now extinct or dispersed, some even having reverted to pagan cults beyond the Mississippi, others gone to the dogs in the cities.

Let me point out some planks in the platform objectively by a mere rough scan by which the Long House religious leaders might wish, were they ever so moved, to present their case as a reason for their inclusion within the wide circle of Christian fellowship.

> They believe in and worship a Supreme Being: The Creator of the natural universe and man.
>
> They believe that the Creator loves all people and provides for their welfare and expects them to live in gratitude to him, in harmony with each other, to observe his teachings as revealed in their traditions, and to express themselves through obedience and voiced thankfulness which form a major part in their recurrent rituals.
>
> They believe in the continuation of existence after death, conditioned by the deportment of the individual during life.
>
> They believe in the forgiveness of social sin through confession directly to the Creator.
>
> They believe in the teachings of the Golden Rule, carried out to the fullest extent of the letter, without modification prompted by gain, by party advantage, or self-protection.

They believe in the efficacy of appeal to the Creator and his lesser agencies, the nature forces, through prayer, song, and dance (which are all the same in essence).

They believe in four minor spiritual agencies, appointed by the Creator to rule the cosmos; these they call angels.

They believe that one of these agencies, mysteriously called the Fatherless Boy, is in some way identifiable with Jesus. To him they ascribe the mission of teaching the world the Creator's purpose, a mission in which he was rejected and slain by evil people in another part of the world, to return at last to his own people, the Indians, by whom he was received and accepted as the son of the Creator.

They believe in the efficacy of images representing various forces, spiritual and actual, active in the world. They do not worship these images but *through* them, employing them in ritual as visible icons of such agencies.

They believe profoundly in the healing power—spiritual, mental, and physical—of their ritual beliefs and ceremonies, when administered by those in rapport with the Creator and his spiritual agencies, through purity of purpose, good living, and adherence to faith.

They perform ritual ceremonies in gatherings, in the Long House or tabernacle and in the home, which embrace approximately no less than two hundred hours of night and day periods, in the course of the year.

They do not dance in the usual sense of the term, but rather participate in ritualized processionals.

They do not "gamble" in the Long House, but rather perform a "gaming" ceremony by command of the Creator in their own belief, by which the losers in the game are the gainers of spiritual benefits, as though by sacrifice.

They believe in emphasis upon the joy of worship and joy of their faith, as ordained by the Creator; a joy to be expressed outwardly in ceremony and in social amusements in the Long House.

The attitude of humility is recognized as a distinct virtue and takes the form of restraint in acquiring worldly property and in self-advancement, which practices are grounds, in the eyes of the whites, for accusing them of being lazy and unprogressive.

They do not seek adherents from within or without their own groups or among aliens. They denounce ridicule and adverse criticism of others' beliefs and expect that the same consideration be given theirs.

There is no crisis of conversion. The young mingle with adults on terms of equality in the rituals and step into full participation with-

out declaration of faith, without pledges, and without enrollment or dues, by free set of will following upon conviction of faith.

They allow no mercenary factors of compensation to enter into maintenance or conduct of religion. Compensation lies in the flow of spiritual blessing upon those who perform labor and service.

They do not regard the Old and New Testaments to be intended for adoption by them. These are intended for other races and creeds. Their own traditions and the teachings of their revealer, Handsome Lake, constitute their testament. At every ceremonial service, sections of teachings of the revealer, Handsome Lake, are recited and made the subject of exposition and preaching.

Their political and civil officers are both ceremonial leaders and ritualists in the ceremonies of Handsome Lake.

They are not only non-evangelical in respect to their own faith but resent any tendency towards formal organization.

They extoll as major virtues the sentiments of humility, gratitude, submission to the edicts of fate, and reconciliation to the events of nature and life.

They abide by the "code" of the revealer who left them a body of teachings comprising about 130 commandments, admonitions, warnings, and examples, many of which are expressed in parable form.

The arrangement of the creed platform, as given above, represents the aims and ideals of creed of the so-called pagan Iroquois. It should be understood, however, that among these people, as among humans everywhere, individuals vary in the degree to which they live up to the ideals of their creed; they are as prone to shortcomings and failures as are others.

THE BIBLE TODAY: A JEWISH VIEWPOINT

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As WE ALL know, there are mountains of literature, of commentaries piled up on every word of the Bible. So it seems to be incredibly pretentious or hopelessly naive to write about the whole of the Bible in some few sentences in a theological periodical. But I have been asked to do this. So I have to give some reason for accepting this invitation. First, I hope even theologians will agree with me that it is often most desirable to see one's lifelong problems with new eyes quite afresh. It is extremely difficult for the expert to forget all his great and detailed knowledge and to become an amateur once more in facing a subject.

Now on this point alone I certainly am in a far more advantageous position than are my theological readers, for I am not an expert, at least on the New Testament. I am only a philosopher. Thus I have not the slightest difficulty in freeing myself from an expert knowledge which I do not possess. And second: I do not write in any official capacity on behalf of Judaism or of Jewry. What I have to say is the quite personal confession of a Jewish layman and teacher of philosophy before Christian theologians. But I believe that every individual in the midst of the present crisis ought to come to a decision as to his attitude towards the Bible.

I think it is safe to say that when one looks at the whole of the Old or the New Testament, it is impossible to form out of either of them a coherent system of ethics or even of religious beliefs. Particularly since the age of the European enlightenment radicals and moderate liberals of all types have stressed the point that distinctly different or even contradictory teachings can be based on either of the two Testaments. In a fascinating book, written in the decade before the French Revolution, but not edited until twelve years ago, Jeremy Bentham, the great English moralist and perhaps the greatest law reformer of modern times, pointed out that the Scriptures of the Jews could be used for the establishment of a law, but only of a national law. And such a law could be valid only as long as that community which adopted it was able to live on its own national soil. The gospels, however, as he puts it, contain "rather a history of transactions," that is, a set of narratives which cannot be shaped immediately into the form of any ethics or law. So Bentham's conclusion was that the books of Moses contain the fundamentals of a law and an ethics, but not one of universal validity; Jesus' preaching, however, has universal tendencies, but it does not give any system of law or ethics. This or similar criticism has often been repeated. But I do not think that we are obliged

to adopt any of the nihilistic results which rationalistic freethinkers commonly couple with arguments of this kind.

Let us first frankly admit that there are moral and religious trends of thought in the older and newer parts of the Bible which one cannot reconcile with each other, if one merely enumerates them. There is in the Old Testament the full, vital pride in military strength; and there is the contempt and the rejection of every warlike instinct, the great concept of an eternal peace. There is the jubilation over secular glory, and there is the retreat from the world into a pure communion with God. There is the Jewish God and also the God of all nations, the creator and ruler of the universe who cares even for the *Kushîm,* the Ethiopians. There is the national God of the group, and there is the personal saviour of the lonely individual. There is the ambition to be the chosen people; but there is also humility, the humblest walking with God. There is a God of wrath, a jealous God, thinking exclusively of the honor of his name; and there is a God of love and forgiveness, of self-denial and mercy. There is the hope of a day of the Lord, and the growth of a longing for a Messiah, but also the memory of a golden age of bridal days between the Lord and his nation in the past. There is strict obedience to the law and voluntary free devotion to God's will. There is the morality of power and vengeance, and there is the morality of love and universal understanding. There is an overwhelming, high sense of justice and fairness, but there is also blind group egoism. There is a justification of hatred, but also the exhortation to love one's enemy. There is the frank and wholehearted praise of eudæmonism, but also the deep understanding of suffering in Jeremiah, Job, and Deutero-Isaiah. There is rationalism and mysticism. There is ardent optimism and desperate pessimism. The list of these contrasts can certainly be prolonged considerably. Moreover, I believe that similar contrasts are by no means lacking in the New Testament. There can be no doubt that here the gospel of love is absolutely dominant. Nevertheless here, too, a certain aggression is noticeable, aggression against the Pharisees and even against all the nationalist Jews whose father is said to be the devil. There is opposition to the law of Moses; but there is also the assurance that Jesus has not come to destroy the law and the prophets, but has come to fulfill, and that not an iota, not a comma, will pass from the law. There we have the most glowing testimony for peace; and yet the Nazis can refer also to passages speaking of the value of the sword. There are the good tidings of the indestructible blessedness and happiness of the pure in heart; but there is also the symbol of the most cruel and fierce suffering—the symbol of the cross.

The most celebrated European thinker of the twentieth century, Henri Bergson, has made an interesting attempt to overcome the difficulties which

prevent us from forming a systematic ethical teaching out of the Sermon on the Mount. In his book, *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion,* published in 1932, Bergson tried to make clear why the ethics of Jesus is the unique model of creative morality. According to Bergson, the great sayings of Jesus do not fit any rigid code, any rules of a fixed group ethics. Common morality consists only of such final commands dictated by the collective will of a larger or smaller community. In it we are exposed to the pressure of imperatives which are imposed upon us by a closed society. But in the gospels breathes a quite different ethical spirit. Here we are no longer subject to the collective will of a closed group. Here we are taught how to open ourselves for universal love, for the love of mankind. In Christian teaching we meet no longer with strict, definite rules, but with education for an infinite love. Here we are freed from the burden of any vigorous moral regulations and we experience the liberation of the soul for an entirely open morality. In true Christian ethics we are no longer subjugated to the collective will of any group, but we follow voluntarily the example of one individual. We listen to the call of one moral hero and genius. We try to imitate the model of Jesus. We enter the world of the *Imitatio Christi.* So Christian ethics is, according to Bergson, superior to common morality in many respects. It uses no pressure, but appeals to the free following of a great example. It is not subservient to the will of any closed group, but preaches the love of mankind. It does not prescribe a limited, clearly circumscribed pattern of behavior, but it kindles the flame of an unlimited power of open, creative, and positive, morality.

And yet Bergson does not deny that his interpretation of Christian ethics is not free from difficulties. He admits that, in truth, the admonitions of the gospels frequently border upon paradox and even upon contradiction. He says—here I quote:

> The morality of the Gospels is essentially that of the open soul: are we not justified in pointing out that it borders upon paradox, and even upon contradiction, in its more definite admonitions? If riches are an evil, should we not be injuring the poor in giving them what we possess? If he who has been smitten on the one cheek is to offer the other also, what becomes of justice, without which, after all, there can be no "charity"? But the paradox disappears, the contradiction vanishes, if we consider the intent of these maxims, which is to create a certain disposition of the soul. It is not for the sake of the poor, but for his own sake, that the rich man should give up his riches: blessed are the poor "in spirit"! The beauty lies, not in being deprived, not even in depriving oneself, but in not feeling the deprivation. The act by which the soul opens out broadens and raises to pure spirituality a morality enclosed and materialized in ready-made rules: the letter then becomes, in comparison with the other, something like a snapshot view of movement.[1]

[1] Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion,* pp. 50 f.

Certainly no snapshot of a racing horse or of a flying bird can ever give an adequate picture of those movements themselves. Every single snapshot view represents of necessity nothing but a seemingly static moment of a movement. And so the seemingly static teachings of the gospels can only faintly hint at the much larger dynamic ethical life they try to build up.

"Such is the inner meaning of the antitheses that occur one after the other in the Sermon on the Mount: 'Ye have heard that it was said . . . . I say unto you . . . .' On the one hand the closed, on the other the open." The "dynamic reabsorbs the static, the latter then becoming a mere particular instance of the former. We should need then, strictly speaking, a means of expressing directly the movement and the tendency" of such a higher morality; "but if we still want—and we cannot avoid it—if we want to translate [the movement of the higher morality] into the language of the static and the motionless, we shall be confronted with formulæ that border on contradiction. So we might compare what is impracticable in certain precepts of the Gospels to what was illogical in the first explanations of the differential calculus. Indeed, between the morality of the ancients and Christianity we should find much the same relation as that between the mathematics of antiquity and our own." In the geometry of the ancients there was not the impetus "which would have made them spring from the static to the dynamic."[2] Well, if there is any truth in such statements, then in fact they confirm nothing but the old profound insight that Christian ethics cannot be adequately characterized by pointing to a number of final commands, but only by pointing to a certain way of life. In truth every admonition of the Sermon on the Mount gives only a limited static picture of an infinitely greater dynamic whole. In this way the Jew Bergson has certainly tried to do justice to the inner spirit of Christian ethics.

But what have we then to think of the Old Testament? Is the Old Testament merely a dark foil in contrast to which the splendor of Jesus' teaching shines so much the brighter? Many Christians in generations past have thought so. And many people think so still. But I fear that by adopting such views we deprive ourselves of most precious gifts which the Bible as a whole can give us today. In any case I, for one, can see the relation between the two Testaments only in a quite different light. I believe that not only the New Testament, but also the Old Testament shows us the way of a creative ethical life. It too represents far more than the closed morality of the group. There are, to be sure, a great number of fixed concrete stipulations in the five books of Moses. Moreover the Pentateuch contains not only ethical prescripts but also sanitary regula-

[2] For the several quotations in this paragraph see Bergson, *op. cit.*, pp. 51 f.

tions and juristic laws. Yet the ethical teachings of the whole of the Old Testament show also tendencies toward an open, universal way of life, just as do the gospels. I firmly believe that it is no mere accident that the Pentateuch is generally called *Torah* in Judaism, and not *huqqê Yahweh* or *Misphpat Adonai* or *Mizwoth Yahweh.* For *mizwoth, huqqîm* or *mishpatîm* are definite, static rules, statutes, and ordinances. But *torah* is essentially a dynamic way of life. *Horeh* and *yoreh,* the hiphil of *yarah,* from which the word *torah* is derived, mean "to show," "to point in a certain direction"; and I think Martin Buber translates *Torah* rightly in German by *Weisung,* that is, "guidance," "showing," and not *Gesetz,* that is, "law." If we take together the ten commandments and the preaching of the prophets, this ethic, too, I believe, is a creative morality and not the static law of a closed group. It does not bring pressure upon the individual by a collective will from outside, but it is open towards mankind and is fully inspired by the will to follow the example of prophetic leaders. It is true that the church as well as the synagogue has frequently transformed its free inner life into a life of rigid regimentation. And even this world of organized religion, of ceremonies, of sacraments, or of other fixed rituals, has its great value. But the Jewish and the Christian way of life shown us in our Bible remains nevertheless something greater than any fixed religious system. It will be forever impossible to capture the spirit living in the two Testaments in any ready-made formulæ. But if one is asked to point in the direction in which this spirit works, I should like to say simply this: In the Old Testament the great, creative idea of understanding and even of loving justice predominates. In the New Testament, however, lives the other creative idea of an all-pardoning, all-forgiving love. And today we have to face again in a far more decisive way than ever before the age-old problem: Do the Old and the New Testaments exclude each other? Can justice do away with love? Or can love supersede and set aside all, even the most legitimate, demands of justice? Since the days of Marcion of Sinope in the second century men have been tempted time and again to eliminate the Old Testament from the Bible and to base the Christian faith exclusively on the New Testament. It seemed to them not only illogical, but even revolting, to have a Bible consisting of two completely different parts and the larger half of their Holy Book of infinitely lower value than the smaller one. All these Marcionites are radicals; and yet there is in all probability great honesty in their radicalism. But I believe it was an infinitely greater wisdom on the part of the church which insisted over and over again—in spite of all the great opposition—on the preservation of the Old Testament within the Bible. Being a Jew, I feel that Christianity has in this way opened the gate wide for an eternally great task for Christians and Jews. Of course, we all

know that those are bad Jews who believe in absolute justice and fairness without doing justice to the preaching of absolute love. And those are very imperfect Christians who believe in absolute love, but hate the Jews because of love of Jesus. What we need more than anything else today is, in my opinion, a true and deeper union of the two Testaments. Though standing essentially on the ground of the Christian gospels, Christianity has taught us never to discard the gospel of justice preached by the Jewish prophets.

If I am not wrong, the profoundest teaching which the whole Bible has for every Christian is not to forget that the world of true love still needs as its basis a world of equitableness and of righteousness. The life of love (*ἀγάπη*) itself becomes endangered, if justice is simply neglected or disparaged. We all have to work to the limit if we are to bring about that substructure of righteousness on which alone the dome of the Christian supreme virtue can rest. To the Jew, however, the whole of the Bible says, according to my deepest convictions: "Your Christian friends have never rejected the Torah. Christians do not deny that we all have to struggle with all our hearts, our might, and our soul for the removal of every wrong in our midst, for the breaking of every yoke of oppression, for the healing of every wound which blind injustice has inflicted. You, Jewish fighter for justice, do not blind yourself to the highest truth that all your labor tends finally to a world in which forgiveness and love can flourish without doing any harm to justice. The crowning of all your long strife for righteousness—what else can it be but the reign of that Christian love which is no longer hampered by the despair of a world crying for justice!"

In this way, remaining a Jew, I acknowledge the highest value of the Christian way of life, as you acknowledge the highest truth of the preaching of the prophets. Such are the lessons which I feel driven to draw today from the union of the two Testaments in our Bible. I may be completely mistaken. But I hope that my Christian friends will not misjudge my ardent wish to coöperate with them to the best of my abilities in the face of the overwhelming dangers which threaten today the survival of the religious and moral heritage of the Old as well as of the New Testament.

PREACHING AND THE WORSHIP SERVICE

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When Amos the prophet preached at Bethel, Amaziah the priest objected in no uncertain terms. "Prophesy not again any more at Bethel; for it is the king's chapel, and it is the king's court." Whatever may have been the social and clerical implications, whatever consideration is to be given the implications of injured vested interests, the incident and the protest still provide a classic example of an ever-recurring controversy between "worship" and "preaching." Subsequent history is full of instances where the exponents of one found themselves at decided variance with the exponents of the other. Opinions and challenges fly back and forth through the highly charged atmosphere.

In the Elizabethan and Jacobean times the sermon was exceedingly popular. The most striking illustration of the vogue of the sermon to be found is in the diary of John Manningham of the Middle Temple. The diary runs from January 1602 to April 1602 and is chiefly remarkable for its vivid picture of Queen Elizabeth's death and its reference to the performance of Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night.* The diarist himself is not a person of special piety, but his notebook contains summaries—some of them of considerable length—of more than forty sermons.

Readers of the diary of Samuel Pepys cannot have failed to notice the number of times that worthy gentleman attended church, sometimes hearing three or four sermons in a single day. He almost always records his impressions of the sermon—apparently his only excuse for being at church, if one omits his strong feminine predilections—but rarely mentions the service of worship. When he does, it further indicates his preference for preaching. For example, on July 29, 1660 he wrote ". . . . the ceremonies did not please me, they do so overdo them."

William Cowper, on the other hand, seems to have disliked preachers and preaching—or at least the kind he heard—if one is to judge from the many witty, but barbed, thrusts he makes at "the things that mount the rostrum with a skip."[1]

While these are selected examples from a restricted period of the past, they are by no means without parallels in every age. The whole subject, if not a new one, is certainly becoming increasingly acute in our day. With us, the sermon is being challenged to justify its rightful place in a service of worship. The preacher is being put on the defensive; he must give convincing evidence for his right to existence and practice. We have not

[1] William Cowper, *The Task,* Bk. II, l. 409.

come to this pass suddenly. There were many "signs of the times." The turn of the century was a period of great preachers and great preaching. These were the days of the revival. Worship was a neglected portion in the services of most evangelical churches. Men's souls were considered lost in the dim religious light of worship, to be revealed only by the levin glare of the pulpit thunderer.

Now we are somewhat repentant. We are more quiet and reserved; we have come to distrust words, even of great men, whether written on "scraps of paper" or spoken from a scriptural text. We feel led to find God for ourselves in the irrefutable chancel.

Back in 1931 Dr. George A. Buttrick began his Yale Lectures on Preaching by asking the question "Is There Room for the Preacher?" Still earlier Dr. S. Parkes Cadman in *Ambassadors of God* had closed that book with the chapter "Preaching and Worship," in which he glorified the latter. In January 1934 Professor Albert E. Bailey discussed in the *Christian Century* the church of the future and, although he proposed many innovations and adaptations, the very significant fact was that he omitted any reference to the sermon. The services of his church of tomorrow were to be worshipful and meditative almost exclusively. Later in that same year the writer was asked to speak at a seminary conference on "Worship." The topic assigned was "The Sermon in the Worship Pattern," and the clear implication was that the subject itself was an afterthought and the speaker would be definitely the attorney for the defense. A few years ago, too, it was seriously proposed in the religious press that we declare a moratorium on preaching for ten years.

The issue is still pertinent. We have been gradually enhancing the beauty of our worship. We have insisted upon a more elaborate order of service. Even our free churches have adopted ritual and ceremony. The very architecture of our church buildings has been changed from pulpit-centred platforms to cross- or even altar-centred chancels. There has been a strong centripetal tendency toward mystical piety and theological anxiety, as against a former centrifugal tendency toward economic justice, international unity, and racial concord. The church service has retreated within itself. Prevailing psychology has been largely responsible for this, together with a social repudiation of the pulpit athletics of preceding generations. The revolt against an unpleasant and unsatisfactory past has found a ready ally in the adventure of a promising future.

We readily admit that there are at least two ways to God. One is the æsthetic and the intellectual, the other is the emotional and the mental. Can these two be combined in the same service for the same individual? Can we unite the expressions of worship with the impressions of preaching —or is it the other way around? Can we join the coöperative, antiphonal

elements of congregational participation with the individualistic, vicarious leadership of the preacher?

Again, for some there is the all too apparent impotency of preaching. How much have we really accomplished by the sermon? What have we achieved in the really great issues of Christianity? Our frequent attitude of futility is well illustrated by an incident that occurred when a Philadelphia Baptist minister was leaving his church after the morning service. His elder son said to him, "Look at your bulletin board." The father looked and read with surprised enlightenment that had not been present when he arranged so to announce his sermon topic—"Dr. . . . . preaches at eight o'clock. 'Who Cares?'"

As if to emphasize this last indictment, there is the frequent drab sermon from a dull preacher in the midst of the most beautiful surroundings. Alexander Pope, the "wicked wasp of Twickenham," one day was shut up to the mercy of a dull and monotonous preacher. He spent his time by writing upon the fly-leaf of his hymn-book:

> I whisper, gracious God,
> What have I done to merit such a rod,
> That all this shot of dullness now should be,
> From this thy blunderbuss discharged on me.

No doubt Charles Reynolds Brown was right when he said, "On ordinary occasions a period of twenty-five or thirty minutes is ample for any sermon. If you have not struck oil by that time, the chances are that you are *boring*—in the wrong place."[2]

Finally, worship seems to be more basic to our nature than is preaching. "The groves were God's first temples" and "in the darkling wood, amid the cool and silence, he knelt down and offered to the Mightiest solemn thanks and supplication."[3] But there was no sermon! Worship seems to strike a higher common denominator of human experience. Our private chapels in schools and colleges, chapels where one may go for personal, silent devotions before an altar and a cross—do these not bear eloquent testimony to the power of worship without a sermon?

Now the inference in all this is that worship is right and preaching is wrong, or, if not that, then the proposition is so presented that we feel we need to defend the sermon and preaching. It does not seem to occur to us that it may be worship that needs to be justified; that preaching does not need an apology. Man worships naturally and effectively, we are told, if only we leave him to his own particular expressions. Very well then, let him worship when and as he wills; the church will give itself to services of preaching exclusively. The hour on Sunday will not force him to

[2] Charles Reynolds Brown, *The Art of Preaching*, pp. 120 f.
[3] William Cullen Bryant, *A Forest Hymn*, ll. 1, 5-8.

conform to a ritual that is foreign to his nature. It will ask him merely to listen to a sermon. Is this position any less tenable than the other? Indeed, one minister in New Jersey deliberately put the pastoral prayer after the sermon because he felt that thus he made the congregation ready to pray! For the same reason there are those who think that the Doxology at the beginning of the service is misplaced because the congregation at that point of the service is by no means ready to praise God. Is it not perfectly possible that the sermon actually prepares for worship?

Really, however, we are not driven to an exclusive determination of an either-or nature. The church service in which worship and preaching appear together is the perfect pattern. The purpose of such a service is not to worship, nor yet to listen to a sermon. The one purpose of the church service is to experience God, to realize the spiritual, to come into a fellowship with The Other, to make available for our daily use his wisdom, power, and abiding spirit.

To this end both worship and the sermon contribute. The unity of the service is not to be confused with the unity of any of its parts, nor with the means of acquiring that unity, nor with the immediate objects of alternate attention. Of course we wish to prevent our service from being a civil war; we wish it to be an artistic achievement in chiaroscuro.

Psychologically the sermon in a worship service is perfectly sound. It is an example of the use of the principle of alternation. Ordinary emotional life is subject to continual oscillation. On the one hand there is depression, restlessness, hesitancy; on the other hand certainty, peace, and joy. On the one hand there is expression, on the other impression; on the one hand activity, on the other passivity. The oscillation is not violent, but frequently the extremes are strongly marked. There is a physiological basis for this. Its presence is too well known and the examples are too common to require illustration.

Suffice it to say that this principle of alternation very definitely applies to a church service. It cannot and must not be composed of only similar elements—that would be deadly monotony. We speak with more accuracy than we know when we say that we "alternate" the parts played by the preacher with those of the choir and congregation; we "alternate" prayer and anthem, scripture and hymn.

One principle of alternation must not escape us. That is the all-important fact that the total object is itself to be grasped through alternate acts of attention and application. Let Professor Hocking say it for us.

> All good things do doubtless belong together; but each good thing, we recognize, is to be pursued separately. The difficulty lies in inferring from the parts to the whole: that is to say, in seeing that the alternation which is obviously necessary as between one partial object and another is also necessary as between all partial objects

and *the whole*. But just this, I think, is what worship means: that the whole must become a separate object of pursuit, taking its turn as if it also were a part, as if it were *another* among the many goods of practical occupation.[4]

If we raise the question of the harm done to a worship service by a poor sermon, we are handling a two-edged sword. The reasonable answer is not that we eliminate the sermon, but that we preach a good one. We need fewer poor sermons, heaven knows; but not necessarily fewer sermons! It must never be said of us as of Israel: "Now for a long season Israel hath been without the true God and without a teaching priest."[5]

Here, indeed, lies the real crux of the matter. It is almost a matter of only academic concern whether the sermon belongs in the worship service; it is a most vital matter whether the preacher can hold up his head while he is lifting up men's hearts. A recent church notice in a Philadelphia newspaper announced that "The talk Tues. . . . on 'The Barley Loaves & Fishes' will be given by Jesus of Nazareth through inspirational contact." That can hardly fail to irritate us, or at least leave us mildly amused; but there is something else involved that we do well not to miss. If preaching is really prophecy, as we have insisted, and prophecy is really a speaking for God, then the preacher has obligations that are not to be found in his letter from the pulpit committee! To miss these obligations is to give ample justice to Tennyson's *Northern Farmer*.

Preaching and the sermon have provided us with such proverbial expressions as "Now don't start preaching," "As dull as a sermon," "As prosy as a preacher." The Protestant minister on the stage is a pathetic caricature. He has become "an inoffensive little man jostled by the crowd and wearing the expression of a startled rabbit. With one hand he holds a circular hat on a bewildered head and with the other desperately clutches an umbrella."[6] It is not necessary to be a pulpit genius or mental giant to counteract that picture—the humble, sincere village parson of Goldsmith did it. Many an objection to the sermon in a worship service takes its origin in the person of the preacher. It is not without deep significance that the congregations that have heard—and still hear—the sermons of great preachers never even know that the question exists.

In the last analysis, however, the sermon's the thing whereby we'll catch the conscience of the church. Sermons must not be tawdry and boisterous, frivolous and fantastic, theatrical and common. Preaching ought not to be polemical; it is better to let sleeping dogmas lie. When the sermon is a self-conscious effort for literary style, the belittling of a

[4] William E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 405.
[5] II Chron. 15: 3.
[6] George Buttrick, *Jesus Came Preaching*, p. 4.

belief, or the belaboring of an opponent, it comes not from the chancel, but suspiciously from the knave. Men are opening their hearts and minds to us today, and they are less interested in a display of pyrotechnics and far more vitally concerned with the warmth even of a charcoal fire. To warm the hearts of men we may and should use all our God-given abilities.

How much easier it is and is going to be to preach worshipfully to men. In the past we have had to argue the cogency of our creed, the facts of our faith, and the credibility of our hope. Our congregations endured us with a blasé attitude or a mood of world-weariness. To them God was an ancient fable, worship a delusion, and religion a defense-mechanism. To be a good or religious man was to be either a hypocrite or an opportunist. To believe in the goodness of God was to be lamentably mid-Victorian, and to believe in the badness of man was commendably late-Georgian.

We are emerging from that. It is demanded of us that we preach worshipfully. "For the preacher, then, and for the hearers alike, the supreme moment in public worship is the moment when the sermon is to begin."[7] At such a moment the preacher will know also how to answer old Dr. Johnson, who was invited to enter the ministry, but refused, "partly, I believe, [writes Boswell] from a conscientious motive, being persuaded that his temper and habits rendered him unfit for that assiduous and familiar instruction of the vulgar and ignorant, which he held to be an essential duty in a clergyman."[8]

A good sermon, far from destroying the values of worship, may be its saving grace. Pure worship may very likely be pure nonsense. "To worship" is better used as a transitive verb, for it is a transitive experience; it must have an object—or should we say an objective? At the gyrations of the Holy Rollers we express holy horror, without realizing that we are actually condemning unadulterated worship turned rancid. The ecstasy of undiluted subjectivism is a perverted exhibitionism. When we charge our batteries too highly, we usually warp the plates! It is well to remember the story

> of a soul,
> A sinful soul possess'd of many gifts,
> A spacious garden full of flowering weeds,
> A glorious devil, large in heart and brain,
> That did love beauty only (beauty seen
> In all varities of mould and mind),
> And knowledge for its beauty; or if good,
> Good only for its beauty . . . .[9]

[7] H. C. Graves, *Lectures on Homiletics*, p. 147.
[8] James Boswell, *The Life of Samuel Johnson LL.D.*, The Modern Library Edition, p. 191.
[9] Alfred Tennyson, *Introduction to The Palace of Art.*

That soul began with flaunting the misquotation that we have so often flaunted ourselves—"Oh worship the Lord in the holiness of beauty!"—and ended by seeing that she had flouted the truth that

> Beauty, Good, and Knowledge are three sisters
> That dote upon each other, friends to man,
> Living together under the same roof,
> And never can be sunder'd without tears.

In this situation a word from the father of Edmund Gosse is most significant. Those who have read *Father and Son* know the story of Philip and Edmund Gosse. It was a story full of parental tyranny and filial assertiveness; the father belligerently conservative, and the son cautiously adventurous. The young man

taught in a Sunday School—and his occasional lament that it was "very hard indeed to walk with Christ" was welcomed by his father as a sign that he was on the side of the Lord. There was nothing so romantic as fighting wild beasts at Ephesus, but he was now, as he remained throughout his life, punctilious to a fault, and suffered grievously at the thought of falling from grace—less on account of the Grace than of the pain to his father. It was uphill work, and no love could make it otherwise.

When he writes that he is "captivated by the beauty of the liturgy of the Church of England" instantly comes the report: "Does worship depend upon soft cadences?" "Is a contrite heart an affair of well-selected phrases?" . . . . And when he expresses his admiration for works of art the answer comes: "Remember that idolatry . . . . pervades, *saturates* Italian and Spanish art and therefore look at all with your conscience wide awake somewhat as we may suppose Paul, with his fine taste and cultivated mind, would look at the art treasures in Athens and Corinth. You may admire what is beautiful, so long as you do not become indifferent to what is wrong.[10]

That last is an heroic sentence! Forget the limitations imposed upon it by contextual exegesis. It overflows that completely. "You may admire what is beautiful, so long as you do not become indifferent to what is wrong!" To that end the sermon is indispensable. It recalls men to activity, awakens them to need, utilizes the accumulated powers of worship, and, best of all, gives divine direction and guidance toward the kingdom of God.

The spoken word is the oldest form of communication. Through the millenia it has been the most compelling form of persuasion. Its personalized transfer of life interests, objectives, and powers has effected miracles of conduct and character. We little need to fear that in the religious service of the church it will ever fail to render its impressive service to religion.

C. Wallace Petty has said it conclusively:

[10] Evan Charteris, *The Life and Letters of Sir Edmund Gosse*, p. 17.

The new sense of the value and dignity of worship among the evangelicals is highly commendable. However, building an open chancel in the meeting-house, flanking it on one hand with the lectern and the other with the pulpit, placing the communion-table in the center of the sanctuary and crowning it with an alabaster cross, for the Protestant church cannot lessen the importance of prophecy. It will rather aggravate the demand for a higher type of pulpit utterance, lest the beauty and solemnity of the background simply accentuate the shallowness and superficiality of the message. The mainspring of our tradition is today, as it always has been, preaching.[11]

[11] C. Wallace Petty, *Today's Jesus,* p. 140.

A FOOTNOTE TO THE GOSPEL RECORD

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At the death of Jesus his disciples were scattered. Yet the continuance of the message depended on the disciples and their converts. Some time after the death of their Lord they were gathered in Jerusalem to preach the gospel.[1] Since these men had left their customary pursuits to follow Jesus, the question arises: How were they supported?

In answer to that question Acts suggests that little thought was given at first to bodily sustenance. But one cannot live by faith alone. Bodily desires must be satisfied. For a while the brethren in Jerusalem kept them.[2] The well-known laws of Oriental hospitality would open the door to the hungry. However, the rapid growth of the group[3] and the addition of visitors from beyond the borders of Palestine[4] created problems for the local group. It will be granted that the Jerusalem fellowship shared their goods.[5] Yet some means of distribution must be established. It was this problem that led to the formal organization of the Jerusalem church.[6] The incident of Ananias and Sapphira[7] and the martyrdom of Stephen[8] belong to this sequence of events. The remark at the Beautiful Gate[9] reflects the condition and reminds us that the disciples were dependents.

Obviously a scheme of self-dependence within a group will work only so long as two forces operate. Either the hope of the group is realised—in this case the end of the age—or additional resources must be added. These may come from the immediate locale, or from new groups developed elsewhere, yet associated with the original group. The latter happened with the Jerusalem church. When, due to persecution, the limits of growth within the Judean vicinity were almost reached, there were other groups being formed.[10] These, as is evident from Acts 15, were affiliated by bonds of fellowship with Jerusalem. But mounting problems of administration detracted from the task of preaching. With the advice and consent of the church the "twelve"[11] were set apart to the ministry of preaching. So the disciples, having left their former means of livelihood, began another, supported by their adherents.

Does this supported ministry have any effect on the future content of the gospel message? If so, it will be reflected in the writings of an out-

[1] Acts 1: 12, 15; 2: 5 ff.; 5: 12 ff.
[2] Acts 2: 44 ff.
[3] Acts 2: 41, 47; 6: 7.
[4] Acts 2: 5.
[5] Acts 4: 32 ff.
[6] Acts 6: 1 ff.
[7] Acts 5: 1-6.
[8] Acts 6 and 7.
[9] Acts 3: 6.
[10] Acts 8: 4.
[11] Acts 6: 1 ff.

standing preacher of the period, Paul. If such evidence appears, then it must be considered in the interpretation of those writings. Actually the day comes when preachers have won adherents to themselves at the expense of the church,[12] but whether they do it deliberately is not stated. Lest any think he seeks his own advancement, Paul refuses the support of his converts and expresses satisfaction that he has not baptized the majority of them.[13] He hopes they will think not of Paul but of Jesus. From the church at Philippi he did receive gifts,[14] but otherwise supported himself by plying his trade.[15]

By the time the letters to Corinth were written it is evident that there were preachers who were anxious to make a good impression on their hearers, and with resulting personal benefit. Against them, with their fine appearance, their gracious gestures, and their philosophical idiom, Paul sets his warped and weakened body and his uncouth speech. He writes, "And I, brethren, when I came unto you, came not with excellency of speech or of wisdom. . . . . I was with you in weakness, and in fear, and in much trembling. And my speech and my preaching were not in persuasive words of wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power: that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God."[16] In the reported speech to the elders of Ephesus he says, "I coveted no man's silver, or gold, or apparel. Ye yourselves know that these hands ministered unto my necessities, and to them that were with me."[17] Thus he sets himself over against those who preach for personal gain.

These passages—and many more might be cited—show that for Paul the important thing was the gospel message. It is not the place here to define that message, but to show that he opposed those who held a lower ideal. Opposition met him on many fronts. It may well be that some of it came from those of the Jerusalem group who thought he was not dealing sufficiently generously with them in the matter of the offerings. There was opposition from paganism, as his ministry at Ephesus shows. One can only surmise what difficulties he had with the mystery cults. This sort of opposition which hampered him from the very beginning of his ministry to the gentiles he deals with in a depth of understanding that calls forth admiration. The opposition which provoked his wrath came from the preachers and teachers who followed his footsteps but not his ideals. He knows their practices will lead to abuses. By the end of the century his early opposition is justified, for the Didache and the Epistles of John

[12] I Cor. 1: 12.
[13] I Cor. 1: 14.
[14] Phil. 4: 14 ff.
[15] Acts 18: 3.
[16] I Cor. 2: 1-5.
[17] Acts 20: 33, 34.

reveal the problem of caring for these traveling evangelists and seek to deal with it. For Paul the gospel is a call to holy living, and the person unwilling to sacrifice self for its advancement does not belong in the church. Those who seek to satisfy the desire of the flesh at the expense of the spirit are unacceptable. "I live," he says, "yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God."[18] And again, "I beseech you, therefore, brethren, ... to present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God."[19]

If he makes of himself and of his converts such stringent demands, it is not to be wondered at that he condemns leaders who profit personally from their preaching. It is his opposition to such preachers that evokes some of his noblest utterances. The ethics and theology of Paul are better understood if this be remembered. How much he hated such spiritually unprofitable preaching is evident from the following sentences. "For many walk, of whom I have told you often . . . . the enemies of the cross of Christ: whose end is perdition, whose god is the belly."[20] Again, "For I have no man likeminded, who will care truly for your state. For they all seek their own, not the things of Jesus Christ."[21] And this striking passage, "Am I not free? Am I not an apostle?"[22] Are there others pressing their claims? Continuing, he says, "My defence to them that examine me is this. Have we not a right to forbear working? What soldier ever serveth at his own charges? Nevertheless we did not use this right." And the words preceding and following the quotation are meaningful in the light of the suggestion that his condemnation of these preachers called forth in all its strength his concept of the gospel.

Having hinted briefly at the development of a supported ministry, one may with warrant admit it as an item to be considered in the interpretation of the messages of Paul. Surely it is the background for I Cor. 9, and that chapter lays the foundation for the great outpouring of chapter 13. II Cor. 8:16 ff. reflects the same background. His allusion to preachers "seeking the favor of men,"[23] and such passages as Eph. 4:11ff., 28b; 6:6; Phil. 4:15; I Cor. 16:1ff. portray the same situation. They show either the cause for the establishment of a supported ministry, *i.e.,* the condition of the Jerusalem group, or Paul's opposition to the abuse of that ministry. In either case they suggest that in the study of the letters of the apostle the establishment of a supported ministry is an item to be considered.

[18] Gal. 2:20.
[19] Rom. 12:1.
[20] Phil. 3:18 f.
[21] Phil. 2:20, 21.
[22] I Cor. 9:1 ff.
[23] Gal. 1:6 ff.

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SEMINARY

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THE THEOLOGICAL seminary of today is the outgrowth of the ever changing institutional life of the church. As a school, it is a part of a great educational system; as an institution of the church, it is a part of general church life. Like all human organizations it is marked by imperfections. As a school, it carries the imperfections of the educational system; as an institution of the church, the imperfections of general church life. Nowhere else, probably, can imperfections be regarded as having more serious import to the church than in theological seminaries, for these lie very close to the heart of ecclesiastical life both as to form and to spirit.

The Responsibility of the Seminary

The responsibility of the seminary is indeed heavy and manifold. The prospective ministers of the church come to the seminary at the climax of their career as students. They come with many varieties of individual temperament, achievement, development, and capacity. They come with diverse qualities of fixedness or fluidity of habit and character formation. The task of the seminary is to take the material the churches send to it year after year and fashion these diverse human entities into such ministers of the gospel as the life of the church and the world shall need during their generation.

These young people may well be called the church's chief treasure. They are going forth into places of leadership in the churches. As the seminary shapes their thought and life, it shapes the thought and life of the church for years to come. For, even though the young ministers of today do not easily step into the place of leadership so readily accorded to their forebears of other generations, it is still true that they are going to make places for themselves in the hearts of multitudes. As they think, the church will learn to think. As they fashion the church, they also fashion the Christian home and the children in that home, the source from which will come the next generation of students to the seminary. In a figure, the ministry may be likened to the blood stream and the seminary to the lungs of the physical body. The blood of the body must be kept passing continuously through the lungs to be relieved from impurities gathered within the body and to be recharged with oxygen. So the ministry of the church is continuously moving through the seminary, there to be relieved of ignorance and misunderstanding and filled with the freshness and vigor of gospel truth.

If life would just stay put, the task of the seminary would not be so difficult. But life will not stay put. Life is always thrusting some new thing upon us, and the last twenty-five years have brought an unusual quantity and mixture of the new. This unusual outpouring of the new may not be *The Wave of the Future* as Anne Morrow Lindbergh has delineated it, but it is certainly a wave of the present, and the seminary must live and function in the midst of it. Of course, this outpouring of the new has its sources in the past, and the theological seminary has, beyond doubt, made a contribution to it. In a measure, therefore, the results of its own work are coming back now to make the task of the seminary for today and tomorrow more difficult.

The new is always intriguing and at the same time puzzling. Its relations to the past must be uncovered and evaluated. It must be wisely fitted into the present and made to contribute to fruitful and wholesome future developments. Among Northern Baptists the seminary faces a declining church efficiency at a time when world conditions call for the church at its best. Decreased missionary giving stands beside increased missionary opportunity in our own shamefully under-staffed fields and seemingly disregards the agonized cry for help of other missions whose home treasuries are locked by war. We watch while our Baptist brethren in Russia, Rumania, and other areas endure bitter persecution even unto death, and our response is in every way too feeble. The spirit that took up Judson and made Baptist missions in India, Burma, and China the glory of the nineteenth century, and sent our finest young people by the score to these (then) far-off lands, seems to have disappeared from among us.

For these disturbing and discreditable developments the theological seminary must accept its share of responsibility. There can be no exact allocation of blame, but in so far as the seminary fashioned the leadership of the churches it must bear its share of responsibility for conditions that have arisen under that leadership. Still further, the flabbiness of conviction and of action which has arisen in the churches makes still heavier the responsibility and more difficult and urgent the task of the seminary for the present and the near future. Every breeze that blows these dreadful days calls for searching of heart on the part of God's people, and certainly not least on the part of seminary faculties and administrative leaders.

It needs to be recognized, of course, that the work of the seminary now having most effect in the life of the churches is that done, probably, fifteen to twenty years ago. It takes years for the teaching of the seminary to pass through its graduates into the life of the active church member and there begin to affect the life and work of the denomination

as a whole. It may be, therefore, that the seminary has already so changed its curriculum, methods, teachings, and spirit that the future of the church is amply safeguarded. So now it becomes necessary to consider briefly

How the Seminary Has Tried To Meet Its Responsibility

The most ordinary sense of fairness compels acknowledgment of the fact that the seminary has not been insensible of its responsibility or without efforts to meet it. During the last two decades noticeable changes have been made in various directions.

The curriculum has been greatly enlarged. New courses of study have been developed in old fields and entire new departments have been added. Archæology, psychology, sociology have become familiar terms in seminary classrooms, and numerous courses are based upon the contents of these sciences. Religious education has come to its own and has been welcomed to the school of the prophets. Abnormal psychology is being recognized.

The multiplication of courses has made necessary a larger resort to electives. The student has far more opportunity to pick and choose, and thus shape his studies to his own likes and dislikes (and probably in some cases to his disinclination to work hard). Indeed, this tendency to recognize the student's preference and individuality has gone so far that some seminaries have ceased to teach any "system" of thought, being content to direct the student to the facts and theories and leave him to formulate his own conclusions.

Another development that is in its infancy and will probably assume much larger proportions in the near future is a sort of "interneship," the attachment of the student to some institution (hospital, church, or similar organization) for special study and work under expert supervision and instruction.

In these and other developments the seminary has been responding primarily as a school closely connected with a general system of education, and it will continue to respond in like manner until the fact that the seminary is more an institution of church life than a part of a school system receives due emphasis. It is at least conceivable that some things which bring the seminary more closely into line with modern educational tendencies may not be best for an institution so vitally connected with the life of the Christian church.

The "interneship" has not yet been sufficiently tested to establish its value, but there seems to be in it promise of real helpfulness when properly directed. But the enlarged curriculum and the tendency to defer to the individual are illustrations of good things that have become enemies of the best. It's a good thing to have the opportunity to learn

something about many things. It's a good thing also to give consideration to the temperament and special aptitudes of the individual student. But it is so easy to make the mistake of allowing a smattering of knowledge about many things to take the place of accurate and comprehensive knowledge of a few essential things. And if the tendency to "rugged individualism" in education is carried to the extreme of thrusting upon the individual student the task of exploring the field of Christian thought and formulating his own system in three years, with even expert guidance in surveying the field, then the question must in all seriousness be raised, Who is sufficient for these things?

Do not the students and the churches deserve more consideration at the hands of the seminary than this policy involves? Seminary students may be choice young men, and may have the benefit of four years of college or university training, but can they be regarded as easily equal to the task such a policy assigns them? They can hardly be thought of as beyond the average college graduate in inherent ability, and most of them come to the seminary with but little knowledge of the vast and taxing field of Christian thought. And this policy thrusts upon them the task of mastering this vast and complex field of knowledge and formulating for themselves a workable system of Christian thought and life in three years. And if these young people fail to accomplish this task, then the churches must suffer from their chaotic and ill-considered teaching.

Doubtless there are those who will rather flippantly characterize this kind of thinking as "stagecoach stuff" and will feel inclined to toss it aside without further consideration. But such may well remember that this kind of "stagecoach stuff" still holds the fort in our medical, law, and engineering schools, not to mention others. Who ever heard of a medical school saying to its students, "Come, we'll help you to survey the field of medicine, and you can formulate your own system"; or a law school saying to its students, "Come, we'll help you to survey the field, and you can formulate your own system of law"; or a school of engineering giving a similar invitation to its student body? A serious suggestion that they should send out such an invitation would throw the faculty of any school of medicine, law, or engineering into a fit of apoplectic indignation. Their graduates must go out from their respective institutions with a "system" of medicine, a "system" of law, a "system" of engineering, systems which have been wrought out by others and mastered by the students, not systems hurriedly thrown together by the students, each for himself, after a survey of his field of study. And if we were in urgent need of a doctor, a lawyer, or an engineer, we would all agree with the faculty. And if we do not want a half-baked doctor,

lawyer, or engineer, do we want a half-baked preacher? Are souls of less importance than bodies and possessions?

What Is Demanded of the Seminary?

Life is pressing heavily on the seminary, as well as upon other institutions. It is demanding that needs be met, and that whatever changes in man-made institutions may be required shall be made quickly. Broadly speaking, life today is demanding that the seminary so change its curriculum, methods, teaching, and spirit that every graduate shall possess

1. An accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the Bible. Not of its history and translations, not of the theories as to its inspiration, not of what men have said about it, but of the contents of the book itself. That the average seminary graduate does not possess this knowledge will doubtless be readily conceded. Many a minister, now years beyond his graduation day, blushes with shame when he recalls how limited was his knowledge of the actual contents of the Scriptures on that notable day in his life. And such ignorance is as much a reflection on a theological seminary as ignorance of the materia medica on the part of its graduates would be to a medical school. For the Bible is the only source of the message of healing for the souls of men. Whatever is to be known of gospel fact and truth is to be found there, and there alone. If the doctor needs to be thoroughly familiar with the drugs he is to use in his ministry of healing to the body, surely the preacher should be more familiar, if that is possible, with the material he is to use in his healing ministry to the soul.

The seminary will not find it easy to reshape itself to give the students this much needed accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the Bible. Many more hours will have to be given to the study of the book itself, especially of the New Testament. That means that many courses now dear to the hearts of professors and popular with the students will have to be eliminated. More use will doubtless have to be made of the English Bible. To study the Bible in the original languages in the seminary is too slow a process for most students. Yet no student should be allowed to graduate from a seminary without a working knowledge of both Greek and Hebrew. Every seminary graduate should hold the firm conviction that no translation or group of translations can be trusted to give him a full and exact understanding of the Scriptures, and that he must continue through the years of his ministry to make the original texts his constant reference and guide. This, as almost nothing else, will guarantee a continually enriching ministry to the churches.

2. An accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the human person-

ality. The young doctor must know the location, nature, and function of the various parts of the human body. The medical school that ceased to require such knowledge of every graduate would be instantly discredited. Who would consider for a moment calling the graduate of such a school as his physician? But is accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the human body any more necessary to the doctor than such knowledge of the human personality is to the minister?

It is easy to imagine many saying, "How can a seminary possibly do this for the student? The psychologists are divided into schools that are set over against each other, and no one has won the field, or even bids fair to do so. Surely this is suggesting something the seminary cannot possibly do." But all such should consider for a moment what such an admission involves. For more than six thousand years man's thought and actions have been recorded in history. These records, as never before, are in the hands of the men of today. The scholars of the world claim accurate and comprehensive knowledge of nearly all the physical elements, of the make up and chemical conduct of the human body, of the constituents and behavior of the plants and the stars. Can it be possible that there are so many men in the world who know so much about so many other things, and no men who, examining the records of six thousand years of man's history, can set forth accurately and comprehensively the nature of the human personality? If such an admission has to be made, it must certainly deliver us from the "magnificent obsession" of our great learning and make us humble enough to be taught.

Really, now, to give an accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the human personality is any textbook needed other than the Bible? What type of man is not presented in the Bible? What kind of human experience has been omitted from its pages? Let the seminary give the Bible its place in curriculum and classroom, and a little added effort will give the student the needed knowledge of the fundamental elements of human personality.

3. Skill in the application of truth to life. The severest test of the seminary faculty, as of the student, lies here. Skill, practical efficiency, is something that must be acquired. Some personality combinations acquire it more readily than others. But personality combinations are not within the power of the seminary to give or much to change. The seminary faculty can only accept the student as he is and make him as skillful as they may. And the success of their efforts will depend much upon the student's readiness to coöperate.

Upon the development of this skill depends a man's success in the ministry. Knowledge, great and exact knowledge, is of little practical

value in any line of endeavor without the ability to apply it. Since the minister's work deals with the most important and delicate elements of man's life, it is superlatively important that he be skillful. Let the theological seminary insist on accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the Bible and of the elements of human personality, but let there be at the same time a ceaseless seeking to develop skill in the application of truth to life.

How can the seminary do more in this direction than is now being done? Three suggestions are worthy of amplification. 1. There are still unused sources of help in the Bible. The major and minor prophets are fine illustrations of messages adapted to the times and of choice of occasions for the delivery of certain messages. A study of the Psalms and of their use in Hebrew worship might well save many a young minister from a slipshod, and even almost sinful, use or neglect of hymns. Then there is the skillful approach of Paul to the various churches and individuals to whom he wrote and to the different problems with which he dealt. And above all there is the unsurpassed example of our Lord in sympathetic understanding of individuals and situations, in suiting his message to the person and the occasion, in presenting profound truth in easily understood speech, in being always approachable yet never simply a "hail fellow well met." In him was skill par excellence in the application of spiritual truth to life, and the young minister is not only definitely sinned against, but is left to sin against others, who is not led to a profound appreciation of the manner and method of the great Master Teacher.

2. The theological "interneship" is capable of wide development and should be very helpful in the acquisition of skill. Seminaries that are within easy reach of hospitals, eleemosynary and penal institutions, "homes," "cures," etc., a number of outstanding city churches and rural parishes may be able to arrange for their students to work in these institutions during the senior year, choice of institution being made on the basis of the student's desire and adaptability. Or it may be better for the seminaries to follow the medical schools and insist on a fourth year of work in such institutions after graduation. Such experience would not, of course, be of equal value to all young ministers, but it should be very profitable to every one of them. And when one considers the almost utter lack of experience of the average seminary graduate in dealing with the physically and mentally sick and the home conditions arising from such afflictions, it does seem imperative that further training under competent supervision be given along these lines.

3. The seminary should seek to impress on every student the fact that the Holy Spirit is to be recognized as a transforming and guiding

power in his life. To some, one fears to altogether too many, a statement of this nature will appear but a pious platitude; yet the statement must be made and emphatically declared to be a sober voicing of truth which no seminary can disregard without great wrong to its students and also to the churches they may serve. The transforming and guiding power of the Holy Spirit is not only firmly embedded in the New Testament, but it is too manifest in Christian life to be either discounted or ignored. Why should the young minister go forth from the seminary without being conscious that he may and does have a guiding hand upon him? Are we so afraid of the supernatural that we are willing to deprive our ministers of, or at least leave undeveloped within them, the consciousness of an essential part of their Christian birthright? True, the doctrine of divine guidance is often abused. Almost all Christian teachings are. But the fact that the doctrine is abused simply makes it the more important that the seminary assume the responsibility of so instructing and developing the student that he will give the Spirit of God that place in inner life and outward action that is proper. The seminary wants its graduates to be efficient. The young ministers want to be efficient. The churches want them to be skillful workmen. But the demands that come upon the minister almost daily reach beyond the powers of merely human wisdom, and if the man of God is to be "thoroughly furnished unto all good works," if he is to be as skillful as he needs and wants to be, he must have an inward qualification and direction that is divinely given. To bring to the student a consciousness of this final and abiding contribution to skill is one of the supreme responsibilities and opportunities of every "school of the prophets."

From Off the Campus and On

FEW MINISTERS are more widely known or more universally respected than is William Pierson Merrill. For more than twenty-five years he was pastor of the Brick Presbyterian Church in New York City, of which he is now pastor *emeritus*. A gifted and compelling preacher, a penetrating and honest thinker, he has stood consistently and squarely for reality in religion. Many of the readers of the CROZER QUARTERLY have read his books; all have sung his noble hymn, "Rise Up, O Men of God." The present article, "Preaching Christ in War Time," made a profound impression at the annual Conference for Pastors at Crozer last April. The QUARTERLY is happy to be able to give it wider circulation.

Our readers will remember with pleasure—and many will wish to re-read—Mr. Heilig's earlier article, "Sisyphus Essays Propædutics," which appeared in January, 1938. It is safe to say the present essay will not be easily forgotten. Mr. Heilig is a retired clergyman, now residing in Philadelphia.

Few men are more competent "to speak for the pagan Indians" than is Professor Speck, head of the department of anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania, who knows not only *about* Indians but knows Indians themselves, and is respected and trusted by them. His article should prove of interest to those who find it increasingly difficult to sing with entire abandon:

> Shall we whose souls are lighted
> With wisdom from on high,
> Shall we to men benighted
> The lamp of life deny?

It is with distinct pleasure that we welcome to our pages a Jewish scholar, Dr. David Baumgardt, formerly a professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin. During 1935-1939 he was a visiting professor at the University of Birmingham in England. Since 1939 he has been on the staff at Pendle Hill. Last year he gave a series of lectures at Crozer. During the former war he served in the medical corps of the German Army and received the iron cross. He is the author of many books and essays.

Robert E. Keighton holds two degrees from Crozer and was for some years instructor in English and public speaking at the Seminary. For the past fifteen years he has been the pastor of the Church of the Evangel at Narberth. His insistence that preaching is not a vestigial remain to be sloughed off from the evolving service of worship is timely

and important. The fact that so many sermons are so dreadfully dull by no means justifies a popular but entirely fallacious interpretation of I Corinthians 1:21.

Those of us who are paid to preach may well ponder the implicates of Mr. Marteney's brief paper. Unfortunately there has never been a day in the history of the Christian church when men whose lives were devoted to an unselfish and whole-hearted service of their Lord have not found their influence lessened through suspicion raised by others who preferred to eat from the tables than to serve them. Mr. Marteney has been the minister of the Baptist church in Ridley Park since his graduation from Crozer in 1930. A native of West Virginia, he took his degree in arts at West Virginia Wesleyan.

In the April issue sixteen presidents and deans expressed their views as to the purpose and aim of a theological seminary. We are happy to welcome to our pages Dr. Henry, one of our older alumni, who since 1914 has been a pastor in the far west. His paper, which deserves thoughtful consideration, views the situation from the angle of a parish minister. It is only fair to say that this paper was not written in answer to the earlier article. It had already been accepted and lay in the editor's files a month before the April issue appeared.

This issue contains an especially long section devoted to new books. There will probably be few readers who will not find their appetites whetted for serious summer reading. In addition to those by members of the Crozer faculty we are privileged to carry reviews by five scholars "from off the campus." J. S. Bixler is Bussey Professor of Divinity in the Harvard Divinity School. He will be remembered as contributing a striking paper to the April colloquium. Nels F. S. Ferré is professor of theology at Andover Newton Theological School. He is a member of the American Theological Society and an acknowledged authority on European theological thought. William W. Sweet is a member of the department of church history in the University of Chicago and the author of several volumes on subjects connected with the modern American field. His colleague, Dr. Sidney E. Mead, collaborates with him in the present review. Since 1916 William Kelley Wright has been a member of the department of philosophy at Dartmouth College. It is a pleasure to welcome him back to our pages.

BOOK REVIEWS

From the Stone Age to Christianity, by William Foxwell Albright, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1940, pp. xi, 363, $2.50.

The title, with special emphasis on the subtitle, *Monotheism and the Historical Process,* indicates the general scope of this volume. In presenting a sketch of the history of thought from far off beginnings down to the beginnings of Christianity the author necessarily draws on many widely separated fields of study. The result is an extremely compact, well-ordered compendium of personal reactions on the findings of archæology, anthropology, prehistory, history, sociology, philosophy, and kindred studies during recent decades.

The revolutionary value of the new contributions in materials and methods for historical studies occupies the foreground (pp. 1-47). The necessity of a philosophy of *entire* history is rightly insisted on (pp. 48-87). Then the swift summary of prehistory and the racial world movements in early history are presented, a period of more than a hundred thousand years, all a preparation for Judæo-Christian monotheism (pp. 88-149). Then follows the thesis of the book (pp. 150-311).

Every page indicates the author's untiring activities, and frequently his daring. Crisp interpretations of passing episodes and brilliant insights into values everywhere abound. Admirable summaries of movements win applause, while confident conclusions to age-long problems and the reckless upsetting of the *status quo* keep the reader continually on the *qui vive.*

Notwithstanding the subtitle and the evident intent of the writer, on the whole, this contribution does not bring any lasting comfort to the conservatives. It is true that many phrases and a few conclusions are likely to be used by the unwary as propaganda for a decadent orthodoxy. But the major part of the book, even though that is eclectic, does not lend itself to such a claim.

Conservatives will probably quote phrases or paragraphs from it in support of various doctrines. Even the verbal infallibility of the Bible may gain apparent support by culled sentences. We glean the following: In the traditions of early Israel there is found a "marked superiority" to those of Greece, Rome, and Britain (p. 42). Archæological discoveries confirm the Israelite tradition "almost always, *as far as they go*" (p. 43). "The figures of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph appear before us as real personalities" (p. 183). In fact, there are a great many local and antiquarian details—in the Joseph story—"which would be inexplicable as later inventions" (p. 184). The Priestly Code is also important as an historical source for the Mosaic period (p. 192), and, on the whole, the Israelite tradition is in striking agreement with the results of archæological investigation (pp. 193-6). Even most of the narratives of the Patriarchs (Gen. 12-50) have come down "in substantially their present form from pre-Mosaic days" (p. 201).

Even defenders of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, with a semblance of logic and a little adroit use of texts, may glean a few sheaves for their support. Has it not been proved that writing was in "common use" earlier than the Exodus and was known from the age of the Patriarchs (pp. 192-4)? Were not the stories of the Patriarchs, much in their present form, older than Moses (p. 201)? Was not Moses born in Egypt, where he attained a place of considerable social importance (pp. 193, 206)? Surely he was at least on a level with Zoroaster,

Buddha, and Confucius (p. 196). He was a monotheist as surely as Hillel and others (pp. 309, 207). Then why deny to him authorship of the Pentateuch, which is so firmly attested by biblical tradition?

Yet all such conclusions, justified in part by the vagueness of the writer, have no foundation in the mind of the author. Such interpretations neglect the qualifying adjective or adverb, such as "almost," "essential," "in general," "substantial," "striking agreement," etc., and disregard the whole tone of the book.

The fact is that long ago Dr. Albright's studies thrust him out of the fold of mediæval orthodoxy, and much as his heart may crave it, and his pen may sometimes assert it, there is no way back. While he denounces some phases of a theory of evolution, as though he were the defender of the ancient Faith, it is the foundation and the backbone of the first hundred and fifty pages of his book, which is the story of human progress through two hundred thousand years of struggle, with continuous adaptation, guided only by experience (pp. 90, 126, 82, 88-96). He attacks Wellhausen and his followers, but adheres as slavishly to J.E.D.P., even to dates, as do most Old Testament scholars today (pp. 47, 190, 192, 197, 244). Mosaism is emphasized, but this is not authorship. The creation and flood stories are found in the Akkadian and Sumerian traditions, and must go back to the Mesolithic period—at least 15000 B.C. Many of the laws are recognized as rooted in Hurrian, and some of them in Babylonian practices (pp. 108-112, 180); and while some of the apodictic laws may have emanated from Moses, "we cannot say how many" (p. 205).

So, notwithstanding his championing of Moses, Albright is in agreement with all critics that the Pentateuch had a long and complex history and that it took its present form at the hands of authors and scribes who altered, added to it, and edited it from about 850 B.C. to the late days of Judaism (p. 147). Indeed *Mosaism,* apart from the thesis of the book, is so vague that one finds but little beyond the echo of a personality.

That Moses was a monotheist, not, of course, of the type of Paul or Calvin or Wieman (p. 207), but as much a one as Hillel (p. 309), is the contention of the author. "If . . . . the term 'monotheist' means one who teaches the existence of only one God, the creator of everything, the source of justice, who is equally powerful in Egypt, in the desert, and in Palestine, who has no sexuality and no mythology, who is human in form but cannot be seen by human eye and cannot be represented in any form—then the founder of Yahwism was certainly a monotheist" is the crystallization of the repeated assertions (p. 207).

But frankly this is but the *ipse dixit* of the author, and its foundations are extremely shallow. The argumentation may be summarized as follows: First, primitive man has the "power of abstraction which leads to a kind of elementary metaphysics, most characteristic of which is the long recognized idea of impersonal power or force . . . . which resides in unusual persons, objects, or phenomena, as well as in gods and spirits" (p. 124). Second, following Father Schmidt, he recognizes "high gods among low peoples" (p. 124). Then in the thinking of early civilizations came the trinity: "father, mother, and son" (pp. 127, 132, 187); in the Late Bronze age, a period of internationalism, we find in Canaan, Egypt, Akkadia, and Ras Shamra "something of a monotheism" (pp. 130, 161-164). Later we find in Deutero-Isaiah a true ethical monotheism, which marks the culmination of the "Mosaic movement" as such (p. 250). "Movement" in this phrase is just as slippery a word as is "Mosaic," and the actual value of either one is in-

different. At best, the author suggests that Moses may have written some of the "apodictic laws," but how many is far from certain. There is no suggestion that he wrote anything else. Then where do we find the *teaching* (p. 207) that embodies this monotheism? Certainly not in the "apodictic laws," for no hint of monotheism is there. Certainly not in any of our biblical records that precede the Exile, for no such claim is there. But Albright builds on two facts: the one, that in the fourteenth century B.C. a kind of a monotheism spread over the Near East; the other, that in Deutero-Isaiah, in the sixth century B.C., we have in the Old Testament an ethical monotheism. Therefore Moses must have been a monotheist. Of course an acorn has an oak in it; but it is not an oak in any sense of the word. Such a conclusion disregards the unequivocal tradition of all pre-exilic biblical records and tags on to the priestly theories never expressed until centuries after the death of Moses.

In his enthusiasm to exalt a great leader Albright, like the rabbis of old, has become the special pleader rather than the scholar. Even if the tribes in Sinai were not barbarous camel-nomads, why should their leader be on a par with Zoroaster or Confucius (p. 196)? It is asserted that it is very unscholarly to deny the *possibility* of material images of Yahweh, but on the same page, we have just been told that all such finds are "based on subjective arguments and arbitrary assumptions" (p. 202). Having lost his sense of fairness, he then proceeds to assure us that "the golden calf simply formed the pedestal on which the invisible Yahweh stood" (p. 203), inferring thereby that it was not an image. Later *Ashima* and *Anath,* the consorts of Yahweh in the Assuan papyri, are retranslated and interpreted possibly as "pure hypostatizations of deity" (p. 286). Devious, indeed, are the ways of the propagandist. And again we are asked to believe that the "golden calves" were very dangerous because of "the taurine association of Baal" . . . . "with the fertility cult" (p. 230), while "the cherubim, being mythical animals, served to enhance the majesty of Yahweh" (p. 230). If the majesty of Yahweh could be enhanced by a symbol in the time of Solomon, why not in the far more primitive environment of Moses (cf. p. 207)? If the cherubim, whose origin was as lowly as that of the bull, could take on new meaning with changing conditions, why not the same regeneration of other symbols? A good biblical tradition of the serpent in the wilderness (Numb. 21:4-9; II Kings 18:4) is that it was set up by Moses. Why not accept it along with the major part of the early Old Testament records? To do otherwise is to uproot Moses from his religious heritage, strip him of all primitive concepts, and leave him a ghostly figure in the midst of his generation. As Philo found Greek philosophy in the Pentateuch, so would the author almost persuade us that theologically Moses and Albright were close of kin.

Due to enthusiasm for the theological discoveries of his hero—Mosaism is conceived of as an abrupt break with the past, of evolutionary mutation (p. 86)—not a few statements lie open to question. Space permits us to raise only a few of these. "If we want to know how Elijah and Elisha reacted to the evils of the ninth century, we have only to read what Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah said in the eighth" (p. 234). Put the cart before the horse in this manner, and there is no difficulty in proving Abraham or Adam a monotheist. "Our most instructive historical document for the entire prophetic movement is the pericope of Elijah" (p. 234). On the same page we are informed that the "ecstatic tradition was too strong to be broken" and that the "rhapsodic prophets"—Amos, Hosea, Isaiah (p. 239)—simply carried on the religious movement inaugurated by their forerunners, Elijah

and Elisha (p. 234). Why not accept the testimony of Amos (Amos 7:14), and listen to Hosea's denunciation of the results of the Elijah movement (Hosea 1:4, 5) and his insistence on a new concept of Yahweh (Hosea 2:10)? And in order to establish the unity in prophecy and the peculiar validity of the ecstatic, we are told that Jeremiah, Hosea, Isaiah, and Ezekiel, the true prophets, each experienced "a true conversion, as in the typical case of Saul (I Sam. 10:9)" (p. 233). One wonders! To prepare the way for this, in the second chapter we were told that "perfect integration of a personality leads to stagnation of that personality," while "all geniuses have been very poorly integrated" (p. 68). Does the exception prove the rule? Tradition, we are told, is almost certainly correct; so "pious fraud" "is contrary to Oriental practice" (p. 244; cf. pp. 44f). Has Albright forgotten pseudepigraphy, or the Song of Hannah, or the Blessing of Moses, or those of Jacob and Joseph, or the Psalms of David in the Masoretic text and in the Septuagint?

Altogether too many of the defenses that have been set up and the pleas that have been put forth for the trustworthiness of tradition are far from convincing. But in quite another direction the book imposes on its readers, especially the laymen, to which group most of us belong. Technical words seem to have no modesty in the vocabulary of the author. Naturally, in a treatise such as this many jawbreakers, as *palæolithic, Neanderthal, Cro-Magnon, Halafian, Natufian, Capsian,* and the like, cannot be avoided. But mere technical jargon and exotic words should be subjected to a lengthy probation before admittance into good writing. But here some have made the headlines: *præparatio, organismic, charisma, catharsis;* and legion marches after them: *demography, heuristic, taxonomic, pejorative, nomistic, mimesis, proxenetism, entelechy, encratic, apodictic, autoptic, mnemotechnic.* Of course, these are used accurately, and all have been manufactured by specialists; but in most writers such would be but a display of vanity, and in none do they prove scholarship.

Two quite different reactions have resulted from reading this volume. One is admiration. Albright, as a research scholar in archæology, prehistory, and history, is the despair and the inspiration of all students. The number of fields he controls, the accumulation of details, his tenacious and ready memory amaze all. His ability to interpret and his readiness to hold most of his conclusions lightly and to reinterpret have set an example to all who would learn.

But the other reaction is hesitation, if not disappointment. Alas, the well-ordered and insistent interpretation falls short of proof. To the fine expression of the essentials in religious life—suffering and sacrifice as basic to progress and vitality (pp. 255-310)—we respond with the deepest reverence. But to the apologist for Mosaic monotheism, for the fundamental similarity of the eighth century prophets with the ecstatics, for a philosophy that insists that Christian theology is sacrosanct, understood only by the initiated, and beyond the criticism of the historian (pp. 67, 300, 307-309)—to such an apologist we reply that a tradition or a doctrine that is worthy needs no special pleading, and that truth which is not convincing to the reverent mind of man the world over cannot stand in the judgment.

I. G. MATTHEWS

Christianity: An Inquiry into Its Nature and Truth, by Harris Franklin Rall, New York, Scribner, 1940, pp. xvi, 363, $2.50.

This volume, chosen as the winner of the $15,000 fiftieth anniversary Bross award, was written by Dr. Rall with three groups in mind: the religious leader, both minister and layman; the college student who wishes to study religion as offering a philosophy of life; and the general reader in the Christian church who wants to be intelligent in a day of changes which affect religion. In addition to his desire to reach these three classes of people, the author hopes his book will serve as "an introduction to theology for those who conceive that discipline as rooting, indeed, in the past, but as oriented to the problems and needs of the present" (p. x).

This hope of the author is not likely to be realized. Instead of being regarded as "an introduction to theology" the volume is more likely to be evaluated as a rather mature discussion of the philosophy of the Christian religion. Before one can have any adequate comprehension of Christian theology, one must first be introduced to the pivotal concepts upon which Christian thought has turned. Whether one accepts the church's interpretation of the phases of the Christian faith indicated by these concepts is, of course, another question. Yet to make a beginning in Christian comprehension, these historic terms must be analyzed. Confucius long since, in stating the conditions for good government, said there must be "a rectification of names" or "a correction of terms." Men must know what their concepts mean. So is it if we would make an effective beginning in Christian theology. The beginner must know the great terms of theological faith whether or not he accepts the church's interpretation. Otherwise, we are well on the road to breeding another generation of theological illiterates. Yet this volume, which is intended to introduce one to theology, nowhere attempts to give any systematic statement of such elemental Christian concepts as incarnation, atonement, reconciliation, Trinity, original sin, inspiration, and such like. To be sure, the substance of some of these concepts is presented without using the theological term, but one looks in vain in the subject index of the book for information concerning such concepts as we have mentioned. In a word, this book is not for the beginner in theology, but for one who is able to find his way around in the forest of theological thought. Instead of being a book suited for the novice in theology, it is rather one for those interested in the philosophy of the Christian religion, which, I take it, is generally considered to be an advanced study.

All of this is not to deny that the volume has considerable value. Divided into four parts, it endeavors through these to state 1. the nature of religion and the Christian religion, 2. the present-day setting of religion as this is determined by the new world of science and the social forces of industrialism, capitalism, nationalism, communism, and democracy, 3. the bases for our knowledge of God, and 4. some problems of faith as determined by ethics, psychology, science, history, and the fact of evil. Such is the field of the book, revealing the breadth of its interest and its primary endeavor to interpret the Christian faith in the light of modern knowledge, social organization, and the age-old problems of the race.

Conceiving "religion" as "man's life . . . . conceived and lived in relation to a world of a higher order, upon which he feels himself dependent, to which he knows himself under obligation, and in relation with which he finds life's meaning and seeks its completion" (p. 15), Dr. Rall finds the function of religion to be "nothing less than to secure for man the highest and fullest life" (p. 16). Religion

leads man to an integrated personality through establishing right relations with God and man. Thus it brings unity into life.

The principle of polarity in religion is presented as religion's capacity to maintain in tension the opposites in religious experience, through which tension action and progress are produced. "The tension of polarity is like the spring of the bow for the flight of the arrow" (p. 26). So religion maintains the tension between fact and value, goodness and power, obedience and freedom, the individual and the social, activity and rest, religion and ethics, permanence and change, the awe, reverence, and fear of God on the one hand and on the other hand "the deep conviction that he who is holy and other is also akin to us" (p. 40). This tension or polarity which religion maintains is productive of an inexhaustible fruitfulness.

When our author considers the nature of the Christian religion, he finds not Jesus, but the Christian God to be the basic reality. Speaking of the religion of the first disciples, he stresses that it consisted not of the church and its sacraments, nor of a set of inspired writings, nor of a system of doctrine, but of "the conviction that in Christ the living God had spoken to them and brought the way of life" (pp. 58f.). Affirming further that Christianity is in truth a religion of the spirit, he goes on to say that "this religion of the spirit . . . . believes that in the spirit of Jesus man knows the heart of the Eternal. The center of Christianity is not the Church, nor Jesus of Nazareth; it is the living God who has come to men in Christ" (p. 60). It seems to the reviewer that the recovery of this point of view is exceedingly necessary if we are to unsnarl the tangled skein of Christian thinking today.

One of the important contentions of Dr. Rall is stated in connection with his treatment of revelation and experience. Setting aside the often held view that revelation is superimposed by God through his direct action, he argues on the basis of Old Testament concepts of revelation that 1. "there is no separation of natural and supernatural," 2. "there is no mutual exclusion of human and divine," and 3. "the realm of the ethical, particularly as seen in historical events, is the special field of divine revelation and human discovery" (p. 155). It is an error, accordingly, to set the natural over against the supernatural.

When he comes to treat of God, Dr. Rall reaches the oft-stated conclusion that our evidences, arguments, and deductions do not "prove" God. However, this does not mean that faith in God is unreasonable. There are a number of facts which are best interpreted by means of the hypothesis that "an ultimate Power, unitary, intelligent, purposive, good" must undergird the universe. Among these facts otherwise unsatisfactorily explained are the unitary and universal order of the world, the double order of the world as one that is and is also becoming, the recognized levels of being and the achievement of values, a certain purposiveness in the universe, the intelligibility of our world, and the fitness of the environment.

The most important of the latter chapters is the final one dealing with "Faith and the Fact of Evil." The ultimate problem here is not that evil exists, but whether or not power and goodness are one. "That is what faith in God means: the power that is back of all things is good; goodness has ultimate power" (p. 313). The historic answers to the problem of evil are the dualistic, the legalistic, that of absolute idealism, that of religious absolutism, and the disciplinary view. Moving from the twin positions that the goodness of God does not exclude his sternness and that the good of man is not in material plenty but in the opportunity for creative achievement, Dr. Rall reaches the conclusion that in a good world there must be freedom, toil, struggle, resistance, order, social relations, social

solidarity, suffering, and pain. It is in this complex of realities that we must find our way through the problem of evil. "The highest reach of Christianity in relation to this problem is seen in its symbol of the cross, the revelation of what sin is and of what the cost of life and good is to God and man" (p. 344).

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Prophets and Their Times, by J. M. P. Smith, second edition revised by William A. Irwin, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1941, pp. xv, 342, $2.50.

Sixteen years ago, J. M. P. Smith published the first edition of this work. It was a sane, solid piece of craftsmanship. In the meantime, however, biblical studies have undergone rapid changes. The activities of archæology have illuminated many dark corners and have outmoded not a few of the certainties of earlier scholarship. Criticism has been liberated from old fears, and values take precedence to tradition, while the historian is rapidly adopting the phraseology of the street in preference to that of the cloister.

The major part of the first edition still remains intact, but there are noteworthy additions, due largely, if not entirely, to the growing knowledge in the areas of Old Testament scholarship during the intervening years. Occasionally we find a change of phrase for clarity or emphasis, and the old dates are sometimes revised. Additions, expressing the convictions of recent scholars, confirming or rejecting earlier conclusions, are very frequently found in the form of footnotes. Thus contributions germane to the immediate problem are brought up to date. Frequently there is an enlargement of the old statement indicating a change of outlook. On the whole the revision is less theological and more psychological than the earlier. An illustration which shows this trend is noted in the first vision of Jeremiah. Irwin gives a graphic picture of the emotional turmoil of the human spirit, the mental struggle, and the personal decision of the prophet which, by the chance sight of a budding almond tree was crystallized into "the voice of God" (p. 137). In the earlier edition this sight "was an assurance to the prophet that he might safely trust Yahweh" (p. 111).

Significant changes are found in the interpretation of the prophets Hosea and Ezekiel. Hosea's marriage is now read in the light of the well-known practices of the prevalent fertility cult of the day. Gomer, the wife in chapter 1, is taken to be a woman belonging to the temple guild, in those days an honored profession. Hence there should be no stigma attached either to the woman or to the marriage, viewed from the standards of that day (2nd ed., pp. 71-80). This removes the chief difficulties so often felt in the first edition (pp. 57, 58), and fits into the popular religious conviction of eighth century Palestinian life. Irwin is also inclined to follow recent writers who assume that the woman in the third chapter is not Gomer.

Fertility worship is believed to have influenced not only the book of Hosea, but to form at least a background for Malachi 2:10-16 (cf. pp. 75, 268). Consideration is also given to the part this cult may have played in the Servant Songs of Deutero-Isaiah. The author is well aware that fertility worship was so popular and its influence so pervasive that even the most ethical and the most profoundly spiritual thinkers in Israel could not altogether escape the effects of its primary concepts. Yet, he is most strenuous in his assertion that the Servant Songs, especially that of Isaiah 52:12—53:12 "is not a Babylonian cult song of the death of Tammuz, nor is it based on one" (p. 234). The discussion is excellent (pp. 231-240).

Of no less importance is the interpretation of Ezekiel (pp. 196-216). The old complacency as to the unity of Ezekiel is gone. In this Irwin is in agreement with most of the recent studies on Ezekiel. Yet it is recognized that we are at the beginning of such studies, not at the end; and the net result will be the enrichment, not the impoverishment of Ezekiel.

On the whole we have here a vital and understandable presentation of the prophets. There is a clear-cut distinction between the early "seers"—primitive or ecstatic prophets—and the "canonical prophets," which is necessary, though rarely ever made. With it goes the corollary which Irwin accepts when he says, "I have set myself against the prevailing view that the prophets were ecstatics" (p. x). This is a worthy successor of its predecessor.

I. G. MATTHEWS

The Problem of Religious Knowledge, by Douglas Clyde Macintosh, New York, Harper, 1940, pp. xvi, 390, $3.50.

This certainly is not a volume for the tyro in philosophy or theology. Highly complicated in terminology, and frequently characterized by long, involved sentences, it demands the strictest attention and concentration to plumb its thought. Yet, with all that, for the serious student of theology, it is likely to be a "must" book in the years to come. Its knowledge of the theological scene is encyclopædic in scope, revealing an amazing acquaintance with the pivotal thinkers in theology both past and present. Not the least of the difficulties of the book for the beginner lies just at this point of the numerous theologians whose views are discussed. Unless one already has a general acquaintance with theological positions and thinkers, one is apt to be lost in the swamp of intellectualism.

Dr. Macintosh investigates the four basic epistemological positions as these relate to the knowledge of God. He considers this quest important because "in the last analysis, the value of religious epistemology is the value of religion itself" (p. 3). That is to say, for a religious approach to have ultimate validity, it must lead to knowledge.

The first of these epistemological approaches in religion—extreme monistic realism—represents the pathway of the mystics. They affirm that in immediate religious experience they are granted dependable knowledge of an independently existing divine reality. At the same time, they declare any other source of knowledge of God to be inadequate or even erroneous. While Dr. Macintosh finally decides that this is a far too uncritical approach to the problem of religious knowledge, he does find a good essence in mysticism, which lies in the mystic's "unwavering subjective certitude to the reality, accessibility, and sufficiency of God" (p. 37). He therefore feels it would be a mistake to disparage all mysticism, since there is far more danger of our losing the good in mysticism than of being injured through carrying it to extremes. While finding value in good mysticism, our author is unwilling to conclude that even it is "an empirical demonstration of the *exclusive* reality of God" (p. 44).

The second general type of epistemology, which has its counterpart in the philosophy of religion, is monistic idealism or idealistic monism. This stands at the opposite extreme from mysticism's extreme monistic realism. It affirms that there is no religious object existing beyond the content of religious experience or idea. The mind holds the only phase of divine reality which may be described as real. In all views tainted by such religious psychologism and psychological idealism, the objective reality of the divine object is either denied, doubted, or

knowledge of it is affirmed to be impossible. Some of the followers of Kant, the psychiatric school generally, the humanists, the logical idealists, and the logical-psychological idealists are classified here. In connection with humanism, which in its religious phase claims that we can have "religion without God," Dr. Macintosh waxes prophetic, surmising that the final end of a humanism which has cut itself away from God will be such dark despair concerning even man as that which characterizes the thought of George Jean Nathan (p. 146).

Part III of the book is by far the most important, since it contains the constructive thinking of the author, presenting the case for critical monistic realism in religion. In this division, which includes chapters XI, XII, XX, and XXI, the author champions an empirical theology rooted in experiential certitude of God, a normative theology in which Christ is the norm for the life of religion, and a metaphysical theology which will provide some defensible world view. The most important of these, for the argument of the book, is the first, and to this we confine our remarks.

The thesis which the exponents of an empirical theology defend is that some verifiable knowledge of an independently existing Divine Reality is experienced in genuine religious experience. Unlike the mystics, the critical monistic realist is unwilling to assert that the Divine Reality is exactly as experienced by us, since, he believes, it is possible for the experiencing subject to add to what is experienced some qualities which are of an exclusively subjective nature. On the other hand, he is not willing to admit with the mystics, that *all* the Divine Reality is known in the experiences of genuine religion. Hence his view is critical both in reference to the religious object and to the content of the experient's experience.

None the less, the critical monist is one with the mystic in declaring that God is known in religious experience. There is a dependable, objective, and divine Factor which gives himself to all men on condition of the right religious adjustment. This statement represents the heart of Dr. Macintosh's personal experience of religion and hence of his philosophy of religion. Proceeding from this awareness, he proceeds to formulate for us certain highly important laws of empirical theology, from which, if we conform to them, there will come to us an immediate experience of the independently real religious Object.

Through adjustment to this Divinely Functioning Reality, "we know something of what the Divine Being is from what the Divinely Functioning Reality does" (p. 209). As we fulfill the laws of empirical theology, it is given to us to know that there is such "a Divine Reality," that this Reality "answers true prayer," "regenerates the human spirit," "maintains the regenerate life," "promotes the health of the spiritual life," "develops essentially Christian ethico-religious character," "convicts of sin, gives peace and joy, 'sheds abroad the love of God' in human hearts," and gives "religious assurance and moral guidance" (p. 209). Hereby the certitude of faith is established and preserved. Man knows God and what God will do for and through him provided the correct religious adjustment is effected and maintained. Here our feet are on the solid rock. Religion ceases to be guesswork. It becomes deep and abiding conviction growing out of experienced fact.

The fourth general type of epistemology, with a counterpart in religion, is described as dualistic realism in religion. Expressions of religion which employ this epistemology declare that God is independently real, but go on to affirm that there is a mutually exclusive duality of existence between the object experienced in religion and the independent reality in which the religious man tends to believe.

The result is a very grave doubt as to whether any real knowledge of the Divine Reality can be gained by man on the basis of his religious experience. In this classification, Dr. Macintosh places the argumentative theists from Thomas Aquinas on, the religious agnostics, the Ritschlians, the critical rationalists, the religious pragmatists, and the members of the present-day crisis theology. He speaks of the latter group as exponents of "reactionary irrationalism," who move away from all faith in the knowledge of God through reason or the scientific method to declare that God is ultimately hidden from man. We can depend upon no rational approach to God; God must come to man and then in such a way that what he is is finally unknown to man. He is the Wholly Other. This is essentially a reaction against the effectiveness of the human reason in religion.

Having finished his long and important trek through the wilderness of theological and epistemological thought, Dr. Macintosh expresses his belief that "in the main the problems of theology, empirical, normative, and metaphysical, will not in the end prove too difficult for the honest and painstaking religious mind; that while there may be much that will pass temporarily out of certitude into tentativeness, there will be no need to despair of the possibility of further progress from such temporary tentativeness into a reasonable and more objective reassurance" (p. 381). We can have religious knowledge. Faith is, therefore, not rooted in mere wishful thinking, but in fact. So "we have the moral right to believe as we must, if we are to live as we ought" (p. 382).

This book cannot be too highly praised and recommended. Scholarly, it is yet profoundly and significantly religious, reaching into the centre of religious reality to show modern men the way to personal certitude in the religious life. He who would know the truth about religion cannot afford to neglect this epochal volume.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Religion and the Modern World (Papers read at the University of Pennsylvania Bicentennial Conference), by Maritain, Hromádka, McGarry, Ryan, Tillich, Calhoun, Gilkey, Niehbuhr, Jones, Strider, Mackay, Tucker, Lazaron, MacCracken, and Shuster, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941, pp. 192, $2.00.

Like all other symposia of its kind this series of papers presented at the Bicentennial Conference of the University of Pennsylvania is very uneven. The chief dividing line comes not from the fact that some writers are Protestant and others Roman Catholic or Jewish, nor from the philosophical and historical orientation of some and the practical and immediate interests of others. The real difference is that one group, including both Catholic and Protestant, is authoritarian in the sense that its members are content to repeat ancient truths and well-worn formulas in the hope that they will have some magic power for the gigantic tasks that are ahead, while the members of another group are liberal in their originality and imaginativeness and their willingness to subject familiar truth to new and critical examination.

In the second group a number of notable essays are to be found. Rufus Jones with his own distinctive charm reviews the rise of the social gospel and professes faith in its future. On the basis of forty years of experience with thoughtful youth Charles W. Gilkey describes the serious and searching attitude of the present college generation and contrasts it favorably with its predecessors. Robert L. Calhoun offers a brilliant analysis of the role of religion in higher education, showing why religion and the educational enterprise belong together. The intellectual life,

he argues, should provide both discipline and freedom. Religion should bring a dynamic unity more inclusive even than that of metaphysics and vigorous enough to withstand the disrupting forces of anger and fear.

Morris S. Lazaron, the one Jewish writer in the volume, contributes an appeal for belief in a personal God which is notable for its sincerity and eloquence. The same element of personal conviction animates the remarks of the Protestant Henry N. MacCracken on the subject of religion's contribution to our national polity and those of the Catholic George N. Shuster on the need for an aggressive Christianity. Jacques Maritain cites the rise of the neo-Thomistic movement as evidence that the intellectual demands of religion are at last receiving their due share of attention.

As might have been expected, the most arresting contribution comes from the pen of Reinhold Niebuhr. Niebuhr would not like to be called a liberal, yet his paper belongs with those of the liberal group because its appeal for a return to biblical religion is so striking in its unconventionality. The most important impression it leaves is that of the need for liberal methods even when the subject is an attack on liberalism. Niebuhr argues for ideas which are as old as Paul and Augustine; yet he does it as a modern philosophical student of history and contemporary society. The result is that he is unable to separate himself entirely from the position he repudiates. He inveighs against the sin of pride which attaches itself to all attempts through reason to win transcendence over nature; yet he appears to feel that no pride is involved in the belief that one can overcome nature by sharing the mind and ideas of God. And he is at some pains to explain why the acceptance of God's truth is a reasonable act for human beings. Yet while his argument falters, no one can deny the suggestiveness with which it is put. Perhaps this is what Niebuhr intended since an argument which convinced by its own cogency would lead to a secular and not a religious conclusion.

Taken as a whole, the fifteen essays which make up this book offer a vivid picture of the contemporary religious scene with its unities and its dilemmas alike. The authors are agreed on certain basic truths and are one in their faith that they can be put to work to save a world even so far gone as our own. Their disagreements are what one would expect in a field where sectarian lines count for so much as they do in religion. Yet controversial issues are here treated in so irenic a spirit that one closes the book with hope for the future unity of religion rather than despair over its present divisions.

J. S. BIXLER

An Enlightened Conscience, by Irl Goldwin Whitchurch, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. xx, 283, $2.50.

This is a thoughtful treatment of ethics from a liberal Protestant standpoint, addressed primarily to ministers and theological students. Such readers no doubt will find the book interesting and valuable. Beginning on the negative side, Professor Whitchurch shows that it is impossible to base ethics upon the authority of the church, or upon the unsupported intuitions of the consciences of individuals, or upon deductions from systems of theology. While Jesus is the central figure of specifically Christian moral enlightenment, it must not be overlooked that there is considerable uncertainty which of his reported sayings are authentic, and how those accepted as such should be interpreted. Some types of moral theory Christianity definitely rejects: *e. g.,* naturalism, ethical relativism, and every sociological

theory that regards rational judgments of right and wrong as nothing more than products of customs and cultures.

On the constructive side, Professor Whitchurch recognizes the importance of the Bible, but he warns us that all its parts are not of equal validity; the Bible is "a source book on a developing moral experience," beginning with the very primitive moral outlook of the Judges, and progressively advancing with the law, the priests, and the prophets of the Old Testament, while in the New Testament higher levels are reached in the general epistles, the Pauline epistles, and the gospels, with the culmination in the Sermon on the Mount. Much attention should be given to the organic unity of motives and intentions, character and the general welfare, freedom and responsibility, purity and goodness of heart. It is most important to promote a better social order, free from present injustices. Although no final list of Christian virtues can be given, five "cardinal virtues" are proposed: sincerity, moral discernment, humility, sympathy, and courage. (One wonders whether sympathy connotes all that is meant by Christian love or charity, and why justice and temperance are not mentioned.)

This volume is probably an unusually broad-minded and well-balanced interpretation of what is known in Protestant denominational circles as "Christian ethics." Even so, to a layman who has for many years been teaching ethics to college undergraduates, a book like this furnishes a startling contrast to his own treatment of ethics. In the ordinary college class, in which some students are Catholics, others Jews, and a considerable number indifferent to religion of any type, it would simply be impossible to approach ethics from religious assumptions of any kind. Outside of ecclesiastical gatherings, the moral side of public questions is seldom discussed primarily from religious considerations. To what extent should ministers and theological students approach moral problems with different presuppositions from their fellow citizens? Moreover, if ministers are honest with themselves, will they not have to admit that their own ultimate test of moral validity is that of reason and experience? By what other criteria can they decide how much moral validity to attach to the dicta of the church, to the different parts of the Bible, or even to the reported teachings of Jesus himself? Ethics, like mathematics and physics, is an independent discipline, not subordinate to any form of religious belief.

WILLIAM KELLEY WRIGHT

Just Among Friends, by William Wistar Comfort, New York, Macmillan, 1941, pp. xiv, 210, $2.00.

The Quakers have never been strong numerically at any time since George Fox founded the Society of Friends in England nearly three hundred years ago. The total membership of that group is now less than 150,000 in all countries, 110,000 of whom reside in America. Yet the Society of Friends has exerted an influence and furnished pioneers in various fields altogether out of proportion to its numerical strength.

Soon after the conclusion of the first World War it was said that the Quakers had done far more than any of the much larger religious groups to create in distressed Europe a new respect for Christianity. And certainly in recent years the influence of the Quakers has been increasing steadily, despite their small numbers. How can this be accounted for in an age when numbers, power-politics, and material wealth are so largely considered the marks of greatness? If one would

have an answer to that question let him read the latest volume by Dr. William Wistar Comfort, president *emeritus* of Haverford College, *Just Among Friends.*

Dr. Comfort's book is in itself such a condensation of the history, principles, practices, and notable achievements of a comparatively small body of people that it defies review within the limits of a few paragraphs. It might well be called a Quaker encyclopedia, beginning with the origin of the Friends in England nearly three hundred years ago, who, for the first fifty years of their history, "were a zealous, crusading and proselyting body of Christians," attacking formalism and insincerity in religion and pleading for a simplicity and sufficiency in the individual heart. Perhaps their cardinal doctrine may be stated as "personal responsibility to the Inner Light, the Witness in the individual heart." "The Holy Spirit may speak to any man." "All men are on equal footing before God." "All ecclesiastical distinctions are of man's device."

The volume relates some of the persecutions inflicted on the Quakers by formalists in religion. It tells of the place of the local Meeting which is the only external mentor or adviser recognized by them. It tells also of the services of worship without any fixed form. Much is made of the fruits of silence, meditation, and moderation of speech. There is a frank, but modest, statement of the Quaker's place in the largest spheres of life, and, properly, a similar declaration of their humanitarian activities and influence in international affairs. Principles underlying Quaker education, which resulted in the establishment of some of the best schools in England and America, are stated. Among such schools is Haverford College, from whose presidency Dr. Comfort recently retired.

Of course, there is a chapter on race relations, with special emphasis on the Quaker attitude toward the enslavement of the Negroes, and the efforts for their uplift in the years that have followed their emancipation. And everyone should know the real reasons why Quakers are opposed to all forms of armed conflict, and the basis of their peace testimony. They are not merely pacifists or conscientious objectors. They believe in sacrificial service to the utmost on behalf of *all* people as a reconciling and peacemaking force. And have they not been peacemakers as truly as any group among us?

Small numerically? Yes. But a long time ago we were told by the Master that "narrow is the gate, and straitened the way, that leadeth into life, and few are they that find it." Dr. Comfort, almost thou persuadest one to be strictly honest in his better moments and to say, "I, too, wish I might be worthy to be called a Quaker."

JAMES H. FRANKLIN

Honest Religion, by John Oman, New York, Macmillan, 1941, pp. xl, 198, $2.25.

Honesty is a virtue claimed by the adherents of almost all faiths, although many sectarians question the truth of the claim when made by those who do not agree with them. This volume challenges religionists generally to compare their convictions with the conclusions of one whose theology, it has been well said, is one of "reverence, freedom, and sincerity." In his preface the author explains that "the title *Honest Religion* sets forth an aspiration after what has no limit or finality, of which the essence is humility toward God and charity toward man, an ideal for all but not an attainment by any."

In this fine spirit the writer faces such serious issues as the cause of the war, the weakness of the church, and why God suffers evil. He warns against the practice of making slogans of half truths, and denies the validity of the claim for "an

infallible Church or an infallible Bible, or both." Seeking finalities such as fixed organizations, ideals, and theologies he declares to be "the supreme error of religion." It must not be supposed that either science or philosophy can fulfil the function of religion, for, he urges, "In religion we must be as bold, as free, as honest, as prepared to face all realities as in science or philosophy. Slavery to tradition, fear of inquiry, submission to institutions are not religion but the want of it, not faith, but unbelief."

Dr. Oman applies these principles in his discussion of various aspects of theology. He finds "the Virgin Birth is plainly not an article of a standing or a falling faith." The idea of total depravity he regards as "exaggerated and unreal," and the notion that guilt may be transferred to the innocent he considers too "unreal and perverted" to satisfy God, and too dishonest for unquestioned acceptance by man.

This should not give the impression that the author does not provide substantial grounds for vital Christianity. What he says concerning the many phases of religious doctrine and life centres in Christ as the revelation of the Father. Honesty inspires the book, freedom pervades it, and faith crowns it. Read it and join the ranks of the many who bless the day in which they discovered this work of John Oman!

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER

The Man Christ Jesus, by John Knox, Chicago, Willett, Clark, 1941, pp. 100, $1.00.

A generation ago the question that was to the fore was "Did Jesus *live?*" Today the question is still being raised but with a noticeable change in emphasis: "Did *Jesus* live?" Of what value is a definite affirmation of the first, if our "yes" is qualified with the caution "but we know nothing about him"? Dr. Knox labors under no delusions. None knows better than he, for he is a competent scholar, the superlative difficulties in the way of an attempt to write a life of Jesus. Frankly he admits this, and disavows the purpose. For such a task we have no sources. Yet despite this lack he feels we can learn a great deal about the kind of man he was. He sees depicted in the pages of the gospels a powerful and radiant figure whose genuine and unique humanity the gospels are utterly unable to conceal, who reached out and laid hold of those about him, and who enthralled the later Paul. Without attempting to describe Jesus, he seeks to point to him.

He was a man of superlative warmth, abandon, even of extravagance and exaggeration. Thus, while every so-called teaching may be paralleled in earlier and contemporary writings, this by no means affects his originality. It was his ability so to condense and concentrate ethical teachings and insights that all else seemed excluded that distinguished him, and made him original. In words of warning against anxiety and covetousness there is little distinctive; but the bold and daring way they stand spoken in the gospel seems to Knox a proof of their genuineness: "There is an extravagance about such statements of which the wise men, just because they were wise men, were quite incapable."

There is an attractiveness about this sort of treatment which is very appealing —I had almost said seductive. I so completely agree that it is to what for want of better name we must be content to call the "personality" of Jesus that we must look if we would seek an answer to the world's greatest enigma—the Easter morning—that I hesitate to raise any questions which might seem to disparage an admirable little book. Yet after all, the query that Knox raises after one parable and another of which he heartily approves, *viz.,* "Who but Jesus

could tell a story just like that?" is perilously close to special pleading. It may be true that Jesus was a man of surpassing charm and winsomeness, was loved by man, showed a warm sense of being a man, of belonging to men, and watched with interest the whole of life and human activity; yet in the list of parables (p. 57) from which he deduces these qualities and this interest I find several of which I am most dubious—the Ten Virgins, the Laborers in the Vineyard. These are but samples of the superlatively difficult task which Knox has set for himself. He has done his task well. So long as he restricts himself to general statements he is convincing. But when he attempts—even by indirection—to pick out specific incidents, difficulties arise.

In a real sense it is a dated book. It could scarcely have been written fifteen years ago; I doubt if even Knox himself would be able to write the same volume were he to attempt it, say in 1955. Nevertheless, while it has a distinct purpose, and that to warn against a loose and to his mind unjustified overskepticism, it is so totally different from many such volumes which have been merrily tumbling off the printing presses in these recent days that it can be confidently recommended for thoughtful reading and reflection.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Biography of the Gods, by A. Eustace Haydon, New York, Macmillan, 1941, pp. xii, 352, $2.50.

The purpose of this volume, as stated in the preface, is to make "a serious attempt to sketch the personal histories of the few, great living gods, with a backward glance at some, once great, who were left behind in the march to the modern world. It is devoted only to the gods and is not intended to tell the story of religions." Employing the historical method of research in the fulfillment of this purpose, the author, after he has informed us how the gods are born, how they change, and who among them died, proceeds to the not unfamiliar story of the origins, careers, and present health of Ahura Mazda, the gods of India, the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, the gods of China, Amaterasu-Omikami of the Shinto faith, Yahweh, the Christian God, and Allah.

Written against a background of religious humanism, which, of course, is the attempt to have religion without God, the book portrays man's long quest for the divine. This is interpreted purely as his attempt to give a "sure cosmic support" to the values which he deems essential to his peace and joy. Because of his imperative needs, we are told that man created not only gods, but also devils, in order that he might explain and justify his emotional response to nature. As a result of this theory, it is affirmed that "the gods could live on and grow continuously, because, as beloved friends, they were fed by man's desires" (p. 12). This early motivation for the creation of the first gods furnished the pattern for the emergence of all later deities. These, also, are simply "more detailed recognition by men of dynamic natural and social forces valuable as aids in winning the goods of life" (p. 15). So throughout man's long history, the gods have no reality in themselves, but are simply mirrors of the needs of man. Hence the author cites with apparent approval these lines from Don Marquis' *Dreams and Dust*:

> As the forehead of Man grows broader, so do his creeds;
> And his gods they are shaped in his image, and mirror his needs;
> And he clothes them with thunders and beauty, he clothes them with music and fire;
> Seeing not, as he bows by their altars, that he worships his own desire.

The truth for Dr. Haydon seems to be, accordingly, that there are no gods and no God. All that is possible is the biography of beings who never had any actual existence and who are, consequently, no readings of ultimate reality. Man has, apparently, in his many gropings after the divine, never encountered any divine reality. He has simply projected the upward yearnings of his heart against the cosmic picture-screen, there to see nothing but the unfulfilled longings of his heart. Here, it seems to the reviewer, we have the basic weakness of the book. It discloses the essential lack of sympathy of the author to the whole human quest after God. He makes no sympathetic or appreciative attempt to appraise whether man, in his many attempts to discover Divine Reality, has, in fact, struck at least some of that Reality through his strivings. The whole, colossal effort of religious men to know God is written off as so much futile, passionate endeavor to find what just isn't there. Typical of this oft-expressed conviction is a sentence on p. 164: "As symbols of ideal values and as aids to daily living, they [the gods of Buddhism] serve, as all gods do, for those who still need them." And again: "They [the gods] are not visible and tangible. What reality they have in their varied personal characters was given to them through the centuries by the clamoring desires of men" (p. 319).

Since the gods have no reality, as man's faith in them wanes, they will disappear to be supplanted by the human ideals, of which they have never been any more than a symbol. Hence the title of the last chapter, "The Twilight of the Gods," which concludes on this wise, revealing the pessimism toward the divine to which humanism always finally comes:

> More needful than faith in God is faith that man can give love, justice, peace and all his beloved moral values embodiment in human relations. Denial of this faith is the only real atheism. Without it, belief in all the galaxies of gods is mere futility. With it, and the practice that flows from it, man need not mourn the passing of the gods.

As an expression of an empirically rooted faith in the reality of the Divine Object, the reader of this review may well consider the presentation of Dr. Macintosh in his *The Problem of Religious Knowledge,* reviewed elsewhere in this issue of the QUARTERLY. There he will find a statement of what one will discover concerning the Divine Object when one makes the correct religious adjustment to the dependable Divine Reality in the universe. Man does strike something in any genuine quest after the divine. The future belongs, I believe, to some realistic appreciation of Divine Reality such as we find in Dr. Macintosh's thought, rather than to the pessimism concerning God which characterizes contemporary humanism.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Nature and Destiny of Man, by Reinhold Niebuhr, New York, Macmillan, 1941, pp. xii, 306, $2.75.

In this, the first of two volumes dealing with the Christian view of man, we have the first ten of Dr. Niebuhr's twenty lectures delivered at Edinburgh on the Gifford foundation. The endeavor is made in these first lectures to examine man as a problem to himself, to discover the source of his vitality and form, to affirm his individuality and his easy conscience, and also to present an apology for the relevance of the Christian view of man, rooting as it does in man, who is at once a creature-being and one made in the image of God, in whose life sin is inevitable, but who, despite this inevitability, is yet responsible before God for the evil of his life. Such is the range of the book.

Dr. Niebuhr contends that the distinctive Christian view of man, as opposed to the purely scientific, "allows an appreciation of the unity of body and soul in human personality which idealists and naturalists have sought in vain" (p. 12). Moreover, the Christian view always contends that man must be understood primarily from God's point of view, rather than from the mere uniqueness of his rational faculties. This means that he is made in the "image of God." Hence man is never fully free, but is always subjected to the will of God. Only as he is obedient to that will does he come into right relation to God and to the whole world order as God rules it. Some dimension of the divine is therefore in man's personality. He is not mere body; he is soul as well.

Dr. Niebuhr strikes hard against all modern theories which tend to dissever the plight of modern man from man himself. The Marxian is criticized because he finds the disease of modern man in the class organization of society rather than in our human passions and desires. All educators and social idealists, such as John Dewey, who have faith that the social tangle can be straightened out through education alone, are taken soundly to task. This optimism concerning human capacity is regarded as a too easy solution of the human predicament.

So the essential validity of the Christian view of man is reaffirmed. Here man is measured in terms of a divine dimension by which he must be measured if he is to be understood. We cannot otherwise know what man is nor explain his capacity for both good and evil. Conscience, accordingly, means God confronting man. In conscience, man feels himself commanded by God. He knows that the Divine Being places demands and judgments upon him. Until this experience comes no man knows himself.

One of the most fascinating, although disturbing, conceptions presented is that man is guilty of sin which he must inevitably commit. This inevitability grows out of the fact that man as spirit transcends not only the temporal and natural process in which he is involved, but also himself. Here is his freedom, which is at once the basis of his creativity and his temptation. Knowing this transcendence, he grows anxious, thereby seeking to transmute his finiteness into infinity; and therein lies the inevitability of the sin for which he alone is responsible. From all of this follows the rather amazing statement, that "the ultimate proof of the freedom of the human spirit is its own recognition that its will is not free to choose between good and evil" (p. 258). This means that, although man sins inevitably, he is none the less responsible. "Man is most free in the discovery that he is not free" (p. 260). Consequently, we have the tragic plight of man, which shouts to the world of his need of redemption.

It seems to the reviewer that Dr. Niebuhr has done that which he criticizes in the rationalists of the last few centuries; namely, unduly intellectualized the plight of man in seeking to explain it. Yet, despite this deficiency, all readers will be grateful for this provocative, first volume, and will await, with anticipation, the conclusion of the matter in the second volume which is promised before the end of the year.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Meaning of Revelation, by H. Richard Niebuhr, New York, Macmillan, 1941, pp. x, 196, $2.00.

In view of the resurgence of interest in revelation due to the centricity awarded that concept by the crisis theologians, this is indeed a timely volume. Some reject the theory of revelation as superstition, while others, accepting it blindly

and uncritically, fasten superstition upon the minds of the faithful. The endeavor of this brief volume is to avoid the shallowness of the former view and the unreasonableness of the latter, finding at once that revelation is the centre of the Christian faith and that man cannot be truly rational apart from his acceptance of it.

Beginning with the problem of the relativity of our human knowledge, the author asks whether or not it is possible, from the limited point of view of historic Christian faith, to find a reality "which invites all the trust and devotion of finite, temporal man." This is the basic problem. In a world of relativity we must not retreat into a dogmatic revelationism, but must "deal faithfully with the problem set for Christians in our time by the knowledge of our historical relativity" (p. 22). This implies the recognition that our Christian view of God springs out of historic situations and that we cleave to the Christian faith in God because we have been surrounded by a believing community. With this relativity clearly in mind the endeavor is made to determine what revelation means for Christians, not what it should mean for all men.

Strenuous objection is raised against the identification of revelation with anything which the church can possess, such as a book, a creed, or a set of doctrines. To identify revelation with such possession is to render it "a static thing . . . . under the human control of the Christian community." The Reformers knew that the Scriptures as a written record of laws, events, legends, and precepts were no more than a cultural record. The books, they knew, do not become revelation until one reads their pages with the prophets' mind, the eyes of Jesus, or the spirit of Paul. Only then will they reveal God to us. Until one gets on the inside of the history which they record, seeing the movement of events through the eyes of prophet, seer, and seeker, rather than as a mere onlooker centuries after the event, one will never verify their visions and truth, seeing what they saw, and apprehending what they apprehended. "The history of the inner life can only be confessed by selves who speak of what happened to them in the community of other selves" (p. 73). The tragedy of orthodox revelationism is that it identifies revelation with the Scriptures as such rather than with the movement of life and aspiration which they record. The Scriptures, rather than being revelation themselves, are but the embodiment of that revelation which makes them Scriptures.

The special, historic occasion of Christian revelation is Jesus Christ, in whom we find God's righteousness, wisdom, and power. This is revelation because this event of Jesus Christ makes all other events—both those before his life and those yet to come within his experience—intelligible to the Christian. Here the heart reasons, since, as Pascal pointed out, "it is the heart and not the head which finds its reason in revelation" (p. 94). Through this experience of the reasoning heart, events are illuminated and we are enabled to understand them. So revelation acts in such a way as to give rationality and wholeness to our personal experience.

Dr. Niebuhr finds three functions fulfilled by this revelatory moment which gives us a pattern by which to comprehend life. 1. It makes our past intelligible. We understand what we remember. 2. It enables the heart, yea drives it, to remember what it had forgotten. We see the good of our neighbors and of our world instead of our selfish interest. 3. It makes us appropriate as our own past much that formerly seemed alien to us. We see the relation, for instance, of the varied branches of the Christian movement to our own life. This is essential, since "without the integration of the personal and social past there can be no present integrity of the self nor anything like human brotherhood" (p. 117).

Since revelation is not static or closed, it must be regarded as progressive, receiving validation in the ongoing movement of life and history. As prophets long ago saw God acting in and through the deeds of the nations of their day, and thereby received proof of revelation, so must it be also in our time. In this way the same Lord who acted in ancient days acts in our day as well. History based on revelation thus becomes "a history of revelation."

In his final chapter, "The Deity of God," Dr. Niebuhr comes to his most specific statements concerning revelation. "When we say revelation, we point to something in the historical event more fundamental and more certain than Jesus or than self. Revelation means God, God who discloses himself to us through our history as our knower, our author, our judge, and our only savior" (pp. 151f.). In that moment a new faith becomes ours, a new standard which we feel bound to follow, and a living God who is known to us "as the contemporary God, revealing himself in every event." God is now in the centre of our life story. We have found one who is worthy of "all the trust and devotion of finite, temporal man."

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Philosophy of Schleiermacher, by Richard B. Brandt, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. 350, $3.00.

Without an understanding of Schleiermacher it is impossible thoroughly to grasp the making of modern theology and the philosophy of religion. Few thinkers in these fields have been so creative and stimulating as he. Brandt's book helps to fasten interest on certain aspects of Schleiermacher's thought. Particularly well done is the background of Schleiermacher's philosophy. Because of Brandt's primary interest in intuition too much space, perhaps, is devoted to Schleiermacher's theory of feeling. Brandt also analyzes it mostly in the light of modern philosophical and psychological theories rather than first of all against the Kantian categorical approach. Schleiermacher's theory of feeling, however, must be seen not a little against the background of the whole new outlook on knowledge by those who felt that general metaphysics had been completely abolished by Kant. That Brandt works with an unfortunate dichotomy between feeling and idea is, therefore, of less importance than that he fails to make central Schleiermacher's basic intention. Religion to Schleiermacher was deepest down in his thinking a necessary form of experience, a pure category which becomes concretely and socially filled only by positive religions. These are more or less adequate as they approach the perfection of God's redemptive revelation in Christ. This categorical approach basically conditions Schleiermacher's meaning of feeling. Without a firm grasp of this foundational motif Brandt naturally fails to see why "feeling" is necessarily noetic. Schleiermacher, furthermore, was no neo-Kantian subjectivist. Individuals must have a living, personal faith, but within historic doctrines. He insisted that religious experience was normal and necessary, not merely in the romantic or mystical way, but in the categorical way where faith has its own inner unity and ideological normativeness—and, if adequate, *a counterpart in cosmic reality.* Brandt strains to show that Schleiermacher most deeply believed in identity philosophy, and that he thought of theology merely as a practical tool of the church. This idea is all too common, but Schleiermacher was supremely interested in a method for theology that would be independent of science, philosophy, scholasticism, and dead orthodoxy. The categorical approach has seldom been vitally understood in the Anglo-American empirical tradition. Schleiermacher has been more misinterpreted than most

thinkers because he was a most inconsistent pioneer and deviated continually from his deepest insight in the direction of psychological and rational speculation. Too much is also generally made of his early works, and these are mistakenly used as keys to his later; and the history of religious thought since his time greatly conditions most treatments of his thought.

Apart from this rather usual lack of perspective, Brandt's work is thorough, significant, and stimulating. He has also put his finger on Schleiermacher's weakest point, the total withdrawing of Christian faith from metaphysical validation, the very thing which Schleiermacher meant to be the strength of his categorical approach fortressed by Kant's "Copernican revolution." The Anglo-American empirical tradition needs to counterbalance its interpretation of Schleiermacher by German-Scandinavian Kantianism.

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

The Great Century: A.D. 1800–A.D. 1914, Europe and the United States, by Kenneth Scott Latourette, New York, Harper, pp. ix, 516, $3.50.

This fourth volume of Professor Latourette's six-volume work is a history of the expansion of Christianity in Europe and the United States between 1789 (or 1815) and 1914. The Christianity that spread during this century was "overwhelmingly Roman Catholicism and [Anglo-Saxon (p. 89)] Protestantism" (p. 43); so most space is given to their organization and methods, with, however, proportional treatment of the Russian Orthodox Church. The missionary work of these three groups among the Jews, pagans, and Moslems of Europe is dealt with in chapter five. The succeeding chapters are devoted to the United States. In them is told the story of the work of "the older American stock" churches on the frontier, the sprouting of indigenous religious groups, the efforts of all the churches to win the immigrants and to "overcome and transmute the materialistic, economic motive which had brought the majority to the New World" (p. 298), the endeavors to extend the Christian influence among the imported pagan Negroes and the native pagan Indians, and to meet at the same time the challenge of shifting populations, social changes, and far-away pagan lands. On these many fronts the Christianity of the century thrust itself out with an innate vigor that is implied in the fact that the financial support for this amazing "spiritual imperialism" came largely from the United States itself.

Because the motif is "expansion," extended accounts of the "attempts to win adherents from one form of Christianity to another," which make up so much of traditional Church history, are eliminated as "only on the periphery of the major theme of our story" (p. 282). This gives to the work, in spite of its great and sometimes confusing detail and its plethora of footnotes, a surprising amount of movement. One is reminded of the moving pictures of the opening of a flower, wherein the almost explosive nature of the process is emphasized by showing without interruption and in a few minutes disconnected pictures that were taken at relatively long intervals. Here is presented a series of brief pictures of events and men which total up to one great picture of a moving, expanding Christianity. The reader may be lost in the labyrinth of minutiæ, and may consider the author's generalizations unconvincing and needlessly extended (notably chapter ii), but he can hardly fail to be convinced that Christianity was strikingly successful in meeting the peculiar problems of the era. It is a picture rightly entitled *The Great Century*—an encouraging picture for the "tired" Christians of the present day.

In this, as in the other volumes, the author in many places is breaking new

ground in a way that makes his hope that the data he has gathered will be "of use for purposes of reference to both amateurs and specialists" seem likely to be fulfilled. The encyclopedic detail, the nearly 2,400 footnote citations, the extensive bibliography, and the index of twenty pages make the work an open pathway to all the chief secondary materials and also to some of the sources. It is invaluable to anyone interested in nineteenth century Christianity.

SIDNEY E. MEAD
WILLIAM W. SWEET

An Introduction to Philo Judæus, by Erwin R. Goodenough, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1940, pp. xii, 223, $2.75.

Philo of Alexandria remains one of the great enigmas of history. To most moderns he is but a name, although they glibly talk of his doctrine of the *Logos,* and of its influence upon Christian thinking, usually without the faintest notion of what this view actually was. He left behind him a voluminous mass of writings, from which—although much has long since disappeared—he can be known as we know few figures from antiquity. What his actual influence was is still hotly debated. Probably he exerted little or no influence on the pagan world—at least there is no evidence that any pagan author ever read him; to what extent he was representative of hellenistic Judaism is also a moot point among experts. That early Christianity was deeply influenced through the Christian Platonists of Alexandria—Pantænus, Clement, and Origen—is almost certain.

Professor Goodenough has performed a very useful service in writing this introduction to a singularly baffling figure. Few scholars are more competent in this field than is he. His earlier volumes, *By Light, Light* and *The Politics of Philo Judæus,* reveal him as an expert who can walk in this thicket as one who needs no guide. The present volume is intended as an introduction for the general reader and beginner in Philonic studies; it will probably also serve as a "guide for the (more advanced) perplexed."

To know Philo is to read him—to read all of his extant writings—but Goodenough rightly feels that the way this is done is all important. To start with such treatises as the *Allegory* is to end in shipwreck, for the modern reader must read literally hundreds of pages of the Alexandrian Jew before he is ready for that esoteric fare. An admirable start may be made with the two treatises in which the Jews in Alexandria are ably defended against Roman persecution—*Against Flaccus* and *The Embassy to Gaius.* Then follow such writings as *On the Contemplative Life, On the Life of Moses,* and *The Exposition of the Law.* At this point the student has made the acquaintance of Philo and is ready for his deeper thought as found in the twenty-one books of the *Allegory,* intended for readers whom he calls "initiates." The modern reader, too, will deserve that title, for, as Goodenough properly says, "the beginner will be such no longer." Then may follow the *Questions and Answers* and a few individual treatises, such as *On the Indestructibility of the World* and *On the Virtuous Being also Free.*

Not only does Goodenough outline the order but he gives an admirably compact description of the several writings as a sort of *vade mecum.* Then follow chapters revealing Philo in his several phases: political thinker, maddeningly loyal Jew, philosopher, and mystic.

Nor should the general reader who never intends to grapple with Philo in this forthright way turn from this review with the feeling: "This is distinctly not the book for me." He will find a deal that will interest him. He will probably think

twice before continuing to talk glibly about the "Word," for he will realize that of the many shades of meaning of *Logos* "word" is not one. He will also feel a bit self-conscious in parroting the ancient nonsense that Philo's *Logos* is really the prophetic Jewish *Memra* wearing a Greek *himation,* for he will realize that it is to Hellenism, not Judaism, that one must look for an understanding of *Logos.* He will also tend to be a bit more cautious when it comes to statements about monotheism and the attitude of the Jew to other gods. He may well be intrigued about the possibility of a real Jewish *Mystery,* whether distinctive rites were in operation or not. He will probably also be intrigued by the fact that unwittingly Philo provided an easy transition to Christianity, although that worthy—always a Jew despite his Greek ideology!—would have scorned the new religion. He may be pained by evidences of a distinct lack of ethical idealism, may even be amused at Philo's essential acceptance of the *lex talionis;* he may well decide that however much some Jews *may* have wished for proselytes, here was one Jew who had no desire for the *gēr* whom he knew best—the Egyptian—as a convert.

In fact, the general reader who is really interested in the world of thought at the time of the advent of Jesus—and who is ready to think as he reads—will find the volume of intense interest. He will probably not lose any of his ardor if told that Professor Goodenough has frankly introduced Philo as he sees him, and that other interpreters—especially some from the synagogue—are not always in the most perfect agreement. If he actually buckles down to the task outlined by Goodenough, he may be confident that he will learn a lot, perhaps enough to venture an occasional dissent from his Virgil.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

A Philosophy of the Christian Revelation, by Edwin Lewis, New York, Harper, 1940, pp. xii, 356, $3.00.

It is the persuasion of the author that "Christianity stands or falls by the reality of its claim to be Revelation" (p. x). By revelation he means that Christianity brings "to men a truth about themselves, and the whole order of things in which they are involved, which they could not otherwise know" (p. x). Proceeding from these convictions as to the necessity and nature of revelation, Dr. Lewis endeavors to defend the Christian revelation by attacking the problem on three fronts. The first front is concerned with the record of the revelation as found in the Bible and the church, the second with the exposition and protection of the revelation, and the third with its persistence and renewal. We consider these in turn.

The first problem is that of the possibility of revelation. We live in a world wherein the commerce of one mind cannot be carried on without the assumption that the things around us are meaningful. Two men of different languages who do not understand each other's speech must find certain objects which have a common meaning for them if they are to discover a path to each other's mind. All of which is to say that men generally, and even the most sophisticated at times, will be found to say that *"this* means *that"* (p. 7). Men, in other words, attribute meanings to things after they experience them through responding to them. But to say *"this* means *that"* is to talk of meanings, of symbols and signs, and this is to encounter revelation, which means the conveyance of truth. "Whether the truth shall actually be conveyed depends upon what is done by the mind which confronts the conveyance. There can be revelation only as there is response" (p. 8). If there is response, however, revelation is possible. If there is response to the historic events centring in the life and death of Jesus, Christian revelation then takes

place. *"This* means *that"* to the Christian. The more-than-human enters the sphere of human life to illuminate, redeem, and sanctify it. God, through Jesus Christ, gives a knowledge of himself, his activities, and his purposes to man in a special way. The theme of the Bible is thus fulfilled, which is, "God and his purpose with men."

Like the Barthians, Dr. Lewis draws the distinction between the words of the Bible and the Word of God. The latter is expressed through the former, but is not to be identified with them. This means that the words of the authors of the Bible were their own words, but that God used them to express his Word. In the Bible, accordingly, both the word of man and the Word of God is to be found. Not until Jesus is this Divine Word lifted out of its association with the imperfections of men. In him the Word is given in a life of such quality that we discover "the perfect equation of the Word."

At this point we are warned against a mistake which is frequently fatal; namely, making the linguistic study of the New Testament an end in itself. This is as evil an error as a crude fundamentalism. To make this mistake is to miss the living Word which comes to men to redeem them.

In dealing with the problem of the exposition and defense of the Christian revelation, Dr. Lewis makes his point of departure the faith aspect of Christianity. He is persuaded that before all else Christianity is a faith. It is not something conjured up by man, but a divine gift from above to impart to men the peace of God. The rational powers cannot prove or disprove that such is the case. Faith, none the less, affirms that it is so.

The full exposition of the Christian revelation comes, of course, in Jesus whom our author regards as eternally identified with God. He has been from the foundation of the world for the express purpose of being the one in whom our human meaning should find fulfillment. "He is therefore at once cosmic root, cosmic nexus, and cosmic crown, 'the Alpha and the Omega,' as much the Finisher as the Author, 'of whom and through whom and for whom are all things'" (p. 85). All of which is to say that Christ, creation, and redemption are inseparables. To prove this is, of course, again impossible for the mind. Here we are in the area of a "faith-judgment." But such judgment, it is held, is absolutely indispensable if we are to place ourselves "within the circle of Christian truth and experience."

In defense of the Christian revelation, our author launches his shafts against the contemporary naturalistic theisms which find God only in the natural processes of the universe. He contends that such views are far removed from anything Christianity has considered God to be. If Christianity succumbs to these forms of naturalism, it will soon disappear, since its distinctive view of God will be gone and without this it cannot long continue. Henry Nelson Wieman is repeatedly scourged as the leader of these naturalistic theists. In opposition to him and his followers, the *must be* of the supernatural is affirmed. "The supernatural is that form of existence which in nowise whatever could cease to be or could be other than it is. *This is God"* (p. 167). Jesus, as divine revelation, partakes of the supernatural within the framework of the natural. So it turns out that Christianity is a faith in the supernatural as it expresses itself in the natural.

In the final part of the book it is given us to know why the Christian revelation will persist and how it will be renewed. The permanence of the revelation is rooted in the unchangeability of man. Though the universe and outer circum-

stances may change, "man, the fundamental man, [remains] the same yesterday, to-day, and forever." He will always be religious and hence he will always need revelation. The renewal of revelation in this and succeeding generations will be affected by the Holy Spirit active in human lives. As the men who formed the New Testament were taught by the Spirit of God, so is the truth of the New Testament revealed to us by the same agency. In this way revelation is constantly renewed and validated.

Such is the substance of this long volume. Cast in the framework of traditional revelationism, it accepts as necessary for Christian faith many of the metaphysical and controversial phases of Christian thought. Among these would be listed the identification of Christ with creation, the virgin birth, original sin, and the descent of Christ into Hades. While these are not accepted entirely uncritically, the tendency is to take refuge in obscurantism when logic is not available or cogent. For instance, it is contended that Jesus was God in the flesh, but that he did not know it. "If he had known himself to be what later the Church declared he was, then he could not have been that! The very condition of the Incarnation was in the subjection of the Incarnate One to the law of the human—which precluded that he should have known all that he was making possible" (p. 200). Such evasion of a baffling theological problem convinces no one but the unintelligent. The greatest weakness of the books lies in such unconvincing positions plus such general, unsupported declarations as that the belief in the virgin birth "is necessary to the completion of Christianity" (p. 188). In all such cases, where it is not possible to establish truth, Dr. Lewis takes refuge in the half-truth that "Christian truth is not truth of reason but truth of faith" (p. 290). Is it not time that we who are to love God with "all our minds" cease taking refuge behind such a position, rather affirming that Christianity is reasonable and that when the temporal experiences of truth do not at least point in a certain faith-direction, we shall not allow *that* to have a place in faith? To do so would, I believe, prevent the surrender of faith for credulity which, I fear, is what Dr. Lewis does time and time again. He keeps entirely too many barnacles clinging to the ship of Christian faith.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Jesus Christ the Same, by James Moffatt, New York and Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1940, pp. 223, $2.00.

The 1940 Shaffer Lectures of the Yale Divinity School were delivered by Dr. James Moffatt. These are now published under the above title, which gives some indication of the thesis which Dr. Moffatt defends and which he asserts in the following words:

> The attempt is to indicate afresh, in the light of our newer knowledge, how nothing is more probable than that he who lived on earth for a few years was the same Christ whom his followers worshipped as Lord, that no new Jesus was created by any syncretistic movement in the first Christian century, that there is a unity in the unsolved mystery of his person which is not only real but the real cause underlying the various interpretations of his life and work. . . . . In other words, by criticizing criticism as well as tradition, we are on the way to a definite, constructive conviction that in a deep sense Jesus Christ is the same for us as he has ever been for our predecessors, little as we may be able to use some of their precise language about him, and also that there is no other Jesus visible or possible on the horizon of a faith which can be seriously called Christian.

Opinions will differ as to how far Dr. Moffatt succeeds or fails in his attempt to establish this thesis, but few will deny that he is cognizant of all the relevant

questions or that he writes with fullest scholarly competence in this field. He follows along the line of the central convictions which the church has held concerning Jesus and holds a high view of his person. This reviewer finds little with which to disagree and a very great deal to commend in this book. Particularly pertinent is Dr. Moffatt's insistence upon the necessity of perspective in our study of the gospels if we are to avoid the extremes to which some scholars go. Perspective he defines as "the power of seeing things in their relations and due proportions."

There is a tendency among some critics to attribute far greater weight in the production of the gospels to the so-called "creative experiences" of the late first century followers of Jesus as they met problems in contemporary life, than to memories of eyewitnesses handed down in tradition. Dr. Moffatt criticizes this tendency strongly, specifically as it appears in Loisy and Guignebert.

> Common to both types of this guesswork is a belittling of Jesus, and also a cleavage between later views about Jesus and any eyewitnesses. . . . . Naturally eyewitnesses are ruled out. They are as obnoxious to such theorists as to the left wing of form criticism. The inquirer is informed that there was next to nothing memorable in the Galilean's career; his immediate adherents played no great role in the growth of a religion with which neither he nor they had any direct personal connection. . . . . The Syrian stars looked down, as they still look down, on the grave of an obscure fanatic, whose fame was shaped and whose name was floated into the world by some sudden swirl in a first-century concourse of 'isms and 'ologies, stirring in Palestine or Syria or Asia Minor; but anything known of him at this birth of his religion was second-hand and limited. Belief in an historical miracle like this forms the creed of Loisy and Guignebert.

Dr. Moffatt refuses to believe in such a miracle. One is reminded of Forsyth's remark about "the credulity of the critics."

Some will suggest that moral and spiritual considerations are to be avoided if an unbiased historical view of Jesus is to be achieved. Dr. Moffatt is of those who believe that Jesus cannot really be discerned even from the historical point of view by those who refuse to accept his moral challenge. "Some contemporaries of Jesus heard him, and were deaf or indifferent. Some saw him, and saw nothing in him. Age after age, within as well as outside the Church, some hear his Word and do not understand it, because they do not care to understand it."

GORDON POTEAT

The Sermon on the Mount, by Martin Dibelius, New York, Scribner, 1940, pp.vii, 148, $1.50.

It is probably no overstatement that the Sermon on the Mount has exerted more influence on a greater number of people than anything else ever written. For countless Christians it has become a sort of *confessio fidei,* a gospel within the gospel, a statement or summary of the essence of Christianity. I would yet venture the statement—if theological students are any criterion—that not one-tenth of one percent of those who would blandly reply that they are among those "countless Christians" actually know what is in this document they so profess to revere. Numberless sermons have been preached upon it; there is a general notion that its application to life today would probably be a very good thing; but what it actually contains, what its nature is, and what are the difficulties (if not the real perils) of its hasty application to the problems of modern life—about these questions a thick fog rests.

In 1937, during a visit to the United States, Professor Dibelius of the University of Heidelberg delivered a series of lectures at Yale on this enigmatic section of the gospel. When later in the year he returned to Germany, he revised his manuscript for

publication. A friend and former student, Professor Kraeling of Yale, has seen the volume through the press. It is a definite contribution to historical and theological scholarship, but written so clearly and simply that the layman will find few obstacles in his path.

Dibelius frankly recognizes—not only as a form critic, but as a serious student of the New Testament, he could scarcely do otherwise—that the Sermon on the Mount is in no sense a real discourse of Jesus, delivered at one time to a definite audience, but is rather a mosaic of individual sayings brought together to form separate groups: beatitudes, new commandments, parables, and the like. As he pertinently remarks, a sermon composed of such a mass of single sentences without a common theme as Matt. 7 contains is quite unthinkable. It is quite clear that Jesus did not speak in that way, but that he spoke those various words at a variety of occasions. On the other hand, although some sections (*e. g.,* Matt. 5:17-20) are scarcely to be seen as coming from Jesus, the impression is given that a large part of this material is to be seen as coming from Jesus, although at more or less of a remove.

As a good form critic should, Dibelius strives to show the way the tradition was passed on before it reached the gospel stage, and that, while a degree of caution was shown in the matter of modifying actual words, there was a distinct readiness to adapt them to the growing needs of life. His analysis and discussion of the Lord's Prayer are able, and his suggestion is distinctly of importance that underlying the present sevenfold petition prayer of Matthew may be seen the three basic petitions which a disciple of Jesus should bring before God's throne: for the coming of the kingdom, for the needs of earthly existence, and for the forgiveness of past and future sins.

The most notable achievement of the volume is the careful and constant insistence that the *whole* message of Jesus is to be seen against an eschatological background; that his purpose was to prepare men for the coming kingdom. This, he is careful to insist, does not mean that Jesus was proclaiming an interim ethic but the absolute and timeless will of God, valid for all eternity. Those modern interpreters who vehemently deny the eschatological basis of Jesus' preaching and who harp upon Schweitzer's unfortunate term *interimethik,* would do well to ponder this volume, if only for its wholesome emphasis upon this basic point. Thus he can say, and rightly, that the new element in Jesus' words is not to be sought for in novel utterances but in a new urgency in connection with the coming kingdom.

The final chapter, "The Sermon on the Mount and the World of Today," will repay careful thought. It was penned four years ago; perhaps he would wish today to alter some few phrases. The basic emphasis, however, is unaffected by temporary vagaries. His warning may be pondered: "Every Christian reader who sees in the Sermon on the Mount more than an interesting document runs a risk of misunderstanding in the overhasty application of its rules to the problems of daily life." The reason for this needed but neglected caution is crystal-clear. The preacher on the Mount does not claim either to give a law or to construct a system of ethics. The world of God, not the condition of life on this earth, either in his time or ours, is before his eyes. If we could once get this into our heads, we might cease trying to find there ready-made decisions for our problems, but might rather look for a standard which we can find there: a determination to solve the problems of daily life "as men who are responsible to God alone, and who know the pure will of God from the Gospel."

MORTON S. ENSLIN

BOOK NOTICES

Form and Freedom in Worship, by Clarence Seidenspinner, Chicago, Willett, Clark, 1941, pp. xi, 186, $2.00.

The author is a Methodist parish minister; his excellent book grows out of his own practical experience. He asserts that he has written a manual on public worship; it is, however, more than that, for he also stresses history and theory in the field of Christian worship.

While admitting that the state of worship in our churches is vastly improved over what it was twenty-five years ago, he yet thinks that we manifest a medley of forms, not unlike the quilt to which every woman in the society has made her own, personal contribution. He thinks the old forms, beautiful and stately though they were and are, will not suffice. In their day they were both indigenous and contemporary. These are the characteristics which our times demand: new, fresh, vital forms by and through which the free spirit may find worship experience.

Particularly interesting is our author's treatment of what is commonly called the "worship pattern": adoration of God, communion with God, and the dedication. In other words, all his orders of service are built to sustain these three movements of the worshiping soul. The sermon falls within the second, and the offering is central in the third.

Part III of the volume deals with Christian worship for the new day, and will be found the most interesting portion for the average minister. Five chapters therein are: "Liturgical Form," "Liturgical Materials," "The Sermon," "The Liturgical Year," and "The Building." It is a good piece of work, and the reviewer takes pleasure to commend it to the reader.

W. R. MCNUTT

Manifest Victory, by J. R. Moseley, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. xv, 238. $1.50.

The writer of this book has been called a modern St. Francis, and with good reason. With simplicity, frankness, and fearlessness, he tells the story of his quest for "union with and likeness to" Jesus. He writes with readiness and charm, but ascribes whatever facility he has with the pen to "a higher wisdom and volition" than his own. His great mission he believes to be "to minister to those at the bottom of human need and . . . . to witness to those at the top of human privilege."

Throughout the volume the highly emotional nature of the author is evident. This has fostered in him a form of mysticism, the illusions and vagaries of which are surprising. To him celibacy seems a higher state than marriage. Beatific visions are not unusual. He speaks with tongues, discerns spirits, performs miracles, and receives revelations. Such mooted questions as the virgin birth and the validity of the theory of evolution are settled by the simple but doubtful device of having a vision of Jesus and getting the correct answers from him.

Along with such experiences, which in the case of many are accompanied by a narrow and critical spirit, Mr. Moseley exhibits a remarkable breadth of view. He insists that "the promise is not to the orthodox, but to those who hunger and thirst, and ask." He has kind words for Christian Science, the Oxford Movement, and Father Divine, and declares that he "will not be a party to . . . . making a division

among the children of God anywhere." Next to the writers of the Bible, his favorite author seems to be Emerson, whom he quotes frequently with evident approval.

The book centres attention upon the things which the author feels are necessary for abundant life and manifest victory. So earnestly and ably does he emphasize these things that the reader cannot escape being impressed by their significance. Anyone who is wise and fair enough not to confuse wheat with chaff will find in these pages inspiration for more triumphant living.

RITTENHOUSE NEISSER

Science, Philosophy, and Religion: A Symposium, published by the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, New York, 1941, pp. viii, 443, $1.50.

This volume contains the papers presented at the above named conference, held in the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, New York City, on September 9, 10, and 11, 1940. The aim of the Conference was to bring together representatives of various disciplines so that they might meet on a common ground and obtain a first-hand knowledge of one another's ideas regarding the totality of human experience (p. 2). It was sponsored by some three score "founding members," all responsible leaders, representing the social and natural sciences, the various schools of philosophy, and groups interested in religion and education.

Each paper represented the individual writer himself, who presented his views without let or hindrance. The clarity of each speaker was such that there was no difficulty in understanding the most divergent points of view. Discussion added to the evidence that the methods and the conclusions of different scholars were as widely separated as is the day from night. Yet all were intelligent, and all were kindly. But, on the whole, the scientist is likely to remain a scientist, and to refuse to build an edifice on what he cannot see or hear or feel or understand. In his ardor he may even neglect elements of value and of feeling. Not a few would even subscribe to the statement, "In their struggle for the ethical good, teachers of religion must have the stature to give up the doctrine of a personal God" (p. 213).

And the philosopher, at least in some cases, is equally insistent. He continues to dwell in his mediæval tower, repeating his ancient slogans, and claiming that he has "a type of knowledge which absolutely transcends the empirical knowledge characteristic of the science of phenomena" (p. 172). The scientist calls, "Come and see, and then believe"; while the philosopher answers, "Believe, and then see and know." So far much seems to be a deadlock.

However, there were values in the conference. The associations and the frank interchange of views will have mellowing and perhaps restraining effects. But also there were *rapprochements.* A scientist could heartily endorse the conclusions of an outstanding religious leader, whose words in part were; "I believe that it is of utmost importance that science and religion should learn to live together not in mere tolerance, but in active co-operation, ... that men may be able to meet the requirements and enjoy the fruits of democratic faith" (p. 276). And a theologian, steeped in Thomist theology, could conclude, "As far as I can see, the reality for which we are looking is man himself, his intellect, and the right of that intellect to act as an intellect in the presence of reality" (p. 368).

The book is a serious contribution to present day problems. Rarely is there cynicism or showmanship. The logic is always closely integrated, and when

presuppositions are granted the conclusions are usually assured. But therein lies the essential problem.

I. G. MATTHEWS

The Origins of the Bible, by Theodore Gerald Soares, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. xi, 277, $2.50.

The above theme is treated with sufficient detail to present, in general, a clear understanding of how the Bible came to be, while its ample glimpses into the development of Hebrew and early Christian thought make it worthwhile to the religious reader. Written in non-technical language, it is easy reading, not infrequently fascinating in its human interest.

The only new feature, and that introduced for the sake of vividness, is of questionable value. Instead of the well-known symbols of Old Testament criticism, J. E. D. P. R., we are introduced to Interpreter (J), Narrator (E), Orator (D), Theologian (I and II Kings), Censor (Judges 2:6—16:13), Compiler (R), etc. In spite of the author's assertion (p. x), these are no more real personalities, nor are they more vivid than were J. E. D. and P. That one man wrote the story of Abraham, another that of Jacob, another the history of Joshua, and another that of Samson (p. 25), was surely less likely to produce a literary masterpiece, than oral transmission by many generations of storytellers. Presentation in this form may have been helpful in a popular presentation to the usual congregation, but to those who are not satisfied with generalities it would seem to be futile camouflage.

Unfortunately, in so good a book, inaccuracies are not absent. How could nomads in the fifteenth century B.C. be found "in the great desert *west* of the land we now call Palestine" (p. 3)? No reading of paragraph three on page 149 can give any meaning other than that the apocalypses in Isaiah 24-27, and in Joel were written a generation later than 165 B.C. Yet this can scarcely have been the intent of the author. Sometimes, as in the date of Joshua, Dr. Soares is fully aware of the latest contributions of scholarship (p. 7). But too often, as the date of Isaiah 9:5 (p. 45), the interpretation of Ezekiel (p. 47), the relation of the Servant Songs to Deutero-Isaiah (pp. 48, 92), the importance of the return of the exiles in 537 B.C. (p. 93), the book betrays no evidence of the direction of scholarship during the last forty years. The volume is excellent notwithstanding the flies in the ointment.

I. G. MATTHEWS

Benedictine Monasticism, by Sister M. Alfred Schroll, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. 217, $2.75.

The Rule of St. Benedict was formulated in the first half of the sixth century. Two and a half centuries later Paul Warnefried, generally known as Paul the Deacon, wrote his commentary on the Rule, in which he gave a detailed exposition of the then current practices of the order. During the first half of the ninth century Hildemar dictated to his pupils the commentary of Paul with his own interpretations. The author of this volume, by making a critical study of these two commentaries, has presented us with an excellent picture of the aims, ideals, and spirit of monasticism during these three centuries, as seen in the cultural levels of the different periods.

Naturally much attention is given to the daily routine of monastic life: The relation of the monks to each other in the household and to the outside world; their disciplines and duties, food, clothing, manual labor, reading, prayers, and liturgy.

Changes in practice over these three centuries are recognized. While the rule was definite, often to the most petty detail, on the whole it was wise, and the abbot always had some leeway in his decisions. But with changing times the interpretation of the Rule must change. To illustrate, the Rule prescribed that all guests should be received as Christ. But with the passing of time the guests, both lay and cleric, became too numerous for accommodation. So practice guided by necessity decided that all who knocked at the door should be blessed, but only those who were poor should be fed and sheltered. The theologian was then left with the problem of interpreting the letter of the Rule in conformity with the changing practice (pp. 147-8).

While obedience, chastity, and poverty were always landmarks in monasticism, the essential aim from the beginning was the more intensive service to God. The cenobitic life, as the highest life, was for the advance of spiritual perfection (p. 190).

The well-ordered day of the monk, its division between manual labor, scholarly pursuits, and religious devotions, sets an example before all who would be worthy servants of the Master. The book is well written, is amply documented, and the well-balanced conclusions seem supported by ample evidence.

I. G. MATTHEWS

You Can Be Happily Married, by Gilbert Appelhof, Jr., New York, Macmillan, 1941, pp. ix, 215, $2.00.

Our author, the rector of St. John's Episcopal Church, Alma, Mich., has given us an excellent manual for life's most important career, namely, marriage and the creation of the Christian home. It is hopeful, indeed, that the reading public is ceasing to be so squeamish about discussing the more intimate and personal phases of married life, of which fact this volume is witness. It is the sort of book that ought to be in the hands of all young couples contemplating marriage—even better would it be, should classes of young people be organized in our churches to study these pages under competent and consecrated leadership. This sort of education is within the proper domain of our churches, and we should offer the service implied by that fact. Chapter headings are: "Looking Forward to Marriage," "The Engagement Period," "Pre-Wedding Arrangements," "The Marriage Service and After," "Special Helps for Married People," "Marriage, a Growing Experience," and "Some Common Family Problems."

W. R. MCNUTT

Essays on Maimonides: An Octocentennial Volume, edited by Salo Wittmayer Baron, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. 316, $3.75.

In March, 1935, the eight hundredth anniversary of the birth of Moses ben Maimon was celebrated at Columbia University. The same month saw many similar celebrations throughout the world, for few figures have left a more definite and permanent imprint upon Jewish culture than did this medieval philosopher. Nor was his influence limited to Jewry; both the Christian and Moslem worlds felt his impress. The present volume contains not only the addresses delivered at

Columbia but five penetrating and elaborate essays by scholars of world-wide reputation. In addition to a discussion of the famous *Guide for the Perplexed* by Leo Strauss and a comparative study of his treatise on the Resurrection by Joshua Finkel the volume contains a very lengthy and thorough discussion of Maimonides' economic views and an interesting treatment of his medical work—for this Spanish Jew was an outstanding medical scientist: the one by Salo W. Baron of Columbia, the other by Max Meyerhof of Cairo.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

This Is the Victory, by Leslie D. Weatherhead, New York and Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1941, pp. 276, $2.00.

Here is a volume that, to a great extent, was born while much of London trembled with the explosion of bombs, the crash of buildings, and attendant horrors of which the world is all too well aware. The book is frankly an enlargement of sermons preached in the City Temple, now a pile of twisted steel and rubble, and all of them are in harmony with the text that furnishes the title: "This is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith" (I John 5:4).

From the text, which is quoted in almost every chapter, one suspects the deliverance of a pacifist. Not so. In the preface Dr. Weatherhead states his personal attitude with reference to the present international conflict as follows: "War is wrong. No one can identify dropping bombs with the mind and will of Christ. Yet I don't see how we could have avoided this wrong without bringing a still greater wrong to generations ahead."

Nevertheless, the sermons, which constitute a symphony, affirm that the great victory to be desired is not so much a triumph of arms as the cleansing of hearts and minds of all bitterness, malice, and hate, and a consuming desire to have God's will done in "the true welfare of Europe and of the world."

A basic argument in the book is to the effect that we were mistaken in our belief that the world was making progress; that our philosophy of life has collapsed because it was too small—it had left out God. Faith gives the minds of men a place to rest and is essential to real victory in the life of humanity. The reader may imagine at first that the author's overshadowing interest is the possibility of giving comfort to individuals who find their lives blasted by the international conflict and in helping them to a triumph in their own souls especially, regardless of a crashing world. Comfort and strength *are* provided for the individuals who find everything about them in apparent collapse. But Dr. Weatherhead is writing for mankind as a whole and is showing how faith in the highest sense is the path to victory for a defeated humanity—a faith that helps to bring God down into human life. And he pleads for a faith consistent with the best light given to the minds of men from every source, and which must express itself in meeting the most urgent problems now confronting the world.

JAMES H. FRANKLIN

How to Find Health through Prayer, by Glenn Clark, New York, Harper, 1940, pp. 154, $1.50.

Who is a mere reviewer to say, "Surely these things cannot be true"? One may be pardoned, however, for being skeptical. Undeniably there is abundant evidence for the validity of much in the field of the mental hygienist. The author begins with mental hygiene and convinces the reader of the value of "washing

the outer skin," of the internal bath also, of cleansing the blood by exercise, of cleansing the lungs in fresh air, and also cleansing the emotions, the mind, and the soul. So far I follow, and I journey with him when he sets forth the banal influences of hate and fear, even in their causing severe heart palpitations and other disorders; but when he asserts that the "children of parents who hate each other to the extent of wishing each other dead are in danger of bad accidents," I drop out of his procession. And when he talks of goiter and cancer and arthritis as being caused by—not merely aggravated by—mental and emotional states, and cured by prayer which corrects these states, I have deserted him completely. The psychiatrist may well ponder a truth in this overstatement of the case, however, because prayer does have therapeutic value. I suspect that the devout convert to Christian Science could write a more enthusiastic review of this book.

W. R. MCNUTT

The Good Shepherd, by C. F. Andrews, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. xii, 205, $2.00.

This is a book written in the highlights of the devotional mood. These pages are appreciative literature of genuine merit, pages manifestly that come from the heart of a great Christian. Therefore, it is a volume containing bread for the hungry Christian soul, of whom, the reviewer may be pardoned for believing, there is a very great number. To all such let him commend this volume. This book is composed of two parts, namely, "The Personal Preparation" for the Christian ministry, and "The Practical Work" of that high calling.

W. R. MCNUTT

Woman in the Sacred Scriptures of Hinduism, by Mildredth Worth Pinkham, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. xv, 239, $2.75.

In this volume we have presented the history of the status of woman down through the long history of Hinduism. The various strata of India's religious literature are examined to determine in each era how woman was regarded and treated. In all some 14,000 pages of representative passages of the Hindu scriptures are consulted to ascertain the position and treatment of the women within the Hindu community. This long trek takes the reader through the Vedas, the Brāhmaṇas, the Upanishads, the Laws of Manu, the Purāṇas, the Mahābhārata, the Bhagavad Gītā, and the Rāmāyaṇa. The author discovers in many places that the *ṛishis* (sacred poets) wrote harmful words against woman and had a very low estimate of her worth. On the other hand, it is also made clear through wide quotation that there were many others among the *ṛishis* who never intended woman to be the victim of degradation and subjection. Indications of this latter trend are found in the lofty place assigned to the feminine in the Hindu pantheon and also in many areas of actual life within the Hindu community.

The book is valuable chiefly because it gathers together under one cover the many and often diverse views regarding woman in the voluminous literature of Hindu India. Not only is the volume informative to the student of religions, but it should also, if carried into the languages of India, prove an effective force in the emancipation of women from the socially destructive views concerning woman formulated by many of the scholars of the past.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Come, Let Us Worship, by Albert W. Palmer, New York, Macmillan, 1941, pp. xx, 136, $1.50.

Dr. Palmer's *The Art of Conducting Public Worship,* 1939, is a splendid volume; the one before us adds little that is new. One suspects it to be a hastily written piece of work designed to meet a criticism of the earlier volume to the effect that it offered little to the small church. This volume is a small church manual. To such churches it will be very helpful. Chapter IX, "Worship for Youth, a Case Study," written by Mr. Julian J. Keiser, a student in the Chicago Theological Seminary, is excellently done, and has the great value of emerging freshly from actual experience. The book is well-worth owning.

W. R. MCNUTT

BOOKS RECEIVED

No Salvation without Substitution, by J. E. Conant, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1941, pp. 171, $1.00.

Prophetic Patriotism, by Carter Helm Jones, Nashville, Broadman, 1941, pp. 168, $1.00.

"These thirteen sermons were preached more than twenty years ago, but they deal with ageless truth in dateless application." They were stenographically reported and retain their spoken flavor. They are couched in Dr. Jones' well-known florid style and are replete with moving pulpit heart throbs.

The Touch of Life, by Frank S. Hackett, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. viii, 118, $1.25.

A group of chapel talks by the headmaster of the Riverdale (N. Y.) County School. As a father who listened to one of them decided, their simplicity and genuinely "down to earth" quality make them well-worth reading.

A Discipline for Non-Violence, by Richard B. Gregg, Wallingford, Pendle Hill, 1941, pp. 31, $0.10.

A Standard of Living, by Mildred B. Young, Wallingford, Pendle Hill, 1941, pp. 46, $0.15.

Pacifist Living Today and Tomorrow, edited by E. Raymond Wilson, Wallingford, Pendle Hill, 1941, pp. 80, $0.15.

**Current Religious Thought: A Digest,* by Charles S. Macfarland, New York, Revell, 1941, pp. 185, $1.50.

**The World-View of Jesus,* by Elmer W. K. Mould, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. ix, 238, $2.00.

**The Kingdom of God and the American Dream,* by Sherwood Eddy, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. xii, 319, $2.90.

**And Great Shall Be Your Reward: The Origins of the Christian Views of Salvation,* by Paul S. Minear, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941, pp. vii, 74, $1.00.

**The Church of Our Fathers,* by Roland H. Bainton, New York, Scribner, 1941, pp. 248, $2.50.

**Can We Keep the Faith?* by James Bissett Pratt, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941, pp. vi, 218, $2.75.

**Secretly Armed,* by Allan A. Hunter, New York, Harper, 1941, pp. x, 159, $1.50.

**Pastoral Psychology* (rev. ed.), by Karl Ruf Stolz, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1941, pp. 284, $2.50.

**Philosophical Foundations of Faith: A Contribution Toward a Philosophy of Religion,* by Marion John Bradshaw, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. x, 254, $2.50.

**Heresy and Inquisition in Narbonne,* by Richard W. Emery, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. 184, $2.50.

**Christian Attitude Towards the Emperor in the Fourth Century,* by Kenneth M. Setton, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. 239, $2.75.

**Social Welfare in the Catholic Church,* by Marguerite T. Boylan, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. xx, 363, $3.00.

**Man's Vision of God,* by Charles Hartshorne, Chicago, Willett, Clark, 1941, pp. xxi, 360, $3.00.

Do Not Sin Against the Cross, by S. J. Reid, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1941, pp. 150, $1.00.

Fifteen sermons.

**Fifty Fruitful Years: 1891–1941,* by P. E. Burroughs, Nashville, Broadman, 1941, pp. xiv, 333, $1.00.

**Worship,* by J. O. Dobson, New York, Macmillan, 1941, pp. 190, $1.25.

Organizing a Public Welfare Committee in Spring County, edited by Margaret F. Byington, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. x, 82, $0.75.

The New York School of Social Work has prepared this little volume for the purpose of training students in the art of organizing "citizen participation in community affairs."

* To be reviewed.